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Abstract: 
The Arab Gulf Countries and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 
The Linkages and Dynamics 1970-2000 
Jawad M.A. El-Hamad 
This thesis examines the changing linkages and dynamics of the relationship 
between the Arab Gulf countries and the Arab-Israeli cont1ict through the period of 
1970-2000. The Arab Gulf countries' level of involvement in suppmiing the Arabs and 
Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict diminished throughout the period of study. The 
thesis explains this diminishing role by discussing the impact of the developments of 
international struggle for influence in the Gulf as well as the Israeli ambitions and 
relations to the Gulf region, largely expressed through the Israeli relationship with Iran 
under the Shah. The thesis shows that the years 1973, 1979 and 1990 formed important 
turning points for international influence in the region. These turning points influenced 
on the level of the Arab Gulf countries' involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Throughout the seventies, the Arab Gulf countries played an active role m 
supporting the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The clearest expression of this 
support was the implementation of the oil embargo against the West during the October 
1973 War. 
The eighties witnessed the birth of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 
formation of which symbolized the emerging security challenges within the Gulf region. 
These security challenges represented by the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and 
the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan exhausted most of the capabilities 
and efforts of the Arab Gulf countries. Their focus and attention shifted away from the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, in spite of the serious and dramatic developments in that conflict. 
The repercussions of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 resulted in a fUJther 
diminishment of the role of the Arab Gulf countries in backing the Palestinians in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Only after September 2000 and the beginning of the Second 
Palestinian Intifada did the Arab Gulf countries again play a vital role, by means of 
financial, political and media support. 
The thesis explains the linkages between security in the Gulf and the Arab-
Israeli conflict. It examines the hypothesis that a reciprocal relationship explaining the 
level and type of Arab Gulf countries involvement in the Arab-Israeli conf1ict has 
existed throughout the period of the study. 
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Introduction 
The hypothesis of the thesis a11d its importance 
Tllis thesis examines the linkages and dynamics of the relationship between the 
Arab Gulf states and the Arab-Israeli coni1ict. It argues that there is a reciprocal 
relationship, whereby the policies of the Arab Gulf states and the role that they play in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict are themselves shaped in part by the conflict. They are also 
shaped by the security concerns of the Arab Gulf states that arise from international 
competition for influence over the Gulf and the pursuit of Israeli ambitions towards the 
Gulf region. 
This study is the first to deal so directly with the reciprocity between the Arab 
Gulf states and the Arab-Israeli coni1ict, and which focuses so intently on the role that 
Arabian Gulf security plays in determining that reciprocity. 
This thesis adopts the historic survey and descriptive analysis approach. It 
analyzes the nature of the relationsrup between the two arenas by examining both the 
impact of historical developments in each arena and how factors internal to each arena 
impact upon the relationship with the other. Crucially, it takes into account the 
geopolitical position of the Arabian Gulf, examining it in effect as the periphery of the 
Arab- Israeli conflict. 
Period of the Study 
The principal period of study for the thesis will be the three decades from 1970 
to 2000. The beginning of this period coincides with the political independence of most 
of the Arab Gulf countries. The Gulf region was challenged with its own heavy security 
burdens during this period, though the nature of those security challenges changed in 
each decade. A large part of Gulf security concerns are related to the economic potential 
of the region, which is due to their extensive oil resources. The jump in the price of oil 
and its subsequent price collapse also happened during this period. This period also 
witnessed important developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict, both in terms of peace 
and war. The most effective developments regarding the level to which the Arab Gulf 
States worked to retain Arab rights and defend their dignity in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
were also expressed during this period. This period thus witnessed great developments 
as well as great challenges to the Arab Gulf States in the economic, political, and 
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security realms, as well as regarding their interactions with the Arab-Israeli conflict.. 
This is thus a convenient period to study regarding the aims and questions of the 
hypothesis. However, the complexity of the subject means that, at times, the thesis must 
delve further into the past to provide relevant context, and venture beyond 2000 in order 
to illustrate consequences of events. No period of time exists in isolation and so, while 
the main emphasis is on the period 1970-2000, the author has not attempted to extract 
this period from its greater historical context. 
Outline of the Chapters 
Each of the three chapters of the thesis deals with impotiant aspects needed to 
examine the validity of the hypothesis. 
The first chapter discusses the potential importance of the Gulf region, and then 
illustrates the extent to which international competition for influence over the region has 
served to shape its policies. It revealed the goals and policies of the international 
superpowers towards the Gulf in tllis regard. It also illustrated the repercussions that 
such competition has had on the security of the Arab Gulf countries, or at least how they 
have perceived it to have impacted upon them. These perceptions of security interests 
have played a role in shaping Arab Gulf policies towards different challenges including 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The second chapter discusses Israeli ambitions in the region. It explores in detail 
the Israeli efforts to consolidate relations with the Shah of Iran. The chapter 
emphasized the critical role that Israeli ambitions played in affecting the Arab Gulf 
countries' security and how the increase in security concerns in this regard affected their 
role and interaction with the Arab-Israeli conflict. These ambitions represented a 
security threat to the Arab Gulf countries during different stages. The chapter unveils 
the potential reciprocal relations between the Arab-Israeli conflict and security in the 
Gulf through its analysis of Israel's relations with Iran and other Israeli policies towards 
the Gulf region. 
The third and tinal chapter shows how the Arab Gulf countries' linkage and 
dynamics towards the Arab Israeli conflict developed through the period of study. It 
also presents the development of their role in the Arab-Israeli conf1ict based on different 
factors through such dynamics. 
In the third chapter, the thesis draws together the relative issues and components 
of the changing dynamics of the Arab Gulf countries' engagement in the Arab-Israeli 
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conflict, and the conflict developments' impacts on the Arab Gulf countries as well. It 
traces the historical development of the participation of the Arab Gulf countries in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the exhaustion of their capabilities in response to the 
emerging security challenges in and around the Gulf region. 
The linkage of the Arab Gulf countries to the Arab-Israeli conflict was effective 
in some periods but was weak or even absent in other periods. The thesis deals with the 
reciprocal impact of the Arab Gulf countries' security with the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The effectiveness of their involvement during the 1970s appeared to have largely 
diminished by the 1990s, except for their contribution to the peace process. More 
recently, however, (and in the period following that covered by this thesis) the Arab 
Gulf states have partially revived their involvement and role in response to the 
Palestinian Intifada that erupted in 2000. 
The thesis has clearly revealed that developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
impact directly on the security and stability of the Arabian Gulf region. Therefore, the 
conflict contributes in the shaping of the policies of the Arab Gulf countries under study. 
Limits of the thesis 
In spite of the achievements of this thesis, the author acknowledges its 
limitations. By dealing with such a prolonged period of time, which includes a great 
many significant events, and having included analysis of many players within one 
hypothesis, it becomes impossible to cover every relevant aspect with the full attention 
that the reader may feel is deserved. The author has tried to highlight the most relevant 
factors for consideration, but recognises that some less obviously pertinent details may 
have been lost in the analysis. 
The author also recognises that there is a heavy reliance on Arabic references 
and translations. This is partly due to the fact that the author has been based in the Arab 
world throughout the period of study, and has had better access to these sources than 
those in other languages. However, the author has also chosen to make full use of 
sources that reflect the perspective of events held within the region under study (the 
Arabian Gulf) in order to express the 'flavour' and raw substance of the security 
concerns as seen from the perspective of the peoples and states of the Gulf 
Much of the translation of Arabic sources into English has been done by the 
author himself. Transliteration has been based on common usage as known to the author. 
Therefore it is acknowledged that the spelling of names and places may be different 
from those of other common transliterations found in Europe. 
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Chapter One 
International Interests and Competition 
For Influence in the Gulf Region 
Defining the subject: the Arab Gulf Countries and the GCC 
The subject of this thesis is the Arab Gulf countries that today comprise the 
GCC. This excludes Iraq and Yemen from the study. The countries have been chosen 
due to their homogeneity, both with regards to one another and in their collective 
linkages with the Arab-Israeli conflict. They are similar in their political systems, as 
well in their cultural, social, and economic structures. Furthermore, they share common 
historical experiences. 
The shared interests and experiences of these countries were made evident when 
they collectively formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. 1 In forming the 
GCC, the member countries demonstrated their understanding that the security 
challenges within an unstable regional environment, such as the Gulf area, imposed a 
necessity for the States to co-ordinate their policies and collectively mobilize their 
capabilities. The organisation was considered to be a practical answer not only to the 
challenges of the area's security, but also to issues of economic development and 
foreign policy.2 The immediate objective was to protect the member states from the 
threat posed by the Iran-Iraq War and Iranian-inspired Islamist activism. 
1. The CCC was established in an agreement signed on May 25, 1981 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia between 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The CCC is considered to be a regional 
common market and a defence planning council. Its purpose, according to its charter, is to facilitate 
regional unity and, eventually, integration through co-operation between its members in the fields of 
international commerce, education, science, technology, industry, shipping and travel, and defence. in 
the introduction to the CCC Charter, it states that the member countries declared that the 
establishment of the CCC was based on the following: 1.) the existing special relations between 
members. 2.) The sharing of similar political systems which were based on Islamic beliefs. 3.) The 
perception of a joint destiny and common objectives. 4.) The geographic proximity of the countries, 
and their common geographical characteristics, leading them to resemble a distinct region with 
common boundaries. 5.) The general adoption of free trade economic policies by all the member 
countries. The CCC Charter can be seen at: www.gcc-sg.org/charter.html 
2. The declaration of the CCC, see the web: www. gcc-sg.orgldeclaration.html 
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The thesis includes a consideration of the period before the establishment of the 
GCC. The intention of the thesis is to consider the linkages and dynamics between the 
countries that eventually comprised the GCC, rather than the institution of the GCC 
itself. Moreover, some of these states have played a more significant role than others, 
given their greater strategic and economic potentials. Equal weight will not, therefore, 
be given to all these countries in the discussions in the thesis. 
The six countries concerned will be referred to as the "Arab Gulf countries". By 
definition, Iraq is technically part of the Arabian Gulf, but for the purposes of this thesis 
whenever the term "Arab Gulf countries" is used it will be referring only to the six 
countries that eventually made up the GCC and will not include Iraq. The thesis will 
refer to them as the GCC when it refers to any collective consideration through GCC 
organization meetings. The thesis also uses the term "The Arabian Gulf', but 
acknowledges the historic dispute over the use of this name. The term "West" is used to 
denote the US and Europe together. 
The reciprocity oftlze dynamics and linkages 
This thesis argues that there has been potential reciprocity of impact in the 
relationship between the Arab Gulf countries and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab-
Israeli conflict has had an impact on Gulf security, while the Arab Gulf countries have 
played a role in the conflict itself. The Arab Gulf countries felt from the early stages of 
the conflict that they had a part to play in its evolution. The Gulf feelings toward the 
conflict are clearly seen in the statements and policies of Saudi Arabia in the 1940s. 
King Abdul Aziz firmly opposed the Zionist movement and Jewish immigration into 
Palestine. He was enraged by the call at a Zionist conference in America for the 
creation of a Jewish state. 3 King Abdul Aziz's interest in the Palestinian issue is 
underscored by the fact that just one week before US President Roosevelt's death, King 
Abdul Aziz was able to extract a promise from him that the US would not take any 
hostile actions against the Arabs and would not take any further steps in the region 
without consulting both Arabs and Jews, the letter was dated April 5, 1945. When 
Truman became President in 1945 and broke that promise by facilitating the settlement 
3. Fahda bint Saud, "King Saud and the Issue of Palestine, "(2002), pp. 1-4, from Alfred Lilienthal, 
"Middle East Perspective", which can be seen at http://www.alfredlilienthal.comlsaudpalestine.htm. 
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of 100,000 Jews in Palestine, Abdul Aziz was emaged and the US ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia resigned in 1946.4 Later, Abdul Aziz's successor, King Saud, as part of his 
assessment of the danger of Zionism, said: "The Zionist threat is like cancer. "5 When 
the UN recognized Israel as a sovereign state on 78% of Palestine in 19486 in spite of 
the objection of the Arab states, fears increased in the Arab world. The Arab public, 
including in Saudi Arabia, protested against the decision in massive demonstrations 
calling for the liberation of Palestine and expressing their fears of the newly established 
Israeli state 7. 
Less than a decade later, a joint Israeli, British, and French attack on Egypt 
followed Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. Saudi Arabia reacted by 
severing diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and France, and cutting off oil 
supplies to their tankers. 8 The Israeli participation in the assault seemed to confirm the 
fears of many Arabs that Israel would serve the role of a Western military proxy in the 
Middle East while it had aggressive expansionary designs of its own. By April 1957, 
one year later, King Saud threatened to open fire on any Israeli vessel attempting to pass 
through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Saudi Straits. In May of the same year, the Kingdom 
lodged a protest with the United Nations against hostile Israeli aerial and navel activities 
in the Gulf of Aqaba, serving notice that it had the right to take whatever measurers it 
deemed necessary in self defence 9. 
These fears were further increased when only nine years later; Israel attacked 
neighbouring Arab countries and occupied the rest of Palestine as well as parts of Syria, 
Jordan, and Egypt as well as two small Saudi islands. Following the Israeli victory in 
the 1967 war, and not least due to a perception that this increased the threat to them 
from Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries became more involved in the 
4. Ibid. 
5.lbid. 
6. The UN Partition Resolution 181 of 1947 gave the Jewish state only 54 %of Palestine. 
7. For more details: Najeeb Al-Ahamad, Palestine, History and Struggle, (1985), pp. 342-393 
8. Encarta Encyclopaedia, Turmoil at Home and Abroad, The web: 
http://encarta. msn. com/encyclopedia _7 6157 542 2 _5/Saudi _Arabia. html. 
9. Fahda bint Saud. (2002), pp. 6-7 
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conflict, primarily through economic and diplomatic means but with some military 
contributions. In general, they sought to support the Arab and Palestinian opposition to 
Israel, and to influence Israel's own supporters to reduce their assistance to the Jewish 
state. Salman Bin Abdul Aziz, the Prince of Riyadh, warned against "Zionist ambitions 
that extend to Medina", the second holiest city in Saudi Arabia, on 20 March 1968 in a 
ceremony under his patronage, convened to support the Palestinian cause. 10 Such an 
alarm by Saudi officials confirms part of the reasons for their involvement against 
Israeli ambitions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It became widely acknowledged in the 
Arab world that the Arabian Gulf region represents strategic depth for the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. At the same time, Israel has demonstrated growing strategic ambitions towards 
the Arabian Gulf and bordering regions, shown in both the nature of its alliances and 
also in its need for oil (as Chapter Two of this thesis will show). This raised security 
concerns for the Arab Gulf countries and led them to try to play a more significant role 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, Israeli missiles at that time were able to reach 
a range that could threaten any Gulf country, a fact that led the Arab Gulf countries to 
consider the Israeli state a threat on their own security. 
Saudi Arabia has played a particularly crucial role in this regard. It was the 
counter player to Egypt in the Arab world throughout the nineteen fifties and sixties, 
balancing Egyptian progressive inclinations with leadership of the conservative group 
of states. Its influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict has at times been crucial as the thesis 
will illustrate later. 
This real and potential reciprocal relationship between the Arab Gulf states and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict has not previously been studied in detail in its own right. This 
dissertation attempts to remedy this gap in the literature. It starts, however, by 
examining one of the key factors that has influenced both the stability and security of 
the Arab Gulf countries on the one hand, and their response to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
on the other. This is the influence of external (super) powers as they sought to secure 
their own interests, both within the Arab Gulf region and in terms of their rivalries with 
one another, taking into consideration the economic and strategic importance of the 
Gulf to their interests. 
I 0. Borhan Dajani(ed), The Annual Book of The Palestinian cause in 1968, (1971), p. !55 
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1.1 The economic and strategic importance of the Gulf 
The importance of the Gulf, and the competition of international players to exert 
influence in the region, has affected the security and stability of the region, and its 
responses to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is necessary, therefore, to begin by exan1ining 
the nature of international interests and competition within the Arabian Gulf region on 
the one hand, and to explore their contradictions and their consistencies on the other. 
This will enable this analysis to determine the security and international concerns of the 
Arab Gulf countries and therefore to contextualise their linkages towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 
The importance of the Arab Gulf countries has increased since the end of the 
Second World War. This importance was due to two fundamental factors: the increase 
in oil exploration and production in the Gulf countries, which resulted in significant 
increases in financial resources, and the development of bi-polar conflict and the 'Cold 
War' in the international arena. The growing economic importance of the region 
contributed to making it a 'tempting fruit' for the new superpowers to try to pluck. Such 
efforts took the form of both objective interaction with the states and peoples of the 
region, and efforts to control them directly as will be shown later. 
The world first became aware of the economic potential of the Arab Gulf 
countries in the 1940s and 1950s as increasing oil resources were found in the region. 
By 1980, oil production in the Arabian Gulf represented one third of the total 
production of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) II , an 
organization founded in 1960 to represent the interests of developing countries whose 
economies rely heavily on oil export revenues. Even more importantly, the relatively 
small populations of the Arab Gulf states meant that little of the oil that was produced in 
them was used for local consumption making the Arab Gulf countries particularly 
important petroleum exporters. In 1980, the Arab Gulf countries thus represented 50-
70% of oil sold on the world markets. I2 
Oil production of the Arab Gulf countries increased throughout the 1980's and 
1990's while the oil production in most other countries remained stable or declined. 
From 1994 to 1998, the Arab Gulf countries produced about 50% of the total oil 
11. Abdullah. Hammoudeh (ed.), "The Introduction", Oil and Security in the Gul( (Dec. 1980), p. 3 
12. ibid. 
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production of the OPEC nations. This was equivalent to 20% of the international oil 
production in the same period. The Arab Gulf countries' oil reserve was estimated to be 
more than 4,662 billion barrels by the end of 1998, representing 45% of the 
international oil reserve 13 . The importance of the larger region is further highlighted by 
the fact that with the addition of two neighbouring countries, Iran and Iraq, the figure is 
increased to 70% of the international oil reserves. 14 
With their huge reserves, the Arab Gulf countries are estimated to be able to 
continuously extract oil almost until the end of the twenty-first century. 15 This is 
especially important considering the expectation that the oil fields in other parts of the 
world such as Russia, the US, China, and Europe are expected to be exhausted in the 
coming years. 16 Furthermore, The importance of Gulf oil stems not only from the huge 
underground reserves in the region but also from its competitive power in the world 
market, owing to its production capacity, lower production costs and competitive 
prices. 17 Not only does the Arab Gulf have more oil than anywhere else in the world, 
but its oil is the cheapest to extract and is of very high quality. 
Due to the huge oil resources found in the region, the economic potential of the 
region, the importance of oil in the economic and industrial development of all 
countries of the world, and the importance of ensuring the stability of both the 
production and distribution of oil, the Arab Gulf countries are considered of high 
strategic importance. Both the West, represented by the United States and Western 
Europe, and the East, represented by the Soviet Union and later Russia, have considered 
the Arabian Gulf of vital strategic importance and have competed over the region in an 
attempt to in±1uence the countries of the area and to ensure their own access to its oil 
resources. We will now look more closely at first the Western view of the region, then 
the Eastern view, and then we will give a historical account of their competition for 
influence in the area. 
13. See: The General Secretary of the Arab League and others, The Unified Arabic Economic Report. 
(I 999), pp. 266-268 
14. Jan H. Kalicki, "A Vision for The US- Saudi and US-Gulf Commercial Relationship", Middle East 
Policy, (May 1997), pp.74-75 
15. Ibid. 
16. N.G. Lineback, "The GulfStream", Focus, (Spring 1995), pp. 15-17 
17. H.Jawhar and A.Sahar, "The International Attempts to Control Gulf Oil",Assiyasa Al-Dmvlya 
Journal, (July 1998), p./3 
13 
1-2 The West and the Gulf region 
Soon after oil was discovered in the Gulf region in the late 1930s, the West 
began showing an interest in the area. This interest is symbolized by the famous 1945 
visit between King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia and US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt on a US ship in the Red Sea and the visit later that same year between King 
Abdul Aziz and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The British at the time 
occupied most of the smaller Gulf states on the Eastern and Southern borders of Saudi 
Arabia. Most of these countries gained formal independence in the 1960s and the last 
British troops had withdrawn by 1971. Even after the British withdrawal, most of the 
oil was being extracted by American and British oil companies. During the 1970s, most 
of those oil resources were nationalized. 
1-2-1 Economic interests 
The first oil crisis that was felt in the West occurred in 1973 when the Arab oil 
countries declared an embargo on oil exports to the West because of Western support 
for Israel. The embargo caused panic among energy consumers. 
Despite attempts by the West to wean itself off of dependence on Gulf oil 
resources in the 1970s, by 1980, the Arab Gulf countries were still providing Japan with 
76-85% of its requirements, Western Europe with 60-65% and the US with 15-30%. 18 
These numbers remained fairly stable, with slight increases for some countries over the 
next two decades. Ted Thornton affirmed that "a long-term strategic interest of the 
United States is to control the flow of Gulf oil, not solely because of American domestic 
needs (7%) but more importantly because Europe and Japan were almost completely 
dependant on this oil. The United States, declining in power economically relative to 
other world powers, sought ways to stay in the game and maintain a competitive edge. 
In spite of the relatively low US dependence on Gulf oil, a little perspective was in 
order. In 1973, the year of the Arab oil boycott, the United States was dependant on 
Arab oil for only 6% of its domestic consumption. In 1990, American dependence on 
Arab oil overall (from other Arab countries as well as the Gulf) had swelled to 30%." 19 
18. A. Hammoudeh (ed.),(Dec. 1980), p. 3 
19. For more details see: Ted Thornton, Middle East History database, The Gulf Wars 1990-1991, the 
web: http://www. nmhschool. orgltthorntonlmehistorydatabase/gulf_war. htm 
14 
During the period of 1995-2002, the Arab Gulf countries supplied the US with 16-18% 
of its oil needs, Japan with about 80-85% of its needs, and the EU with 65-70% of its 
needs. 20 These figures illustrate that Western Europe and Japan are highly dependent 
on oil supplies from the Arab Gulf countries and their oil has long been an important 
factor in the economic progress of the West. 21 
Moreover the rates of dependence on, and demand for, oil by these same 
industrial countries, are expected to increase dramatically over the next two decades for 
a number of reasons, but especially because of the entrance of China as a major new oil 
importer. The share of the above countries in world oil consumption in 1995 was 58%. 
China joined the oil importing countries in 1995, buying most of its needs from the Gulf 
region22 . China's oil imports were only 0.4 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 1995, but 
they are projected to grow to 6.9 mbpd by 2020 23 . In addition, China's need for gas 
will increase from 0.5% of world gas consumption in 1990 to 3.7% in 2020 24 • Table 2 
in the appendix shows the projected increase in world demand for oil until 2020. Table 
3 shows the extent to which Gulf oil will be expected to fill this increasing demand. 
The American Defence Department raised US concerns of any problems that 
might face oil flow from the Gulf region, in a report defining US interests and 
commitments in the Middle East. Noting American, European, and Japanese 
dependence on oil from the Gulf, the Defence Department asserted that "any threat to 
Gulf security would endanger the critical economic interests of the United States. "25 
European concerns are similar to those of the Americans. The Western European 
countries concentrate their attention on securing energy sources, believing that without 
getting oil and gas in steady rates and at reasonable, predictable prices their economies 
will be prone to instability. 
20. For more details, see: Energy Information Administration, U.S Department of Energv. (October 
2002), The web: www.eia.doe.gov/Emeu/cabs 
21. James Ekniz, "US Domestic and Foreign Policies",Oil and Security in the Arabian Gulf. (1980), 
p. 40 
22. DOEIEIA, "Estimates in International Energy Outlook,I999", ( April/998), p.36 
2 3. DOEIE!A, "Estimates in International Energy Outlook 1997 ", p. /15 
24. Ibid., p./37 
25. William Perry, "United States Security Strategy for the Middle East", Office of the Secretary of 
Defence, (May 3, 1995), p.6 
15 
The US Defence Department report mentioned above also noted that the vast 
expansion of wealth in the hands of the Gulf countries as a result of the oil boom of the 
1970s had made that region an important market for Western goods, and that 
maintaining access to those commercial markets was an important American interest. 26 
One scholar described a similar view in Europe, saying the European countries seek 
"the security of continuous dealing with the profitable markets of the Gulf and 
maintaining European investments there". 27 Arms constituted one of the most 
important Western products imported into the region. One scholar noted that the West 
was so keen to sell arms to the region that they emphasized the threats that the countries 
were facing to encourage them into buying more arms. He called such practices: 
"Threat and Protection Trade".28 
The Western countries benefited tremendously from these arms sales. Arms 
exports increased dramatically following the Second Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. At the 
same time, from 1988-1992, there was a clear decline in the sale of arms to the third 
world in general because of the end of the Cold War. In 1988, sales had amounted to 
about $24 billion, but they fell back to $9 billion in 1992. In the early 1990s, the 
Stockholm Institute for Peace Research reported that many weapon manufacturing 
companies in the West were facing possible bankruptcy. 29 The massive arms deals with 
the Arab Gulf countries constituted the most important factor in saving those companies 
from bankruptcy. Arab Gulf countries were at the top of the list of the arms purchasing 
customers during the period of 1989-1993, according to the same Institute in its 1994 
yearbook. Saudi Arabia, as the Institute says, is one of the world's largest purchasers of 
military equipment. During the eighties it was the greatest customer in the world arms 
market. In the period 1989-1993 it spent $8.039 BN, and was the world's third largest 
arms importer. The Emirates were the 17th largest importer and spent $ 2.491 BN. 
26. Ibid., p.l 0 
27. Mohammad Saed ldrees. "Role of Security and Military Cooperation in Development of the GCC as 
a Regional Identity", AI Mustaqbal AI-Arabi Journal, (Jan 1997), p./13 
28. N.G. Lineback,(/995), p. 13 
29 Ibid., p.32 
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Kuwait was the 21 51 largest importer and spent $2.308 BN. 30 [See table (10) in the 
appendix]. 
This trade exchange is closely linked to oil in that the Gulf countries ability to 
buy so many Western industrial and food products in addition to military equipment, 
infrastructural improvements and other items is due to the wealth they have derived 
from oil sales. 
During the period of 1973-1990 the European Community (EC) exports to the 
Arab Gulf countries totalled between $18-23 billion in value, while its imports from 
them totalled between $11-18 billion. This reveals a surplus in the balance of payments 
to the EC advantage as shown in Table 5. During 1990-1993 the Arab Gulf countries' 
imports from the EU increased to a rate of $3362.11 million annually. They exported at 
a rate of$1916.1 million annually in the same period to the EU. 
The Arab Gulf countries imported from the European Union (EU) at the rate of 
$23,979.3 million annually during the period of 1994-2000, as can be seen in Table 6. 
They exported to the EU at the rate of $13,408.1 million annually in the same period, 
leading to a surplus of $10,571.2 million to the advantage of the European Union. 
Regarding the US, Saudi Arabia itself exported about $3,611.7 million in 1986; 
these exports jumped to $7,688 million in 1994. The Arab Gulf countries' imports as a 
whole from the US were $1540.35 million annually, while they exported $1264.28 
million annually through 1990-1993.31 The Arab Gulf countries' imports from the US 
increased to $12103 million annually during the period of 1994-2000, while American 
imports during the same period were $11595 million annually from Arab Gulf 
countries, making an annual trade surplus in favour of the US of $508 million dollars as 
indicated in Table 4. 
Looking at the above figures, the importance of Gulf oil is evident on two levels. 
First, the Western dependence on Gulf oil for their own economic production as was 
discussed earlier. Second, the huge sums spent on Western imports into Arab Gulf 
countries has made oil important in enabling the Arab Gulf countries to continue being 
such an important consumer market for Western goods. This further underscores the 
30
. Jawdat Bahjet and Hassan Jawhar, "The peace and Stability Factors in the Gulf in the nineties: 
Internal Indications and external Pressures", Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi, (1996), p. 41 
31. ESCWA, Statistical Abstract of ESCWA Region, (1999), Tables # Vl/l-2 and# VIll-3, pp.374-385 
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Western interest in maintaining the security and stability ofthe Gulf region. Not only is 
free access to oil resources and steady oil prices important for the internal Western 
economies but the stability in the oil market is also important for the Western producers 
of goods sold to the Arab Gulf countries. The wealth of these countries has made the 
maintenance of a convenient environment for trade in the Arab Gulf countries a vital 
Western interest in itself. Linked to this is the further Western interest in maintaining 
channels for the continued investment of excess Arab Gulf states' wealth in Western 
financial and trade markets. "Saudi Arabia alone has placed an estimated 60% of its 
global investments in the United States through passive and direct investment".32 Saudi 
investments in the US and Europe are estimated to be from $700-900 billion. The US 
market enjoys $420-630 billion of that total. Saudi Arabia was the region's single largest 
FDI investor in the United States during the years 1998-2000.33 
1-2-2 Security interests 
Due to these very important economic interests, the West considers the Gulf 
region a vital interest that lies within its strategic periphery. The most notable Western 
strategic interests in the Gulf region can be characterised as follows: 
1. Consolidating military control over the region. 
2. Sustaining the Arab Gulf governments as the safety valve for the 
economic and strategic interests of the West, and preventing such 
regimes from using oil as a weapon or threatening its routes. 34 
3. Preventing radical Islamic, national, or leftist movements from 
affecting social and political affairs in the Gulf region, as such 
movements are usually perceived to be against most Western 
policies in the region. This is in addition to preventing such 
movements from influencing Gulf stability and threatening oil 
supplies. Edward Djerejian, former Assistant to the US Secretary 
of State, talked openly about such issues. He said: "Religion is 
30. Tanya C. Hsu, "The United States Must not Neglect Saudi Arabian Investments", The web: 
http://www.saudi-americam-forum. org/Newsletters!SAF _Essay_ 22. htm 
31. Ibid. 
34. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Navigating Through the Turbulence: America and 
the Middle East in a New Century, Report of the Presidential Study Group, (2001), pp. 58-60 
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not a main factor to direct our policy towards any state in the 
Near East (including Arab Gulf states), but our dispute and 
conflict is with and against radicalism, rejection of tolerance, 
compulsion and terrorism which often accompany religious 
issues in the Near East."35 Djerejian summarized the results of 
US policies in the region as follows: 36 
c To build up a comprehensive and durable peace between 
Arabs and Israel (i.e. to end the conflict in favour of 
maintaining Israeli security and ensuring the Arab Gulf 
states do not get involved in the conflict.) 
• Creating a series of security measures to safeguard the 
friends and allies of the US in the Arab Peninsula (i.e. to 
maintain a large military presence that gives the US de 
facto military control over the region and enables them to 
support those governments that keep in harmony with US 
interests and security requirements.) 
1-2-3 Reciprocity: Gulf Security and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
The previous section has underscored the great economic and security 
correlation between the Arab Gulf countries and both Europe and the US. This 
correlation emphasizes the overlapping of many interests and forces both the Arab Gulf 
countries and the West, particularly the United States, to look at their relationship with 
each other as vital. The need by both sides to maintain this economic co-dependency 
strongly affects the Arab Gulf countries' general policies and dynamics including 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict as the economic associations have led the Arab Gulf 
counties to be politically cautious. This caution has translated into the Arab Gulf states 
playing a less significant role in the Arab-Israeli conflict than would otherwise be 
expected, except during the first half of the seventies and in the US sponsored peace 
process. 
35. Edward R. Djerejian, "US Policy Goals in the Near East", US State Department Dispatch, ( 
9114/92), p. 701 
36. Ibid. 
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While the economic correlation between the Arab Gulf countries and the West 
has led them to refrain from taking an active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US has 
not been similarly cautious as it considers Israeli security, along with access to oil, as 
the two vital American interests in the Middle East. Michael Hudson best expressed 
this when he said that US interests in the Middle East can be summed up as what he 
calls: "The Holy Trinity: Israel, Oil and Fighting Communism (during the Cold 
War)."J7 
The American public and strong commitment to Israeli security is translated to 
view any hostility towards Israel from the Arab Gulf countries as a hostile move against 
the US itself. This has led the Arab Gulf countries to become even more cautious in the 
hopes of avoiding any critical dispute that may emerge with the US on the bases of the 
contradiction of interests between the Arab Gulf countries and the US in regard to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The correlation of economic interests between the Arab Gulf 
countries and the West has thus created a security preoccupation in the Gulf, which has 
lessened the Arab Gulf states' ability or, sometimes, willingness to participate 
effectively in the Arab-Israeli conflict, underscoring the hypothesis of the potential 
reciprocity between the Arab-Israeli conf1ict and the Arab Gulf countries security. 
1-3 The Soviet Union and the Gulf Region 
The Soviets first tried to establish relations with some Gulf countries, especially 
Saudi Arabia, during the period between the two world wars. In the 1950s, the Soviets 
increased their interaction in the Gulf when they supported the 1958 revolution in Iraq. 
But the nature of Abdul-Kareem Qasim's rule, his internal problems, Iraq's instability 
and the bloody methods he used to liquidate Iraqi communists strained his relations with 
the Soviets.38 On account of their experiences with Iraq, Soviet policy in the region 
became more cautious and practical after 1961. A major event underscoring this new 
mode of Soviet policy was the 1966 Soviet agreement with Kuwait to increase the 
volume oftrade between the two countries?9 
37. Michael Hudson," Play the Hegemony: Fifty Years of US Policy Towards the Middle East", 
Middle East Journal, (Summer 1996), p. 329 
38. Walid Sharif, "Soviets and the Arabian Gulf', Dirasat Al-Khaleej Wal-Jazira Al-Arabeya.(January 
1996), pp. 94-95 
39. Ibid., p. 95 
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The huge oil wealth in the Gulf region became a principal factor in shaping 
Soviet international strategy in light of reports in the early nineteen seventies 
anticipating that Soviet oil production would start declining in the late nineteen 
seventies. 40 When the Soviets expressed their desire to satisfy their oil needs from Gulf 
sources in 1971, it was considered an official recognition of the oil problem in the 
USSR. The Soviets adopted a strategy of encouraging Arab states to nationalize their 
oil, which was monopolized by Western companies at that time. 
In sum, the geographic-strategic position and international strategic and 
economic value of the Gulf region were objects of attention by the Western and Eastern 
camps throughout the Cold War period and even before and after that time. The great 
attention given to the Arabian Gulf by the two camps was based on the volume, quality 
and low cost of Gulf oil, and the strategic position of the Gulf between North and South 
Asia and its linking of Eastern to Western Asia, especially during the closure of the 
Suez Canal. 
1-4 The stages of international competition for influence in the Gulf region 
The international attention and competition to influence the Gulf regwn 
progressed through four different stages. Three of these stages took place during the 
Cold War Era while the fourth occurred in the post-Cold War Era, which brought about 
a new strategic environment with new consequences for the Arab Gulf countries. 
1-4-1 The Cold War Era 
During the period of 1945-1990, Western and Soviet interests predominated in 
the competition for influence in the Gulf region. They were fighting indirectly through 
their support of opposing factions in the region. During the Cold War Era ( 1945-1990), 
policies were formed in a way that endangered the oil fields themselves through 
increasing international competition to influence the region41 . 
They also competed economically, ideologically and militarily. Their 
competition went through three distinct stages. It is important here to study these stages 
to clarify how they affected Gulf security as well as the Arab Gulf countries' role in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
40. Ibid. 
41. For more information see: Shebli Telhami," The Persian Gulf Understanding the American Oil 
Strategy"; in www. Brook. edu/views/op-ed/telhami/20020 129.htm 
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1-4-1-1 First stage: 1945-1970 
After the Second World War, the competition of the Western and Eastern blocs 
for influence in regions of energy and strategic importance emerged. The result of this 
competition influenced the security, economy and alliances of the regions over which 
they were competing. 
In the early part of the Cold War, the United States was concerned about 
preventing a Soviet takeover of the Gulf oil fields, which the US believed would give 
the Soviet Union the ability to control the flow of oil to the industrialized world. The 
Americans pursued "the containment policy" which aimed at containing the Soviet 
Union and not allowing it to increase its influence. US President Harry Truman's 
administration (1945-1953) was concerned about the Soviet military presence in 
Tehran. Truman provided $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey in an attempt to 
stave off any Soviet attempt to increase its influence in the region. The provision of 
financial assistance to developing countries as a means of challenging Soviet ambitions 
became known as the "Truman Doctrine." The Doctrine was aimed primarily at the 
Middle East, and the major strategic objective behind it was protecting the oil reserve 
fields. 42 
The alternative idea of exploding the Gulf oil wells as a last resort in case of 
military conflict there was also addressed by the Truman administration in 1949. At 
that time, the Americans and the British moved explosives to the Middle East. They 
intended to blow up both the oil wells and the refineries in the Gulf if a Soviet takeover 
became imminent. In spite of opposition from the CIA and the State Department, the 
plan was implemented and explosives were moved to the region as shown by the 
recently declassified American National Security Council documents NSC 26/2 and 
NSC 26/3. 43 Telhami explains that the plan was later reinforced by President 
Eisenhower's administration in 1957 after the closure of the Suez Canal.44 As Telhami 
explains: "Despite concerns by State Department officials that such a policy would be 
opposed by the host countries if it ever leaked, this policy was implemented in the 
40. National Council for Peace Salidarity, Iraq, Research and Studies Papers. (11-1411111972) 
41. For more Information See: Shebli Telhami, " The Persian Gulf Understanding the American Oil 
Strategy; in: http://www. brook. edu/ dybdocroot!press/RE VIEW /spring2002/Telham i. htm 
44. Ibid 
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1950's and remained in place at least through the early 1960's, so great was the worry 
that the Soviet Union would come to control a substantial share of the world's oil."45 
The competition over the region intensified in the early 1960s when the many 
predictions were realised about the great quantities of oil in the Gulf region. The 
Western camp, in particular, felt that its fate might be dependent on its control of the 
region and oil tanker routes across the Arab Sea to the Red and Mediterranean Seas 
through the Suez Canal. This feeling led to an exaggerated evaluation of Soviet 
aspirations and plans towards the warm water and oil resources of the Gulf region. 46 
1-4-1-2 Second Stage: 1970-1979 
This period began with the full British military withdrawal from the Gulf region 
in 1971. This left a security vacuum that the two superpowers moved to fill. The Soviet 
strategy was based on the support of leftist parties revolting against the "imperial" 
presence in the region. Through such support, the Soviets hoped to establish a foothold 
in the Gulf periphery, if not on its coasts. In 1969, Muarnmar Al Qadafi led a 
successful military coup in Libya - a country of great oil potential. His inclinations 
towards the USSR and his opposition to Western policies created a Western security 
obsession, and an opportunity for more Soviet influence in the region. In 1972, The 
USSR signed a friendship agreement with Iraq, a country that had just experienced a 
military coup bringing the leftist-leaning Baath Party to power. This represented a new 
danger to US interests in the Gulf. The new regimes in Iraq and Libya raised the 
importance of Gulf oil to the US and its allies as well as increased concerns about 
growing Soviet influence in the region. 
The US strategy was altered to intensify its ability to project military power. On 
July 25, 1969 US President Richard Nixon stated that the United States would 
henceforth provide extensive military assistance to regional allies to give them the 
ability to stave oti any threats to their security. He addressed three principles for the 
new US strategy saying first, the US would keep all of its treaty commitments, second, 
would protect any ally or nation considered vital to US security from any threat by a 
nuclear power, and third would furnish military and economic assistance to any ally 
45. Shebli Telhami, "A Need for Prudence in the Persian Gulf', jrom: www.brook.edu/views!op-
ed/telhami/20020129.htm. 
46. Will D. Swearingen." Geographical Reviews", Geographical Review, (1993), pp. 490-491 
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facing aggressiOn, while at the same time looking to regional allies to assume the 
primary responsibility of providing the manpower needed for regional security.47 
This strategy, termed "The Nixon Doctrine" emphasized the creation of "a 
regional system allied to the US in order to protect US interests. It also served to 
promote America's aid and weapon sales to create independent power centres able to 
maintain local stability and help in securing US interests".48 In this regard, the United 
States increased its military assistance to both Iran and Israel in the hopes that those two 
nations could serve US interests in the Middle East. 
During the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the US intervened in favour of 
Israel. This intervention came at a time when the Arab World believed Egypt was about 
to achieve victory in the war. The Arab public and regimes were enraged by the 
American intervention. Arab leaders decided to halt oil supplies to the US and its allies, 
leading to an international energy crisis. By that time, the region had become an 
essential provider of oil to Western industry, and the embargo led the US to revise its 
earlier plan of blowing up the oil fields in case of an imminent Soviet takeover to a new 
plan of ensuring the Western ability to occupy the oil fields themselves. 
James Ekniz, the former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, affirmed that 
Kissinger threatened to occupy Gulf oil fields; the Saudis were surprised since such 
I 
threats would only make the USSR a winner in the international competition in the Gulf 
region.49 One scholar described US policy at the time, saying: "The US was concerned 
with its ability to project military force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil 
flowing". 50 Henceforth, the US not only considered access to oil but also a military 
presence in the Gulf as a vital interest. 51 There were many fears in the region that the 
US was planning to occupy the oil fields in the event of any new crisis. 52 Marwan 
47. The Freedictionary.com, Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam November3, 
1969, The web: http:// encyclopedia. theji·eedictionary. com/Nixon%20Doctrine 
46. A.S. Abdul-Muhsin and D. Alyaseen, "US Interference Policy in the World", Middle Eastern Issues 
Journa/,(1999), pp./9,30 
49. James Ekniz, (1980), p.42; see also: Abu Talib, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Shadows of 
Jerusalem, (1992), pp./36-137 
48. Joyce Battle, (ed.), "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein, The US Tilts towards Iraq 1980-1984", 
National Securitv Archive Electronic Briefing, Book No. 82, p.6, The web: 
www.gwu. edu/%7 Ensarchiv/NSAEBBINSAEBB82/ 
49. Little Brown and Company, Henry Kissinger. Years o(Upheaval. (1982), p.878 . 
52. R. K. Ramazani, Security Issues in the Gul(Region, (1981), p.13 
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Buhairi explained the details of possible scenarios that were under discussion in the US 
through 1973-1979.53 
Although in the aftermath of the 1973 war, the Soviets stood in much closer 
solidarity with the Arabs, the US was successful in its new strategy of securing the flow 
of oil and preventing the Arabs from halting oil supplies in the future. To ease the 
immediate crisis caused by higher oil prices, the International Energy Agency (lEA) 
was established. The lEA was tasked to find alternatives to Gulf oil, research energy-
saving technologies, and research oil substitutes to free Western industries from 
potential Arab pressures. But even more important than the lEA, American success 
came about because of the continued strong ties the US had with the monarchies of the 
Gulf and because the US was able to find suitable channels for the excess Gulf wealth 
that came about after the 1973 oil embargo. Despite strong public opposition to 
American support for Israel, the Arab Gulf regimes also feared the nationalist and leftist 
tendencies being articulated by pro-Soviet Arab groups and feared a strong alliance with 
the Soviet Union could ultimately undermine their monarchical systems. Furthermore, 
the increased wealth enjoyed by the Arab Gulf states found better outlets for both 
investment and consumer purchasing in the Western capitalist markets than they did in 
the Soviet bloc and this resulted in the rapid development of strong economic ties that 
cemented the US-Saudi alliance. 
The USSR tried to exploit the popularity it had gained in the Arab world after 
1973 by building stronger relations with some Gulf countries, in addition to other Arab 
countries, but these attempts were not successful in replacing American influence, 
partly because Soviet influence in some parts of the Arab world was seen as a threat to 
the Gulf regimes. The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in overthrowing the pro-
American Shah in 1979 led to a new phase in the international competition for influence 
over the Gulf. The revolution provided increased incentives to the Soviets to attempt to 
increase their influence in the region. 54 The new Soviet stance is best exemplified by 
their invasion of Afghanistan later that same year. At the same time, the downfall of the 
Shah incited the Americans to think about defending their oil interests directly, since 
Iran could no longer play the role of America's "regional ally" as had been assumed 
53 For more details on American scenarios and threats to deploy forces in the Gulf oil fields area, 
read: Marwan Buhairi, Arab Oil and American threats 1973-1979, (1980) 
54. Thomas Stauffer, "The Political Uses of Arab Oils", in Ronald G. Wolfe.(ed.), The United States. 
Arabia, and the Gulf. (1980), p.31 
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under the Nixon Doctrine. The rise of an Iranian Islamic regime that opposed American 
policies thus increased both the Soviet and the Western inclination to increase their 
involvement in the region. 55 
1-4-1-3 Third Stage: 1980-1990 
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 changed the geo-political 
situation in the Gulf region in particular, and in the Middle East in general. By 
occupying Afghanistan, the USSR became 300 miles away from the Straits of Hormuz, 
through which pass about 57% of the world oil trade, comprising 80-85% of Japan's oil 
requirements and 60-70% ofEurope's requirements. 
In a speech before the Indian Parliament, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev 
announced an initiative that underscored some of the USSR's strategic goals for the 
region. In that speech, he urged the Arab Gulf countries to make genuine changes in the 
existing power balance that was serving the growth of the Western military existence in 
the Gulf region. 56 
The new Soviet moves were of great concern to the US. The US found its 
resources and strategic influence in the region threatened. The USSR was in direct 
occupation of Afghanistan and had strong alliances with Libya, Iraq and South Yemen, 
a country that could threaten Oman, which was in control of the strategic straits of the 
Gulf. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had massed its forces on the borders with Iran and 
was providing assistance to the Iranian Tudeh Party, a communist party hoping to use 
the instability in Iran to take power in that country. All these Soviet moves made it 
seem possible that they would be able to surround the Arab Peninsula, endanger 
Pakistan and threaten Iran. If the Soviets were successful they would gain real control 
over the Gulf region and the supply of oil to the Western industrial countries. 57 
According to Western experts, the US in the late 1970s and early 1980s had 
become "worried by potential conflicts in the region, terrorist and subversive activities, 
and the expected need of the Soviet Union for Gulf oil that it would not be able to pay 
55. Elmer Berger," A Tangled Web: Israel and the Gulf', Arab Studies Quarterlv Journal, 
(Winter/Spring 1991), p. 83, 17p, ABESCO Electronic Data Base. 
56. Stephen W Buck," The Gulf 2000 Project", in Charles Doran and Stephen W Buck, The Gulf 
Energy and Global Security: Political and Economic Issues, (1991), pp.9-ll 
57. Michael C. Lynch, "'The Economics of Petroleum in the Former Soviet Union", in Gulf Energy 
and the World, Challenges and Threats. (1 997), pp. 112-114 
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for. "58 Washington saw Moscow as a main source of danger to the safe t1ow of oil and 
the Arab Gulf countries' independence. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided 
the US with the justification it needed to increase its military presence in the region. 
US President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) adopted the policy of maintaining a 
direct American military presence in the Gulf, as opposed to the earlier policy of relying 
on militarily strong regional allies. The Carter Doctrine calted for the establishment of 
Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) that could quickly be deployed to the Gulf. 59 
According to the Carter Doctrine, the U.S. would not allow any outside power to gain 
control over the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. In announcing the Doctrine in 1980, Carter 
stated that "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf 
region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force." 60 While the invasion of Afghanistan provided the justification for the 
new doctrine, it was aimed also at ensuring the Soviets would not be able to take 
advantage of the unstable sihmtion in Iran to increase its int1uence there. "This policy 
thus warned the Soviets away from Iran, which had just had a revolution, and at the 
time was holding hostages in the United States Embassy." 61 
The Soviet threats never materialized. This was partly because the Soviets 
failed to receive the sympathy they had expected from the Arabs in their confrontation 
against American "imperialism," largely because of their occupation of an Islamic 
country (Afghanistan). The Afghan Jihad t1ared up against the Soviets and had echoes 
throughout the Arab and Muslim world, especially in the Gulf, giving support for the 
US strategy of driving the Soviets away from the Gulf region. 
Robert Pelletreau has described the US philosophy for maintaining Gulf security 
since the late 1970s as having come about as a result of a series of continuous crises that 
threatened the security of the Arab Gulf states. 62 Pelletreau says that with the rise of the 
58.R.K. Ramazani, (198/),p.JB 
57. A.S. Abdui-Muhsin, (1999), p./9,30 
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Islamic Revolution in Iran and the downfall of the Shah in 1979 and then the Soviet 
invasion of Mghanistan, the US increased its military presence in the region to secure 
American oil interests and protect friendly regimes in the Gulf region,63 i.e. Arab Gulf 
countries. Since then the US has gradually increased its military presence in the region 
in the light of a series of new crises. The first of these was the Iran-Iraq war. 
The Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980, when the region was passing through grave 
developments including the serious revisions to previous security strategies of both the 
Western and Eastern (Soviet-led) blocs. The Iran-Iraq war endangered the security and 
stability of the whole region, and exhausted the resources and potentials of both Iran 
and Iraq in addition to the other Arab countries in the Gulf. Both the Soviet Union and 
the US however derived some benefits from the war. The USSR thought that its war 
with the Afghan Mujahideen (warriors) would be contained during the preoccupation of 
Arab, Gulf and Muslim countries by in-fighting. On the other hand, the US and its 
Western allies used the escalation of security threats to the oil fields and their shipment 
passages as a pretext to intensify its military presence in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. 
The Western industrial countries simultaneously increased their revenues from the 
increased sale of military exports to the region, which had the indirect effect of further 
inflaming the war. So, this war served the interests of both superpowers in spite of its 
escalating dangers to the oil supply of Japan and Western Europe. 
The war weakened the Arab ability to respond to emerging dangers to their 
interests through the eight years of the war and onward. It also led to a further 
weakening of the ability of the Arab Gulf countries to back the Palestinians and the 
Arab confrontation countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the Iran-Iraq war, in 
June of 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and waged a fierce war against the Palestinians. 
The Israeli army defeated the PLO forces, which were left alone in that battle. Israel 
eliminated an important ally to the Soviets. At the same time, the Soviets couldn't help 
their ally militarily to face Israeli attacks. Thus, the Israeli achievement provided the US 
with an additional victory in the Cold War against the Soviets in the Middle East that 
helped in weakening its influence in the region. 
The world changed dramatically in the late 1980s and those changes had 
dramatic effects on the Gulf. The Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan and that 
defeat marked the end of many communist regimes throughout the world, including the 
63. Ibid. 
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USSR itself. This defeat and its resultant breakdown calmed Western fears over Soviet 
threats to the Gulf and led to dramatic changes in the strategic calculations of the 
countries of the region as well as of the United States, which became the sole 
superpower in what became known as a uni-polar international system with the end of 
the Cold War Era. American military pre-eminence did not end their ambitions toward 
the region; they re-evaluated their policies based on how the new developments affected 
their national security objectives. 
1-4-2 The Post-Cold War Era: 1990-2000 
In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait. The Iraqi actions 
were regarded as a violation of the rules of the international order and an act of 
aggression against a sovereign state. The Soviets, along with some Western countries, 
tried to find a political solution that would save Iraq from an American invasion. They 
offered a peaceful initiative that Iraq accepted; but the deal was explicitly rejected by 
the US. For more than five months, the Soviets had led shuttle diplomacy efforts to 
overcome the main disputes that created the crisis but they failed to save Iraq from an 
American-led military assault. In early 1991, the US and its allies began a war that 
drove Iraq out of Kuwait and destroyed much of Iraq's military power, which had been 
rapidly increasing. 64 President George Bush acknowledged that he had waged the war 
to maintain the major sources of oil in the world, necessary for the industries of the US 
and its allies, and to preserve Americanjobs. 65 
In the same year of the American attack on Iraq, the Soviet Union formally 
dissolved and Russia took its place. While Russia was no longer considered a 
superpower, it did maintain interests in the region. Iranian-Russian relations 
consolidated rapidly after the second Gulf war in 1991, especially in the field of 
economic, military, and nuclear cooperation, increasing Western security concerns in 
the region66. The increase of the economic ties between Iraq and Russia also increased 
64. Hermann Frederick Elits, " The U.S Perception of (Persian) Gulf Security", Asian Affairs, (Oct. 
1994) 
65. U.S National Archive and Records administration, The web: 
http:/ l>vww. archives. govlresearch _room! aliclreference _ desklm il it my _resources/gulf_ war. html 
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American concerns. These concerns were in addition to the constant Western concerns 
about the assumed threats of Iran and Iraq against the security and stability of the Arab 
Gulf countries. This escalation of Western security concerns resulted in a new kind of 
international competition in the Gulf region. This competition was consequently 
projected by the increasing military presence of the US and its Western allies in the 
Gulf region during the nineties. The US and its allies continued to claim the need for a 
military presence in the region on the pretext of such concerns. "On September 23, 1990, 
US secretary of State James Baker testified before a congressional committee that the 
United States sought a "permanent military presence" in the Gulf. What was not 
elaborated at the hearing was the fact that the United States has been trying for years to 
establish a permanent centre for military operations in the Gulf region, an effort which 
naturally had been rebuffed by the Arabs. "67 
These military forces undertook a complete siege of Iraq, imposing draconian 
military and economic sanctions against it, in the aftermath of the 1991 war. The US 
aimed to become the sole security guarantor for the region, this partially involved 
ensuring that the region was isolated from any regional framework concerning security; 
tllis was best illustrated by the American efforts against any real implementation of the 
military aspects of the Damascus Declaration which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. One analyst has described this policy, saying that: "the main concern in the 
American mapping of the region is to isolate the oil shores from any Arabic depth, i.e. 
to distance oil and its empowerment away from the densely populated Arab areas. It 
then persuades the oil countries that their security can't be granted without US power 
and influence. "68 
A 1995 US Defence Department report suggested that America's new security 
policy in the Gulf would depend on a large, direct American military presence in the 
region as "only U.S. forces have the capability to meet and defeat the very real military 
66. The oil-rich and strategically important Gulf is high on Russia's list of priority regions. Russia 
sought to balance it's policy among fran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf states. For more details regarding 
Russian-Iranian relations see: Robert 0. Freedman, "Russian-Iranian relations in the 1990s", Middle 
East Review O(Jnternational Affairs, (June 2000), The web: http://meria. biu. a c. ill 
67. Ted Thornton, the web: http://www.nmhschool.orgltthornton/mehistorydatabaselgulf_war.htm 
66. Mohammed Rabia, "New American Policy in the Middle East", Palestinian Policy Journal. 
(Summer-Autumn 1994), p.15 
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threats to the stability and security of the region." 69 US Ambassador Martin Indyk 
emphasized the American interests in the region when he said: "The free flow of Middle 
Eastern oil with reasonable prices is still one of our national constant interests." 70 The 
US Defence Department put the unhindered flow of oil from the Gulf as its top regional 
strategic interest in the 1995 report, which states that: "Our paramount national security 
interest in the Middle East is maintaining the unhindered flow of oil from the Persian 
(Arabian) Gulfto world markets at stable prices."71 
Edward Djerejian, the former Assistant to the US Secretary of State, expanded 
upon this concern by noting that the unhindered flow of oil required the stability of the 
Arab Gulf countries' regimes. He asserted that "stability in the Gulf is vital, not only to 
our own national interest but also to the economic security of the whole world." 72 
To maintain stability in the Gulf in the 1990s, the US also increased its focus on 
the fundamentalist threat sweeping through the Arab Gulf societies. As for Islam, the 
US Defence Department's strategic report of 1995 says that: "some have asserted that 
radical Islam is the principal danger to the Western democratic world" 73 • A similar 
statement was made by an influential Washington think tank which asserted that: "The 
threats the Arab Gulf faces endanger the regimes themselves, not only from the 
neighbouring countries but also from within. These threats include the radical Islamic 
' 
opposition revival. Such threats should be considered by the US strategy in the 
region." 74 Despite the new focus on the internal threat posed by radical Islamists, the 
dangers posed by Iraq and Iran headed the list of security concerns in the Gulf, leading 
to the rise ofthe American policy of the "Dual-Containment oflraq and Iran." 
The Dual-Containment policy of keeping both Iraq and Iran constrained required 
the United States to increase its own military presence in the region. "The US project 
(to safeguard security in the Gulf) is based on the concept of keeping a Western marine, 
air and land military presence in the Gulf region after the crisis ends. It also encourages 
67. William Perry, US Security Strategv in the Middle East, (May 3, 1995), p.l 
68. Martin lndyk, "Clinton's Administration policy Towards the Middle East", Palestinian Studies 
Journal, (Summer 1993), p. 9 
69. William Perry, (May 3, 1995), p.6 
70. Edward Dierejian, (9/14/1992), p. 701 
71. William Perry, (May 3, 1995), p. 15 
72. The Washington institute for Near East Policy, (2001), pp. 56-57 
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the development and modernization of the Arab Gulf countries political structures, 
making the goal of the US to contain any threat to the security and stability of friendly 
countries."75 One scholar described the new policy saying that: "The US works with 
the aim of not allowing the emergence of any regional power in the Gulf that opposes 
US policies. The US permanently keeps its Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) in the 
region to accomplish this policy. It also strengthened its military cooperation with the 
conservative states in the region." 76 
Conclusion 
The chapter has illustrated the strategic and economic importance of the Gulf 
region to external powers, notably the United States and - during the Cold War period -
the Soviet Union. It has demonstrated the degree to which the region has been the 
source of competition by external powers pursuing their own security interests and 
playing out their competition vis-a-vis one another within the region. The analysis 
provided a backdrop to the environment within which Arab Gulf states have made 
policies, illustrating the degree of constraint laid upon them by the interests of, and 
influence of, international powers in the region. 
It has also shown that the security threats posed to the Arab Gulf countries and 
the strong economic correlations between the Arab Gulf countries and the West resulted 
in an increasing level of Arab Gulf countries economic and military dependence on the 
US, especially in the 1990s when a large US and Western military presence was 
established in the Gulf region. 
In concluding this chapter it is worth mentioning that while European and 
American interests generally coincide in the Gulf region, they are not identical and there 
are some slight disagreements in what we have termed as the West. Both the Europeans 
and the Americans want energy at reasonable prices and steady rates, but at the same 
time, they compete with each other for oil contracts. The Europeans furthermore try to 
obtain oil directly from the Gulf States without any American intermediary role and 
thus are not wholly appreciative of the large American military presence in the region 
when that presence threatens to not only provide security but also bring about economic 
benefits and privileges to the Americans. The Europeans also compete in the 
75. MS. Idrees, (Jan.. 1977), pp.48-50). 
74. Majdi Omar, The Changes in the World Order and The Middle East, (1995), p.6. 
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armaments' market with the US and large arms deals often become a source of 
contention between the US and some European countries. Finally, the US and Europe 
have different perceptions regarding how to deal with the supposed Iraq-Iran security 
threats to the region. Unlike the US, the Europeans believe in engaging rather than 
excluding Iran and Iraq. 
This chapter has provided a key insight into the context for analysing the 
policies of the Arab Gulf states towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, a second 
key aspect of this has been the policies of Israel itself towards the Arab Gulf states, 
which will form the basis ofthe following chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
Israel and the Arabian Gulf 
Israel has had an important impact on the Gulf and its security smce its 
establishment in 1948. 1 Israeli ambitions were directed towards the Gulf in various fonns. 
This chapter will concentrate on what has constituted perhaps the most important of these 
forms, namely the relationship between Israel and Iran and how that relationship impacted 
upon the security of the Arab Gulf Countries. As far as chapter one has shown the first 
source of security challenges and concems.in the Gulf, this chapter will thus illustrate the 
second source of security challenges that created dynamics in the policy of the Arab Gulf 
countries, i.e. Israeli ambitions and policies towards the Gulf, including its relations with 
Iran. 
Iran constituted the most important country in the Israeli "Perimeter Theory"2 of 
establishing strong security ties with non-Arab states bordering the Arab world. As pm1 of 
that theory, Israel also established security relations with other countries that affected the 
security aspects of the Arab Gulf states, most notably Ethiopia in Eastem Africa. Saudi 
Arabia was deeply concemed about the Ethiopian-Israeli relationship, which had been 
especially close until the overthrow of the Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 but continued 
even after that3• In 1978, Ethiopia received military aid from Israel in its border war with 
Somalia. Israel also aided Ethiopia against Muslim Eritrean secessionists (suppm1ed by the 
1. In fact, the security implications (?f the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine began even before 1948 
as the Zionist Movement's desire to establish a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab world had an impact on 
Gu(f security, especially considering some Zionist ambitions to occupy lands that include parts of present-day 
Saudi Arabia. These Zionist ambitions and their e.ffect on the Gulf will be discussed in the next section. 
2. Shumeil Seigif The Iranian Triangle: Secret Israeli-US-Iranian Relations. First Volume oftwo,(/983), pp. 
93, /07 
3. For more il?[ormation about Saudi and other Arab concerns about the lsraeli-Ethiopian relationship see: 
Mitchell G. Bard, "The Evolution of Israel's A.fi'ica Policy," Jewish Virtual Librmy, The web: www.us-
israel. org/jsource/P oliticsla.fi'ica. html 
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Arab states) in 1984 and 1985.4 However, the emphasis in the thesis will be placed upon 
the Israeli-Iranian relations because they are linked directly to the Arab Gulf countries' 
security. Before discussing the Iranian-Israeli relationship however, there will be a brief 
discussion of early Zionist and Israeli ambitions and actions in the Gulf region and how 
they affected Gulf security. 
2-1- Early Zionist and Israeli ambitions in the Gulf region 
Prior to the establishment of Israel, the Zionist movement saw the Arabian 
Peninsula as an important strategic area. On its Western side, the Peninsula controlled 
access to the Tiran Straits and the Mandeb Gate which would be important shipping and 
trade routes for any future Jewish state in- Palestine. On its Eastern side, the Peninsula 
controlled access to the Straits of Hormuz and the most impotiant Iranian (Persian) pmis. 
Furthermore, there had been ancient Jewish communities in parts of the Peninsula, most 
notably Khaibar and Yathrib, and some influential Zionists dreamed of re-establishing 
Jewish control over those areas, both for historical and religious reasons - as some Jews 
claimed the Torah promised them a state including those areas. To achieve their larger 
ambitions, other Zionists included parts of the Gulf within the proposed state of Israel, as is 
best exemplified by the statements made by Zionist leaders as well as some of the Zionist 
maps of Israel published before the actual establishment of the state. 
In 1904, Theodore Herzl, considered the founder of modern Zionism, said: "What 
we need is not a united Arabian Peninsula, but a poor dispersed peninsula divided into a 
number of small emirates, under our sovereignty, denied of possible unity against us". 5 
Herzl included large parts of the Arabian Peninsula within his proposed state of 
Israel. In addition to Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, Herzl's map included all of 
Egypt west of the Nile, all of Iraq south of the Euphrates, and a large section of western 
Saudi Arabia. 6 [See Map (I) in the appendix]. A different plan by the Russian Zionist 
leader, Dr. M. L. Rothschtein, was devised during World War I when he wrote a letter to 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibrahim Abdul Karim, "The Arabian Gulf in Zionist Calculations," Al-Ta'mt•on Journal. (April 1986), 
p./2 
6. Ibid., p. 12 
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the British Government calling for Britain's help in establishing a 120,000-strong Jewish 
army in Bahrain that could fight under allied command and after the war establish a Jewish 
state in the Eastern pat1 of Saudi Arabia from Bahrain up to the borders of Kuwait. He 
claimed that such a state would protect future British interests in the region from any 
Ottoman, German, or internal problems.7 A later map proposed by the Zionist Movement 
in 1923 and widely published in the Arab press included part of the Arabian Peninsula as 
part of the proposed Israeli state8 [See Map (2) in the appendix]. King Abdul Aziz 
expressed such fears in a letter to the British government dated January 1st 1937. He 
-
emphasized that "many letters he received express the fears of Muslims. They claim that 
Jews plan to occupy Al-Madina and Khaibar (in Saudi Arabia), and to destroy the grave of 
the prophet Mohammad".9 
The fears in the Gulf region that Zionists planned to occupy parts of their land in 
addition to Palestine did not stop with the creation of Israel in 1948. By that time, the oil 
wealth within the Gulf region was becoming known and many observers believed that 
Israel's need for oil would lead to ambitions to have access to the oil fields in the Gulf and 
its routes in the Red Sea. Abdul Karim expressed the fears felt in the Arab Gulf countries at 
the time in an article he published in an official GCC journal. Abdul Karim says that in a 
1957 book by an Indian author, it was noted that the strategic plan of the Israeli Army's 
chief of staff noted that: "The strategic impot1ance of the region may require Israel to take 
control over Saudi Arabian oil fields... Israel gives very high impot1ance to the areas of 
the Suez Canal, the Litani River, and the Persian Gulf." 10 
Arab Gulf States fears were also increased by Israel's meddling in the affairs of the 
region. Israel began interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq, the strongest Arab country in 
the Gulf region, soon after the establishment of the Jewish state. Israel suppm1ed violent 
7. lbid.,p.l4-15 
8. Ibid., p. 15 
9. Abdulla Abu Alia and RaJiq Al-Natsheh, The Kingdom o[Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Cause, (1991), 
pp. 403-404 
/0. I. Abdul Karim, (1986), p. /6, The book referred to is by Karangia and entitled The Israeli Dagger. 
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riots in the Kurdish region in northern Iraq in 1950. 11 This was later acknowledged by 
Moshe Arens who admitted that Israel had offered aid to Kurdish fighters wishing to gain 
independence from Iraq and that the Mossad had performed many intelligence operations 
encouraging those early riots in the 1950s. Israel's attempts to use the Kurds to keep Iraq 
internally preoccupied did not end with the 1950 riots but were done again in 1958, and 
again just prior to the June 1967 war, when Levy Eshkol met with Iraqi Kurdish leaders in 
Iran for that purpose. After that meeting, the Iraqi Kurds began receiving more direct 
assistance from Israel. After the 1967 war, the Iraqi Kurds stmted getting $500,000 a 
month from Israel in addition to the Soviet equipment Israel captured from Syria and Egypt 
in that war. 12 
Israel was also perceived as a threat to Gulf security in that it openly linked its 
interests to Western interests, introducing itself as an extension of the West in the Middle 
East. 13 It has been introduced in the West as "a strategic asset" for Western political 
interests in an unruly, "disorderly non-Western Arab world". 14 Its supporters in the West 
proposed that a militarily strong Israel would be willing and able to support Western 
policies towards the Arab or Muslim world. The best early application of this use of Israel 
occurred when France and Britain conspired with Israel to attack Egypt in 1956. While 
Israel had its own interests and agenda in the attack on Egypt, the Israeli participation also 
served the goal of protecting Western interests concerning the Suez Canal. 
2-2- Iran wu/er the Shah, and Israeli ambitions 
Iranian-Israeli relations, which began two years after the establishment of the Jewish 
state, had a special impact on Gulf security. Iran had constituted a traditional security 
threat to the Arab Gulf countries and the increasing political, economic, security, 
intelligence and military ties between Israel and Iran considerably heightened the security 
II. Elmer Berger," A Tangled Web ", Arab Studies Quarterly Journal, (Winter/Spring 1991 ), p. 83, 17p, 
ABESCO Electronic Data Base 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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concerns of the Arab Gulf countries. The Israeli assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, pmtly hosted 
and motivated by the Shah's regime, represented an example of how the Iranian-Israeli 
relationship led to escalating security concerns in the Gulf in the 1950s and 1960s. 15 The 
Iranian-Israeli relationship facilitated Israel's support for the Kurds in 1950, 1958 and 1967 
and gave Israel the ability to meddle in Arab affairs, at times without even the agreement of 
the United States. As Berger points out, Israel's assistance to the Iraqi Kurds underscored 
that "with, or without, United States' advance, open agreement, Israel now considered itself 
practically free to extend its "self-defence" to the Gulf" 16 
The strong Israeli alliance with Iran confirmed the perceived view in the Arab Gulf 
countries that Israel had ambitions in the Gulf, and that the Israeli-Arab conflict could 
potentially extend into the Gulf region if Israel was not checked. This is because Israel 
"had come to be seen as an enemy that rejected all peace offers and aspires to control the 
Gulf region and its wealth." 17 The Israeli alliance with Iran was aimed at "weakening any 
possible Arab military threat from the Arab Gulf either by Arab Gulf reinforcements to one 
or more of the Arab states bordering Israel or by direct military strikes from the Gulf 
through one of the neighbouring Arab states." 18 
This section will cover the historical development of the Iranian-Israeli relationship. 
To fully understand the dynamics of the relationship there is a need to look at the period 
prior to the period of this study. Therefore, this section will cover the period from 1950 up 
to 1979. 
From the early fifties, the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, had close links 
with Israel. The similar kind of relations and alliances that Iran and Israel had with the US 
as well as the similar functions both played regarding US regional interests, helped to 
I 5. For .further details on the Kurdish factor see: Elmer Berger (Winter/.Spring i99 I), p.83 
I 6. ibid. 
I 7. The Stanley Foundation ,Policv Brie( #7," US Challenges and Choices in the Gulf israel and the Gu(f", 
p.I 
I 8. Elmer Berger, (Winter/Spring I 99 I), p. 83 
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cement this relationshi p. 19 These relations extended to inc I ude military, intelligence and 
economic fields. 
2-2-1 Relation developments and their vari!JUS stages 
Fearful of Soviet threats, the Shah quickly joined the American camp during the 
Cold War and the fear of communist threats remained a main motivation for the Shah in his 
dealings with the region. When it became clear that Israel would also be a pat1 of the 
Western camp, the Shah also began having relations with Israel; however, he tried to adopt 
political positions that would not drag Iran deeply into the Arab-Israeli conflict. He 
believed that he could avoid being dragged into the Arab-Israeli conflict and yet still use his 
relations with Israel to achieve important goals of Iranian foreign policy.20 Such policies 
included improving relations with the US and limiting Soviet influence in the region. 
The Shah played the game based on the two pillars of his policy. While the pillars 
were in many ways contradictory, they formed the basis for the Shah's relationship with 
Israel throughout his reign. The first was his commitment based on principle to suppot1 the 
Palestinian and Arab rights in the conflict. The second was his pragmatic political approach 
in dealing with Israel as a de facto reality that not only must be dealt with but also that he 
could benefit from. Through the 1950's and 1960's he desired American suppot1 against 
Soviet ambitions and the challenge of Nasserism in the Gulf region. His perception that 
Israel could influence US policy in the region provided him with the basic motivation to 
establish relations with Israel. This will be clarified later in this chapter. 
The Iranian-Israeli relationship passed through what may be summed up as three 
phases during the period starting with the establishment of the State of Israel and ending 
with the downfall of the Shah's regime in 1979, after the Islamic revolution headed by 
Khomeini took over. 
Researchers have disagreed on how to divide the stages of the Iran-Israel 
relationship. Some suggested that the June War in 1967 was a turning point, while others 
saw Nasser's death in 1970, after his approval of a political settlement that was offered by 
19. Syed Zahra, "Strategy of the Two Major Powers and Security in the Gulf', Al-Fikr Al-Jstrategv At-
Arabi, Arab Development Institute, No.2, (Oct.l981), p. 84 
20. R. K. Ramazani, Security Issues in the Gul[Region, (/ 981 ), p. 4/3 
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the US Secretary of State known as "The Rogers' Plan", as the most important factor in the 
middle stage of these relations. Other researchers consider the October War in 1973 as an 
important turning point in Israeli-Iranian relations that occurred even before the Shah's 
downfall. This chapter of the thesis divides the period into three stages: 1948-1967, 1967-
1973 and 1973- I 979. 
2-2-1-1 First Stage: 1948-1967 
Iranian-Israeli relations during this period were largely dictated by the Cold War 
between the Soviet Union and the US. The Shah feared Soviet ambitions against Iran. In 
I 94 I, during World War II, the Soviet Union occupied Iranian Azerbaijan and remained 
there after the end of the war. It was only in 1946, under Western pressure, that the Soviets 
withdrew. That event was one of the first con1licts of the Cold War and it placed the Shah 
squarely in the American camp. 
Iran did not recognize the newly born Jewish State in its early days. It is interesting 
to note that: "After the formation of the UN Committee on Palestine Affairs on May l51h, 
1947, the Iranian delegate in the Committee, Nassrallah Intizam, voted against the partition 
of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states."21 Iran was reluctant to recognize Israel at that 
time due to many factors including the balance of power, Iran's special relations with the 
Arab and Muslim world, and the strong Israeli links with the USSR, the traditional enemy 
of Iran. When Israel was first established, it enjoyed strong ties to both the US and the 
USSR and it was not certain which side Israel would take in the Cold War. The USSR had 
been one of the Zionist movement's most important arms suppliers prior to I 948 and it 
supported the UN decision to establish Israel. But after Israel was established, Israeli 
leaders quickly moved to the Western camp. When Israel's position in the Cold War 
became clear, the Shah practically recognized Israel in I 950 and established low-level 
relations. 
Iran then allowed for the emigration to Israel of tens of thousands of Iranian .Jews22 
at a time when the rest of the Arab and Muslim world was refusing to recognize Israel and 
21. Shwneil Seigif, (1983), p. 179 
22. Ibid. 
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tried to prevent their Jewish populations from emigrating to and strengthening the new 
state. According to Seigif, 55 thousand lfanian Jews migrated to Israel between 1948-
1968.23 The Israeli census of 1961 gives an even higher number, identifying approximately 
60,000 Jews in Israel originally from Jran?4 The Shah also allowed Iran to be used as a 
transit station for Iraqi Jews who migrated to Israel in the early fifties. These migrants used 
to stay for ten days in Iran before they were transported to Israel by air. It is estimated that 
almost 60,000 out of a total population of 120,000 Iraqi Jews left to Israel through Iran in 
1950. 25 
Iran however was not at the time very concerned with its relations with the Arab 
world while it saw the new link with Israel and the US as an impot1ant political step that 
would help it face the growing Soviet influence in the region, on one hand, and the widely 
spread Arab nationalism in the Middle East, on the other.26 
This stage witnessed noticeable and concentrated Israeli activity to broaden 
relations with Iran on the basis of sincere friendships between officials in both countries, on 
one hand, and on the active mutual visits and meetings, on the other. During this stage, an 
Iranian affairs office was opened in Tel Aviv inside the Swiss embassy in 1950. It 
supervised the immigration of Jews to Israel, from and through Iran, in addition to 
broadening the field of trade exchange between both sides. 
Such relations accelerated after the 23rd July 1952 Revolution in Egypt, which 
raised the slogan of "Arab homeland from the Ocean to the Gulf'. It was strengthened by 
two Nasser steps, the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956, and the sending of Egyptian troops 
to Yemen, which controlled the Mandeb Gate of the Red Sea. The military cooperation 
between Israel and Iran continued to increase. The Shah justified the increasingly strong 
relations with Israel by noting the escalation in danger as a result of Nasser's policies 
23. Ibid. 
24. Elmer Berger, (Winter/Spring 1991), p. 83 
25. Ibid. 
26. R.K Ramazani, (1981), pp. 415-416 
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towards the Gulf. The Shah regarded his links with Israel as a defensive measure in the face 
ofthis Arab danger?7 
In 1956, Iran agreed to ship oil to the Israeli port of Eilat. It was agreed that a 
pipeline connecting Eilat to the Israeli city of Bar Shiva would be built, thus providing an 
alternative shipping route after the Suez Canal was closed by Nasser in 1956. The year 
1957 witnessed an important development in Israeli-Iranian relations. The Iranian Prime 
Minister, General Taymour Bekhtiar, met with the Israeli Ambassador to Paris, Jacob Tsur, 
in September 1957. Both pm1ies agreed on an unwritten alliance, which resulted in opening 
an Israeli Commercial Office in Tehran in 1958,28 and in the activation of the diplomatic 
missions of both sides. These steps coincided with the expansion of the Nasserist national 
tide aiming at the unification of the Arab homeland on one hand, and with the signing of 
weapon deals by both Egypt and Syria with the USSR in 1955 and 1956 respectively, on 
the other. 29 The Israeli oil pipeline from Eilat to Bar Shiva was completed in 1960 allowing 
for an increase in Iranian oil supply shipments to lsrael.30 In the same year Iran signed a 
defence pact with the United States. The Shah emphasized Iran's recognition of Israel in a 
press conference on 23rd July 1960. Such developments led Nasser to cut his diplomatic 
relations with Iran, and a media war erupted between both countries. 31 King Hussein also 
called upon the Shah to retreat from his decision to recognize Israel. As a response to 
pressure from both the Arab League and the Iranian public itself, Iran did not exchange 
Ambassadors with Israel. But Iranian-Israeli relations continued to consolidate on the 
military and economic levels.32 Ben Gurion complained about the secrecy that was 
enforced by the Shah on Iranian-Israeli relations in his letter written to the Shah on May 23, 
1963.33 The year 1964 witnessed Arab attempts to restore Iranian-Egyptian relations, but 
27. Ibid. 
28. Souresrafi Behrouz, Khomeini and Israel, (1988), p. 34 
29. Benjamin Beit Halhami, The Israeli Octopus, ( 1989), p. 19 
30. Shumueil Seigif, The Iranian Triangle, Second volume of two, (1990), p. 55 
31 Shumeil Seigif, (1983), pp. 98-100 
32. Ibid, p./01 
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the Shah maintained his position of refusing to restore relations with Egypt until Egypt 
apologized publicly. 
2-2-1-2 Second Stage: 1967-1973 
Both Iran and Israel shared joint interests in their opposition to the Soviet Union and 
to Arab ambitions for unity. At the outbreak ofthe June 1967 War, and the defeat of Arabs 
by Israel, the Iranian-Israeli bilateral relations began a new stage. The outcome of the war 
gave Iran indirect gains represented by Nasser's defeat and the collapse of his Unionist 
Arab Project. The war also led to the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Yemen and the 
pottrayal of the Soviets as incapable of supporting their Arab allies in defeating Israel. The 
Soviet stance led to the retreat of popular inclinations towards Communism and the USSR 
in the Arab world. 34 
At the same time, the Shah publicly denounced the June 6, 1967 Israeli aggression 
against the Arab countries. The Shah in fact froze cooperation with Israel for two 
months.35 At the time, the Shah called upon Israel to withdraw from the newly occupied 
territories while at the same time calling upon the Arabs to recognize Israel in its 1948 
borders. This was in accordance with the traditional position of Iran in calling upon all 
parties in the region to adhere to UN resolutions and international law without getting Iran 
deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to satisfy Iranian public opinion, which was 
strongly against the Israeli aggression. It is worth mentioning that the Shah kept most of 
his relations with Israel away from the public, and the political and diplomatic relations 
between Iran and Israel were always kept at a low discreet level.36 
There was however no signs of a long-term downgrading in the Iranian-Israeli 
relationship in the aftermath of the 1967 war and the Shah in fact continued providing 
Israel with oil during and after the war despite strong Arab objections. The Shah's 
criticism of Israel thus did not cost him much in his relations with the US and Israel while it 
34. R.K.Ramazani. (1981), p. 417 
35. Shumeil Seig(f"(/990), pp. 91-92 
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provided him with the political cover to leave the door open for any future developments in 
his relations with the Arab world. 37 
The Shah did not gain much traction in the Arab world from his temporary actions 
against Israel, especially since the leftist-leaning Ba'ath Party took power in Iraq in 1968 
raising the level of tension between Iran and Iraq. The Iranians soon realized that they 
were subject to a new Iraqi threat that might substitute for the subsiding threat from Nasser. 
Moreover, the Arab-Israeli War of Attrition which lasted from 1967-1970 brought back the 
ghost ofNasser's and Soviet dangers to both Israel and Iran. 
The gravity of these dangers were somewhat reduced by the Egyptian and Jordanian 
acceptance ofthe US-sponsored "Rogers' Plan" for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. That acceptance resulted in the halting of the War of Attrition by the Arabs against 
the Israeli occupation forces, in 1970. The Egyptian move attracted the attention of Iranian 
politicians, who saw it as an important shift in Egyptian diplomacy away from their alliance 
with the Soviets. Consequently, Egyptian-Iranian diplomatic relations were restored after 
10 years of disruption. After Nasser's sudden death in September 1970, events accelerated 
for the normalization of Egyptian-Iranian relations and the Shah established especially 
good relations with the new Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat. Many other Arab leaders 
consequently visited Tehran. 
These increasingly warm ties between Iran and the Arabs were slightly disrupted by 
a dispute over three Emirate Islands. The Shah had long claimed both Bahrain as well as 
the three Emirate islands as an intrinsic part of Iran. While the Americans and British were 
strongly opposed, practically, to Iranian control over Bahrain, they did not oppose Iran 
taking over the three small Emirate islands. "The Shah reached an understanding with 
Britain on the fate of Bahrain and the three islands in the Gulf."38 With Britain's full 
withdrawal from the Arab Gulf in 1971, the Shah occupied the Emirate Islands of Abu 
Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Arabs strongly protested against the move. In 
addition to cutting diplomatic relations with Iran, Iraq cut its diplomatic relations with 
37. Mostafa Zahrani," The Coup that Changed the Middle East: Mossadeq V. The CIA in Retrospect", 
World Policy Journal. (Summer 2002), p. 94 
38. US Libra!)' of Congress, "State and Society, 1964-1974," Iran - A Countrv Study; The web: 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov.lcgi-binlquenJ•2/r?frdlcsldy:@/ield(DOC!D+ir0027) 
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Britain in opposition to British complicity in Iran's taking of the islands. Libya suggested 
sending troops to the Gulf to help protect the region from Iranian incursions and it 
nationalised its shares in British petroleum in opposition to the British stance.39 The 
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister affirmed that "such Iranian policy couldn't serve the security and 
stability in the Arabian Gulf region." He emphasized that Kuwait was worried about such 
Iranian military moves in the Gulf.40 
However, the dispute over the Emirate islands was kept at a low level and when 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet military consultants and experts from 
Egypt in July, 197241 the Shah's relationship with Egypt improved dramatically. The new 
Iranian relationship with Egypt, which continued to be Israel's strongest enemy, led to 
different Iranian perceptions of its regional alliances and role. While Sadat never insisted 
that the Shah cut or lower the level of his relations with Israel as a condition for restoring 
Iran-Egypt relations,42 Israel was alarmed that the developments could have a serious 
impact on Israel's interests whether in its relations with Iran or in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
This alarm was underscored by the fact that Iran attempted to keep its strong relations with 
Israel hidden. The Prime Minister of Iran, Amir Abbas Hawaidi strongly denied any 
diplomatic or other relations between Iran and Israel in 1973."43 Mr. Khala Tbari, the 
Foreign Minister of Iran, affirmed that "Iran doesn't recognize the legitimacy of Israeli 
existence and has no official relations with Israel. Iran has only recognized the de facto 
existence of Israel as a country that has a chair in the UN. "44 
39. Rosemmy Saeid," The dispute on the Arab Islands in the Gulf", Gul(and Arab Peninsula Studies, (April 
1976), p.9 
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2-2-1-3 Third Stage: 1973-1979 
Israeli-Iranian relations began their third stage during the October 1973 Israeli-Arab 
War. Iran clearly sympathized with the Arab side during the war both because public 
opinion in Iran was overwhelmingly pro-Arab and because of the good personal relations 
the Shah had with Sadat.45 During the war, Tehran sent medical aid to Egypt, and 
warplanes with pilots to Saudi Arabia to help in solving logistical problems related to the 
war. It also allowed Soviet civilian planes to use Iranian airspace to transpot1 weapons to 
the Arab countries bordering Israel. Meanwhile, Iranians did not allow Australian Jews, 
who volunteered to fight with the Israeli side in the war, to pass through Tehran on their 
way to Israel.46 
The Shah also supported Sadat's peace initiative to end the cont1ict. He encouraged 
and pressured Israel to accept UN resolutions and advocated bringing about a 
comprehensive peace in the region in compliance with Iran's traditional stance towards the 
conflict. As part of a US-supported peace deal, he exerted pressure on Israel to completely 
withdraw from the Sinai, including the Abu-Rudeis oil field after the 1973 war. In 
exchange, Iran promised through the US "to provide enough oil for Israel. "47 By strongly 
advocating and working for a peaceful solution, the Shah felt he would be able to earn a 
position of leadership in the Gulf region and he used his developing relations with Egypt as 
a catalyst for that ambition. 
In the aftermath of the war, Iran's improved relations with the Arab world is best 
exemplified by the settlement of the Iranian-Iraqi dispute over the Shatt AI-Arab with the 
signing ofthe "1975 Agreement" in Algeria. Even more impot1ant than this was the larger 
strategic picture that existed in the region following the war in which the United States 
increasingly saw the oil-rich Arab countries as playing a role in the security of the region. 
After the assassination of Saudi King Feisal in 1975, Saudi Arabia became willing to use its 
monetary prowess as a means of neutralizing the influence of leftist-leaning states, such as 
South Yemen and Iraq, and bolstering pro-Western governments in the region, thus 
45. Shumeil Seig(f, (1983), p. 105 
46. R.K. Ramazani, (1981), p. 419 
47. Souresraji Behrouz, (1988), p. 3 7 
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complementing the pro-Western Iranian security policy in the Gulf and leading to a 
concrete application of what was known as the American "Twin-Pillar Policy."48 
When the Right-wing Likud Pm1y under the leadership of Menachem Begin came to 
power in Israel in 1977, the Shah increased his criticism of the Israeli policy of refusing to 
implement UN resolutions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Shah had long held the 
position that the US should force Israel to evacuate occupied Arab territories and recognize 
Palestinian rights.49 This stance resulted in the new Israeli Right-wing Government led by 
Begin to agitate against the Shah's regime and the Israeli Government called upon the US to 
halt its aid to Iran. These political developments resulted in the deterioration of Iranian-
Israeli relations on the political level. 
Despite both this political deterioration as well as the application of the American 
"Twin Pillar" Policy that worked to bring Iran closer to the pro-Western Arab countries, 
Iranian-Israeli relations continued to flourish throughout the 1970s in the economic, 
security and intelligence fields. Trade exchange continued between Israel and Iran, a joint 
Iranian-Israeli project to develop a long-range missile capable of caJTying nuclear warheads 
was signed as late as 1977, and the Mossad-Savak intelligence agencies maintained high 
levels of cooperation. The fact that such relations continued despite political tensions, 
underscores the deepness of the Iranian-Israeli relationship and it was that deepness that 
continued to be seen as a security threat to the Arab Gulf states. 
This view of the Iranian-Israeli relationship as a continuing threat to the Gulf was 
expressed by Mohammad AI-Ansari, one of the most well-known Arab intellectuals of the 
Gulf. Al-Ansari said to AI-Sayad Magazine: "The cooperation among the intelligence 
agencies of the US, Israel and Iran is full and continuous. This cooperation is aimed at 
48. R.K. Ramazani, "Security in the Persian Gulf'', Foreign Affairs. (Spring 1979), The web: 
http:l!wwwforeignaffairs.org/1978/4.html; Bruce R. Kuniholm, "September II: A campus Reflects", 
American Historv journal, Vol. 89, Issue 2, The web: 
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M. Nixon's endorsement in 1970 of what became the "hviu-pi/lar" policy, the United States sought to ensure 
stability in the gulf through cooperation with Iran, which American officials recognized as the region's 
predominant power, and Saudi Arabia". The web: http:/lwww.dukenews.duke.edu/9/lsitelkuniholm.html 
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exchanging military and political information regarding the Gulf as well as the rest of the 
Arab world ... The Israeli diplomats have freedom to work in Tehran, while Iranian oil 
remains the main source for Israeli industry and military."50 
AI-Talea', a well known magazine published in Kuwait, described Iranian-Israeli 
relations as a means of allowing for Zionist activities to have access to the Gulf through 
Iran. It emphasized the fact that Israeli economic activities were penetrating the Gulf 
through different Iranian companies.51 
In 1979, an Islamic Revolution overthrew the Shah of Iran and led to the 
establishment of a new regime in Iran. Interestingly, Iran remained an impmiant factor in 
the Arab Gulf States relationship to the Arab-Israeli conflict even after the revolution, 
though in a different way. While the Iran factor during the Shah's regime involved the 
strong ties between the Shah and Israel; after the Revolution the Iran factor involved the 
strong mutual public hostility between Iran and Israel while at the same time there was 
hostility between Iran and the Arab Gulf states. The public hostility with Israel provided 
Iran with some popular support within the Arab world and thus forced the Arab Gulf 
countries to compete with Iran by claiming support to the Palestinian issue as a means of 
the Arab Gulf states being able to maintain their own legitimacy while also justifying their 
opposition to Iran. On the other hand, Iran received military anns deals from Israel during 
its war with Iraq (1980-1988) as will be detailed later, which raised additional security 
concerns in the Gulf. 
2-2-2 Main Fields of Cooperation 
While the above sections have shown the chronological development of Israeli-
Iranian ties, it is important to provide a more in-depth look into the different fields of their 
relationship. This in-depth study will thus enable us to see the full picture of how the 
Iranian-Israeli relations impacted upon the Arab Gulf States security. 
50. Mohammad Jaber Al-Ansari, "An Arab Integrated Bloc to Face the American -Iranian challenge", Gulf 
and Arab Peninsula Studies Journal, (Janumy 1975), p. 188 
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2-2-2-1 Economic Field 
Iran began supplying Israel with oil in 1954, directly and constantly. The closure of 
the Suez Canal in 1956 led to deeper ties between both sides, because around 73% of Iran's 
imports and about 76% of its exports used to pass through the Suez Canal. After the 
Canal's closure, Israel was the practical alternative port to the Canal. This turn in events 
coincided with the Soviet trend to halt oil supplies to Israel, following Israel's participation 
in the tripmiite aggression on Egypt in 1956. As a result, an agreement between Israel and 
Iran was signed in which Iran would supply Israel with its oil needs at a price of $1.30 per 
barrel. The agreement took effect from the summer of 1957.52 The Israeli oil pipeline from 
Eilat to Bar Shiva was completed in September 1960. Iran, then, doubled its oil supplies to 
Israel. Another pipeline was constructed in the summer of 1967, which also doubled, for 
the second time, Iranian oil supplies to Israel. Moreover, Israel used to re-export Iranian oil 
from its ports on the Mediterranean Sea to countries in Eastern Europe. 
As for trade relations, Israeli exports to Iran, including military equipment, 
increased from the value of $23 million in 1972, to $225 million in 1978. This composed 
about 7% of total Israeli exports (see Table 7).53 
The commercial tenders, contracts and regular flights between Israel and Iran 
should also be mentioned. Israel trained more than 1500 Iranians in agricultural 
cooperatives and helped in the activation oftourism and agriculture in Iran. This interaction 
continued in spite of the deterioration in the political relations after the Likud Party took 
power in Israel in the 1977 elections. So "under the Shah, from 1953 to 1979, Iran was one 
of Israel's primary suppliers of oil and a major commercial partner". 54 
2-2-2-2 Military and Security Fields 
The military aspects of the relations were manifested in mutual military cooperation 
and by the training of Iranian officers by Israel. On the intelligence and military fronts, the 
Israeli Mossad took part in creating the Iranian Savak apparatus, training its officials in 
52. Shumeil Seigif, (1990), p. 55 
53. Berijamin Halhemi, (1989), p. 21 
54. Allreter.com Encyclopedia," Israel and fran", the web: www. lupii?[o.comlcountJ)'-guide-studyllsraell 
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Israel and undertaking many joint intelligence operations.55 During the long period of 
strong bilateral relations between Iran and Israel, strong links were established between the 
general staffs of both sides. Such links included ties among those involved in combat, air 
force operations, intelligence and counter espionage. Israel helped in training 400 Iranian 
pilots, paratroopers and gunners56 . 
The Head of Iranian Intelligence, Ali Kai, first visited Israel in October 1958, 
accompanied by his wife and daughter. He was received by General Yehoshafat Hercabi, 
Head of Israeli Intelligence. During that visit, Kai met with Yizhak Rabin, Ben Gurion, 
Golda Meir and Shimon Peres.57 He also met with Israeli Reserve Colonel Jacob Nimrodi. 
Kai suggested that Nimrodi be designated as an Israeli Liaison Officer in Tehran. Nimrodi, 
who was later promoted to a Military Attache, is considered the engineer of Israeli-Iranian 
ties. He lived in Iran for more than 25 years. 
The former Iranian Air-force Commander Amir Hussien Rabiey said, "Most Iranian 
officers above the rank of major visited Israel. . . . The Deputy Minister of Defence for 
Purchasing Affairs, General Hassan Tofnyan visited Israel more than a hundred times."58 
The first military-security agreement between both sides was signed on January 2211d, 1960. 
General Haim Herzog, Head of Intelligence in the Israeli army, signed it with the Shah 
himself at Marmara Palace in Tehran. This agreement formed the basic foundation for 
broader military ties between Iran and Israel.59 Accordingly, Israeli air industries began to 
repair and maintain "Iran Air" planes in July 1960.60 During the period of enhanced 
relations, all Israeli Chiefs of Staff except for Haim Bar Lev visited Tehran. 
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Israeli experts helped in technical operations of the Savak. The Shah also sent many 
security and intelligence officers to study in Israel. Cooperation between both sides 
developed and included the exchanging of reports and assessments about Arab countries 
and the Gulf region, in addition to the activities of Palestinian organizations. Cooperation 
continuously and steadily increased during the reciprocal visits of Iranian and Israeli 
intelligence officers. 61 Experts from both countries worked together to develop a long-range 
missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The agreement regarding this joint project 
was signed in the spring of 1977, during Shimon Peres' visit to Iran. Iran financed the 
project with one billion dollars of crude oil that was to be transferred to Israel.62 These 
military and intelligence relations were seen as a security threat by the Arab Gulf countries. 
They felt that the exchange of information between Israel and Iran about Gulf military and 
security situations increased the danger to the Gulf from both Iran and Israel. 
2-2-2-3 Political Field and Visits 
On December 41h, 1961, Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, paid a secret 
visit to Tehran. In 1966, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol visited the Iranian capital, while 
Golda Meir had done the same in 1965 and met with the Shah. She visited Tehran a second 
time in 1974 at the invitation ofthe Shah himself. During the period of 1974-1977, Yitzhak 
Rabin paid three visits to Iran, while Yigal Alon paid two visits. Israeli Foreign Minister, 
Moshe Dayan, paid three visits while Shimon Peres paid one visit. Menachem Begin, the 
Prime Minister, visited Tehran once in 1977. Underscoring the importance of the 
intelligence aspect of the relationship, the main host to all the Israeli officials was Ne'mt 
Allah Nasseri, the Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Iranian Intelligence Apparatus, 
"Savak".63 Such high-level visits reflect the deepness of the Iranian-Israeli relationship. As 
both Iran and Israel had ambitions toward the Gulf region, these visits also increased the 
national security anxieties of the Arab Gulf countries. 
61. Ibid., and Shwneil Seigif, (1990), pp. 58-59 
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2-2-3 The motives and gains of both sides of the relationship 
1. The Iranians 
The fundamental motive of Iranian foreign policy under the Shah was Iran's basic 
interest to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East. That goal was attained following both 
the 1967 War and the 1973 War.64 Another important reason behind the Shah's enthusiasm 
to establish and maintain strong ties with Israel was his belief that American Jews could use 
their influence in the United States to help him in the American Congress.65 The Shah 
hoped that Israel would be the advocate for Iran in the US. During the December, 1958 
visit to Tehran of General Yehoshafat Hercabi, the Israeli Head of Intelligence; the Shah 
asked Israel for a favour. The Shah said to his guest: "as for the Israeli high prestige in 
Washington and the great Jewish influence [in the US], Israel should explain to the 
Americans what is going on in the region. The US is not aware of Iran's need for weapons 
and financial aid".66 The Shah repeated his demands to every Israeli whom he met. Israel's 
former President, Chaim Herzog, commented on the Shah's demands by saying, "the Shah 
saw every Israeli as a gateway to Washington." 67 Such relations aimed also at balancing 
the threat that Iran felt from the Arab Nasserism tide which was escalating in the Gulf. As 
far as for Israel, which is considered a strong enemy to Egypt, such relations would pave 
the way for both of them to potentially work against that "common" enemy where the shah 
considered such relations as a "defensive measure", as mentioned earlier. 
2. The lsl'aelis 
It is believed by some observers, especially those from Israel, that relations between 
Tel Aviv and Tehran were strategic, regardless of the regime in lran68 . Such a belief is 
64. Andrew I. Killgore," Iran and Israel: A Parallel", Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 
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based on three main considerations. First, Iran forms a continuous factor of unrest in the 
Arab World. Second, Iran is able to neutralize Iraq in the equation of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, as Iraq is one of the strongest potential enemies of Israel and the most dangerous. 
Third, Iran is a basic element in the Israeli "Perimeter Theory"69• Ben Gurion had suggested 
this theory in 1953 and it was adopted by the Israeli Government as a policy in which the 
Israelis would aim at "having close relations with non-Arab countries of the region, t.e. 
Ethiopia, Turkey, and lran."70 
The supposed contrast between the Arab world and Persian Iran, and the perceived 
suffering of the Shiites in Arab countries of Sunni majority, may be considered stimulating 
factors for discord between Iran and the Arab world. If so, the above three strategic 
motives are valid regardless of the regime in Tehran. Israel, as a result, was keen to 
enhance relations with the Shah. Such relations provided Israel with a presence on the Gulf 
coasts which it could use to serve its own ambitions and interests. 
With the Shah's downfall in 1979, Israel lost a strong ally and their relations with 
Iran came to an end. In the field of intelligence, Israel had had more influence in Iran than 
any other country in the world; and in nearly all other areas Israeli influence in Iran was 
second only to that of the US.71 In the 1980s, the Israeli desire to test the possibility of 
reviving these ties as well as their immediate concem about the fate of 80,000 Jews72 in 
Iran encouraged Israel to assist Iran in its war against Iraq. This became known as the 
"Iran-Contra" scandal, and the US co-operated with Israel in this regard as Richard Curtiss 
will show later in this chapter. These developments led to a renewal of contact between 
Iran and Israel. Israelis hoped for and worked to change the attitudes of the new regime in 
Iran to increase the possibility that Iran may restore the old relations. Israeli Prime Minister, 
Yitzhak Shamir emphasized this in February 1987, when he said: "Israel is greatly 
69. Shumeil Seig{f, (1983), pp. 93, 107 
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interested in establishing a strategic alliance with Iran in spite ofthe long distance between 
Israel and the new regime". 73 
All of these economic, military, and political ties make it clear that it is crucial to 
understand the Iranian-Israeli relations to come to a full understanding of the Arab Gulf 
countries worry regarding them. 
The relationship with Iran was very strategic for Israel. But it was viewed by the 
Arab Gulf states as a threat that boosted their security concerns. The Shah fell under Arab 
pressures especially from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Arabs called upon him to 
stop providing Israel with oil and to use his influence in Washington to force Israel to ease 
its position in regard to the Arab world.74 
Israel-Iran relations, Gulf security and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
Israeli-Iranian relations were both a security concern to the Arab Gulf countries as 
well as a factor in the formation of their policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Early 
Israeli interference in Gulf security affairs, most notably in Israeli assistance to the Kurdish 
riots against Iraqi stability in the 1950s and 1960s, was facilitated by the Israeli ties to Iran. 
This Israeli policy towards the Kurds underscores the fact that the Israeli relationship with 
Iran gave Israel the ability to extend and secure its vital interests in the Gulf in accordance 
with the Israeli "perimeter theory" explained earlier in this chapter. This strengthened Israel 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict as it weakened the Arab Gulf countries ability to contribute 
directly to that conflict in case of any escalation. The presence of Israel next to the borders 
of the Arab Gulf countries has been manifested in increasing security concerns affecting the 
shaping of their policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict as discussed in this chapter and 
chapter three. 
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Furthermore, any attempt by the Americans to use the Israeli-Iranian relationship as 
part of a pro-American agenda in the region was seen as coming at the expense of the Arab 
Gulf countries strategic impotiance to the US and a threat to the impmiance of the Gulf 
countries in the American "Twin Pillars" policy. 
In many other ways, Iran was used as a source of Israeli strength in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Iran was a major source of Jewish migration into Israel and served as a station for 
Iraqi Jews on their way to emigrate to Israel, thus helping bolster the Israeli State and 
provoking Arab and Islamic opposition. Iran also provided Israel with its need for oil, thus 
strengthening its military and civil industry in addition to creating economic and social 
stability. By strengthening the Israeli state and helping it become stable; Iran played an 
impmiant role in strengthening Israel's position in the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
consequently increasing the security concerns of the Arab Gulf countries. 
Those security concerns were increased by a number of other factors as well. The 
intelligence cooperation between Israel and Iran in which the two countries exchanged 
reports on the Arab Gulf countries and the Palestinian organizations in the Gulf was of deep 
concern to the Arab Gulf countries. The joint Israeli-Iranian project to develop a long 
range missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads also increased the security concerns not 
only of the Arab Gulf countries, but of the entire Arab world. The Shah's interpretation of 
Iranian relations with Israel as a "defensive measure" against Nasserism also increased the 
security concerns in the Gulf. This interpretation implicitly indicated that the Shah would 
consider using his ties to Israel in the event of any military conflict with the Arab countries, 
hence providing for the real potential of Israeli pmiicipation in a conflict between Iran and 
the Arabs in the Gulf. 
These examples of Israeli interference in the Gulfs affairs, the Israeli potential to 
harm US-Gulf relations, the various ways in which Iran strengthened Israel as well as the 
direct security concerns that came about as a result of the Iranian-Israeli relationship all 
supplement the linkages and dynamics. They also underscore the potential reciprocity 
between Gulf security on the one hand and the Arab-Israeli cont1ict on the other. 
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2-3 Israel and Gulf Security in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution 
Israel's influence on the security of the Arab Gulf countries did not end with the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979. Its influence continued largely through its relationship with the 
US. The US became an increasingly important player in Gulf security after the Iranian 
Revolution and after the downfall of the Soviet Union, as was seen in Chapter One. The US 
dimension to Israel's impact upon Gulf security came through the American strategic 
alliance with Israel, the Israeli ability to influence US policy and the political obstacles the 
US-Israeli relationship placed in the way of improving US-Gulf ties. 
Israeli Strategic Role 
In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, Israel increased its efforts to put itself 
forth as the frontier military base for defending Western interests in the region. Zionist 
propaganda put forward Israel as the only Western-style democracy in an unstable and 
uncivilized Arab/Muslim world. Pridham affirmed that "it is against this background that 
Israel objected to the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia in 1980 and the Fahd plan for peace in 
1981. At the same time, Israel engaged in a campaign of rhetoric presenting Israel as a solid 
democracy, a part ofthe "free world" and the only reliable ally of the west in the region as a 
counteract to any developments in the Gulf-US relations. 75 Israeli supporters noted that 
while the Shah of Iran had earlier worked to defend Western interests in the region, that 
role was a factor in leading to his being ovetihrown, thus proving that no Arab or Muslim 
country could be trusted to play the role of a stable defender of Western interests. 
It was within this context that Israel destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor on June i'\ 
1981, using advanced aircraft supplied by the US.76 While at the time the US did not 
officially approve the operation, Israel's ability to undertake the act illustrated the military 
role that Israel could play in the service of Western interests. The Reagan Administration, 
(1980-1988), respected Israel's military capabilities and saw Israel as a force that could 
block Soviet designs against Persian (Arabian) Gulf oil. Thus, the US and Israel signed a 
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Strategic Cooperation Agreement in November 1981.77 In describing the agreement, 
Garaudy says: "Ariel Sharon, Begin's Minister of War, met his counterpart, Casper 
Weinberger, and together they drew up a strategic cooperation plan to deflect any Soviet 
threat in the region." 78 The agreement represented an important upgrading in the US-Israeli 
relationship and confirmed Washington's acceptance of Israel playing the role of a proxy 
Western military force in a region that included the Persian (Arabian) GuiC9 
This potential role of Israel was further solidified in 1982 when Israel invaded and 
occupied large parts of Lebanon and quickly destroyed much of the PLO infrastructure, 
forcing the dispersal of its forces. Israel showed that it could eliminate the military 
capabilities of an enemy of the US and Israel and a regional ally of the Soviets. This 
further consolidated the belief of many Reagan administration officials that Israel had an 
impmiant strategic role to play in the Middle East. 
Such a role for Israel was alarming to the Arab Gulf countries, which feared that 
Israel might use its arsenal of traditional arms or weapons of mass destruction directly 
against their interests. The Arab Gulf countries fear of such Israeli ambitions was pmiially 
fuelled by the strong opposition Israel had to the sale of any weapons, even defensive ones, 
to the Arab Gulf states. Just before the US signed the strategic cooperation agreement with 
Israel, the American Jewish Lobby had put considerable effmi in their unsuccessful 
campaign to block the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. The Arab Gulf States 
feared that the attack on Iraq and the invasion of Lebanon might be a prelude to military 
operations against the territories of the Arab Gulf states. Their fear was especially pe1iinent 
in light of the awareness in the Arab Gulf countries of the early Zionist maps that included 
large parts of their tenitory in "Israel" and the widespread belief in the region that Israel 
had expansionary designs on the Gulf as well as other Arab countries as was repeatedly 
stated by Saudi leaders. 80 
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Saudi Arabia, in pat1icular, saw Israel as a potential security threat. 81 The Saudi 
calculations were based on a number of factors including: 
• Israel's occupation of two Saudi islands during the 1967 War, Tiran and 
Sanafer (see map (3) in the appendix), which were being used by Egyptian 
troops at the breakout of the war. The two islands were not returned to Saudi 
Arabia after the Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Israel 
subsequently allowed UN forces on the islands with an understanding that 
they would not be returned to Saudi Arabia. 
o The Israeli cooperation with Iranian intelligence m collecting information 
about the Arab Gulf States during the reign of the Shah before 1979. 
• Israel's daring use of Saudi airspace, without Saudi permission, when they 
struck the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June of 1981. 
• The continued Israeli objection to any US arms sales to Saudi Arabia, 
whether the advanced AWACS aircraft in October 1981,82 the Phantoms F-
15 in 1992, or the Space Satellite deal of 1994. · 
• The continued Israeli interference in the Arab Gulf countries security 
relations with the US in the Gulf region, in the Red Sea and even in the 
Tiran Straits.83 
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82. AWACS DEAL TO Saudi Arabia: 
The Reagan administration in its efforts to promote peace in the region and to face the Soviet 
influence proposed to sell the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) A WACS aircraft with all the assistance needed 
to activate them. President Reagan began defending his proposal on I October 1981. He was ultimately able 
to win the votes in Congress after an intensive four week marathon that ended on 28 October 1981. 
The main source of opposition challenging the president's proposal came from Israel and its Jewish 
Lobby and fi"iends in Congress. Secretary of State Alexander Haig met separately with both Saudi Crown 
prince Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin during the marathon to clear the 
way for the approval of the deal. He also addressed the House Foreign Affairs Committee as well as the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee which both rejected the deal. 
President Reagan lobbied for the deal by himse(( using his personal il?fluence to pressure Senators. 
He emphasized that "such a deal won't pose a threat to Israel or compromise U.S national security." 
(Source: The Eighties Club, the Daily News - October 1981, http://eightiesclub. tripod.com/id I I 6. htm) 
As background support for the Saudi E-3 AWACS, the Peace Sentinel program for Saudi Arabia began in 
1981. It includedfive A WACS aircraft and six E-3 derivative (KE-3) in-flight refuelling tanker aircrajt, along 
with spare parts, trainers and support equipment. In 1984, the Saudi government exercised an option to 
increase the tanker order to eight. The .first Saudi E-3 was delivered in June 1986. with deliveries of the 
remaining E-3s and tankers completed by September 1987. 
The ·web: http://www. boeing.com!de{ence-space!in[oelectlawacs/saudie3. html 
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American Jewish lobby 
The issue of the American Jewish lobby and the extent of its ability to influence.US 
policy is very controversial. It is out of the scope of this thesis to go into detail on the 
issue. However, this section will mention two major examples of how the Lobby was able 
to influence US policies towards Gulf security. For further evidence and discussions there 
are many sources by other authors who deal more directly with the Lobby issue84 . 
Through its ability to influence US policy, the American Jewish Lobby constituted 
the second way that Israel continued to have an impmiant impact on Gulf security in the 
aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. The American Jewish Lobby undertook efforts to 
impede the sale of many US arms to Saudi Arabia and to interfere in the security relations 
between the US and the Arab Gulf Countries as mentioned earlier. 
It also played an important role in the framing of US policies towards the region. 
The best example of this is US policy towards the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Seymour 
Hersh, in a New York Times atiicle printed on December 8, 1991, provided persuasive 
evidence that throughout the Iran-Iraq war, "Israel was aggressively pouring arms into 
[Iran] in order to sustain the Iran-Iraq war and thus keep two potential enemies preoccupied 
with each other."85 As George Ball points out, the ability ofthe American Jewish Lobby to 
influence US policy enabled Israel to quickly get the Reagan administration to buy into the 
scheme of secretly arming Iran. 86 So on one hand, the United States encouraged the Arab 
Gulf countries to provide military and economic support to Iraq while at the same time it 
was providing secret military support to Iran. Israel and the American Jewish Lobby 
played a decisive role in initiating and organizing the contacts that led to the US supplying 
weapons to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. On the other hand the US had its own motives in 
83. William B. Quandt, "Riyadh Between Supe1powers", Foreign Policy Joumal, (Fa/11981), p. 44 
84. The ability of the American Jewish Lobby to influence American policy towards the Middle East is a huge 
topic that has been dealt with extensively by other authors, see especially: Chef}'/ Rubenberg, Israel and the 
American National Interest, (1986), and the books by former US Congressman Paul Findley, They Dare to 
Speak Out, People and Institutions Conti"onting Israel's Lobby, (1985), and Silent No More, Conti"onting 
America's False Image oUslam, (2001) 
85. George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball. The Passionate Attachment, (1992), p. 292. 
86. Ibid. 
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undertaking the arms sales to Iran, most notably the freeing of American hostages in 
Lebanon and the effect that would have on the American presidential campaign as well as a 
secret way to fund anti-Communist Nicaraguan fighters. It was the contacts provided by 
Israel and American friends of Israel that made the anns sales possible thus enabling Israel 
to influence US policy in a way that lengthened the Iran-Iraq war. This served a number of 
Israeli interests that, largely through the efforts of the American Jewish Lobby, also came 
to be seen as American interests. 87 
The interests served by the prolongation of the Iran-Iraq war included keeping Iraq 
and Iran preoccupied and thus unable to play an active role in the developments of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, providing a pretext for the increased US military presence in the 
region, confusing the Soviet strategy in the region and hindering any serious upgrading of 
Soviet relations with either Iran or Iraq. The American Jewish Lobby was also able to use 
the war to fw1her justify Israeli-US strategic cooperation in accordance with the 1981 
agreement aimed largely at limiting Soviet influence in the region. Stephen Shalom agrees 
to this analysis. He explicitly states that the American policy of supplying both Iran and 
Iraq with weapons during the war had the effect of keeping those two large regional states 
preoccupied while also weakening their military capabilities - both of which were 
important Israeli interests. 88 
This same kind of thinking continued even after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the American war against Iraq. The developments in the 
region prompted both Israelis and Americans to exert great etfot1s to prevent Iran and Iraq 
from playing any real role in maintaining Gulf security. To do this, the "Dual 
Containment" policy against both Iran and Iraq, was devised. The influence of the 
American Jewish Lobby was instrumental in the adoption of this US policy. The policy 
was formulated by Martin lndyk when he was the Executive Director of the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, a research institute sponsored by the American Israel Public 
87. Curtiss detailed the role qf the Jewish Lobby to cover the Israeli role in this scandal, for the details see: 
Richard H. Curtiss, Stealth PACs: How Israel's American Lobbv Seeks to Control US Middle East Policv, 
(! 990), p. 98 
88. To see an argument that it was actually the US intention to prolong the war see: Stephen R. Shalom, "The 
United States and the Iran-Iraq War", The web: http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/Shalomlraniraq.html 
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Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the American Jewish Lobby's main institutional body.89 
lndyk advocated and lobbied for the policy and later helped enforce it when he moved in 
1993 into President Clinton's administration ( 1992-2000) through his position as the Senior 
Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. 
The Israeli constraints on US-Arab Gulf countries' relations 
Another way that the US-Israeli relationship impacted upon the interests of the Arab 
Gulf countries, in their relations with the US, was that it established obstacles in the way of 
establishing strong security ties between the US and the Arab Gulf states. "A special 
relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia was viewed in Israel as a dangerous threat to 
its national security"90 . In 1981, in the aftermath of the A WACS deal, Israeli Defence 
Minister Ariel Sharon, declared that Saudi Arabia was a confrontational country. 91 This 
declaration increased the resolve of the American Jewish Lobby to block any other anns 
deals between the US and Saudi Arabia. During the 1980s, this kind of thinking hindered 
the development of strong Gulf-US ties at the same time that the Soviet Union was 
threatening the region. 
Tlu·oughout the 1980s, the Arab Gulf states tried to keep their countries and the Gulf 
region in general, free from foreign military bases. The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 
Fahd Bin Abdul-Aziz, clearly expressed this policy when he said in 1980 "we will not 
allow the establishment of new foreign bases on our ten·itory, because we do not want our 
country to be pushed into the conflicts of the superpowers.'r92 The unwillingness of the 
Arab Gulf countries to allow for the establishment of Western military bases was partially 
motivated by strong domestic opposition that was largely due to the strong US ties to Israel. 
At a time when. a strong Gulf-American security alliance seemed to be a natural 
reaction to Soviet actions and the Iranian Revolution, US suppot1 for Israel and its 
89. For the role of the Jewish Lobby in getting the US to adopt the policy of Dual Containment see, Ahmed 
Yousef and Teny M. Rauch 111, Demonizing Islamic Revivalism: The Jewish Lobby's Impact on United States 
Foreign Policy, (1997), p. 3 
90. B. R. Pridham, (J 985), p. 186 
91. Palestinian Research Center, israeli Broadcast Dailv Report, Vol.I 0, No. 2481, (616/11 11981, 13 p.m.) 
92. John Nelson, eta/.," Saudi Arabia: A Shaky US Pillar", Newsweek, (March 3, 1980), p. 38 
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aggressive policies against Arabs in the region led to apprehension on the part of the Arab 
Gulf regimes, which feared strong open ties to the US would lead to a weakening of their 
own legitimacy on one hand, and the strengthening of domestic public opposition on the 
other. Robert Hanx, a former Commander of the US military force in Bahrain, affirmed 
such understanding. He said: "one ofthe major weaknesses in US foreign policy is its lack 
of understanding that its support of Israeli objectives will impede the development of US 
cooperation with the Arab Gulf States." 93 
American-Israeli relations, thus, remained a constant factor in overall Gulf security. 
Had it not been for conflicts between Gulf countries, especially between Iraq and Iran 
( 1980-1988), and subsequently between Iraq and Kuwait ( 1990-1991 ), the US would not 
have been able to achieve its current military presence in the Gulf region.94 This was 
implied by James Baker in the testimony he had before a congressional committee in 
199095 . 
Even after the Americans helped the Arab Gulf countries force Iraq out of Kuwait in 
1991, the Saudi Chief of Staff during that war, Prince Khalid Bin Sultan, strongly opposed 
the establishment of new American military bases on Saudi territory, instead calling upon 
the Arab Gulf nations to develop their own military strength threefold as a means of 
defending themselves against any tlu·eat from Iraq or Iran. Prince Khalid was concerned 
both about the internal opposition that an American military presence in Saudi Arabia 
would generate (an opposition largely premised on the strong American supp01t for Israel) 
as well as the fact that a military dependence on the US would weaken the Arab Gulf states' 
abilities to defend themselves from any Israeli attempt to increase their influence in the 
region. Prince Khalid was also disgruntled by the American conditions put on weapons 
sales to Saudi Arabia (conditions largely dictated by the strong pro-Israel lobby in 
Washington as shown before) explaining his position by saying: "I don't refuse putting 
93. Robert Ham:, Oil and the US Policv Towards Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Arabic Papers, 
(1980), p. 30 
94. A. L. Atherton Jr.," The Sh(fiing Sands of Middle East Peace", Foreign Policy Journal, (Spring 1992), 
pp. 118-121 
95. The Global Intelligence Company, "Israel and Iran: Covert Friends? ", 3\9\2002: 
www.worldnetdaily. com/news/article. asp 
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limits to weapon sales, even to Saudi Arabia, if criteria of such limitations are equally 
implemented on all sides in the region, including Israel".96 This view from such a high-
ranking former Saudi official affirms the concern felt in the Gulf about US policy towards 
Israel. 
Kenneth Pollack alluded to this in an article in the Foreign Affairs Journal. In 
discussing different scenarios for the future security of the Gulf: he pointed out that the 
Israeli factor could scuttle any attempt to establish a regional security system.'r97 He 
affirmed that the presence of American troops in the Gulf, especially in light of the strong 
US ties to Israel, leads to local claims that the United States is seeking to prop up "hated 
local tyrants" and control the Middle East. The American troops, he said, are seen as a 
"source of humiliation and resentment for pretty much all locals ... a constant reminder that 
the descendents of such Islamic States can no longer defend themselves and must answer to 
Western powers."98 
Related to this is the fact that the Arab Gulf States are continually subject to Arab 
criticism because they do not stand firmly against American and European policies in 
support of Israel even while the West is allowed to enjoy the oil, waters and strategic 
position of the Gulf, and even have been allowed to establish military facilities in Arab 
Gulf countries. On the contrary, Western countries stand by Israel despite its violations of 
Arab rights and its engagement in aggressive acts and assaults against Arab security. Such 
behaviour by Israel leads to increased calls in the Arab world for more pressure against the 
West, and questions the relationships the Arab regimes have with the US. 
The international failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in a way that would 
respect Arab rights ignites hostility against the US in the region. This is based on the 
prevailing belief that the US is in full alignment with Israel. This dilemma puts pressure on 
the relations the Arab Gulf countries have with the US. Governments of the Arab Gulf 
countries believe that the success ofthe peace process in regaining Palestinian rights might 
96. Elmer Berger, (Winter/Spring 1991 ), p. 71 
97. Kenneth M. Pollack, "Securing the Gulf', Foreign Affairs Journal, (July/August 2003), the web: 
www.(oreignalfairs. org 
98. Ibid. 
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contribute to reducing such pressures. It would reduce the level of Palestinian resistance 
and might enable Arab states to build stronger security relations with the US without 
provoking internal unrest for the Arab Gulf governments. This understanding of the crucial 
linkage between the Arab-Israeli conflict and Gulf security, including the stability of the 
regimes itself, is best illustrated by the concluding statement of the GCC summit's 
Foundational Conference in May 1981 which states: "Gulf security is linked to the 
achievement of peace in the Middle East. It is also linked to a just settlement of the 
Palestinian issue that secures the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. These rights 
include the right to return to their homeland, to establish their independent state, and their 
right to Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories, including Jerusalem."99 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the impmiant linkages between Israeli ambitions and 
Gulf security. The chapter showed that Israeli potential threats to Gulf security were 
represented most dramatically by Israel's good relationship with Iran under the Shah. This 
was mainly manifested in the strong economic and military ties between the two countries. 
The Israeli ability to influence US policy towards the region formed another source of 
potential threat to the Arab Gulf countries' security. Grave Israeli violations of international 
law, including numerous attacks on Arab states, fUJiher increased the concern of the Arab 
Gulf countries. The chapter showed that Israel was seen to constitute a source of threat to 
the security and stability of the Arab Gulf countries. 
The chapter emphasized the impmiant linkages between Gulf security and the Arab-
Israeli conflict. It showed the potential reciprocity between them where Israel is the 
common factor. 
While many factors influenced some of the nuances in the positions of Arab Gulf 
countries toward the Arab-Israeli conflict (as will be discussed in further details in chapter 
3), their own security concerns formed the most important determining factor. Israeli 
ambitions, policies, and influences towards the Gulf has also been one of the most 
important elements in overall Gulf security. This provided additional support to the 
99. 0. Al-Khatib," Gulf Political Development Within the Framework of CCC", Al-Uioom Al-ljtimae}!a, 
(Winter 1985), p. 209 
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hypothesis of potential reciprocity between security in the Arab Gulf countries and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Arab Gulf countries reacted to the Israeli threat posed to their security m 
various ways. One of the ways was in the formation of their own policies towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict including their efforts to provide the Palestinian cause with political, 
military and economic aid while also providing economic assistance to the Arab countries 
that bordered Israel, as will be shown in details in chapter three. 
The next chapter will expand upon this concept by showing how the Israeli 
ambitions towards the Gulf region increased the credibility of the argument that the security 
of the Arab Gulf countries is linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The chapter will illustrate 
this argument in two ways. It will first provide an assessment of the historical 
developments in the Arab Gulf countries' policies that were linked with their role in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. It will also show the emergent developments within the Gulf and its 
periphery regarding their security and economic capabilities. It was these developments 
that created the main dynamics for the linkages. 
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Chapter Three 
Developments of the linkages and dynamics of the Arab 
Gulf countries in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
It was clarified through the first and second chapters of this thesis that the 
international competition for int1uence and the Israeli ambitions in the Gulf region have 
affected the environment within which the Arab Gulf countries have determined their 
policies towards the Arab-Israeli cont1ict. It is necessary now to examine both the 
historical development of those policies as well as those factors that can be considered 
as constants and those that can be considered as variables in determining the Arab Gulf 
countries' responses to developments in the cont1ict. Therefore, this chapter will begin 
by assessing the ideological and strategic principles that have served as constants in 
guiding the Arab Gulf countries' policies. The chapter then examines how the 
relationship between the Arab Gulf countries and the Arab-Israeli cont1ict has been 
affected by four main variables that determine the extent to which these constants are 
applied. These variables are the following: first, the correlation between Western 
interests and the Arab Gulf interests as was outlined in chapter one; second, the 
developments in the Arab-Israeli cont1ict itself; third, the developments within the Gulf 
region that have impacted upon the perception of their security; fourth and finally, the 
development of the economic capabilities of the Arab Gulf countries. 
The chapter concludes with an assessment of the changing dynamics and 
policies of the Arab Gulf countries towards the Arab-Israeli cont1ict in the period of the 
study, i.e. 1970-2000. It will show the degree of the potential reciprocity between Gulf 
security, linkages, and policies towards the Arab-Israeli cont1ict. It will also find the 
limits that such policies and linkages are affected by. 
3-1 Ideological and strategic principles 
The Arab Gulf countries' response to and role in the Arab-Israeli conf1ict is 
based on basic principles and on fundamental strategic interests. 
The individual and collective Arab Gulf stances have generally been close to the 
official Palestinian position since the establishment of the PLO in 1964. Three 
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important trends influenced these stances: first, Arabism from the fifties until the late 
seventies, second, Islamism from the early eighties up to the end of the 20th century. 
And third, the general desire of the Arab Gulf states to support policies that conform to 
international laws and resolutions. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states thus 
repeatedly call upon the international community to force Israel to comply with UN 
resolutions, in particular Resolution 242 of 1967'. This Saudi policy is illustrated by 
the revelation of a former CIA officer who discussed the correspondence between King 
Feisal and President Richard Nixon. Raymond Close, the former CIA officer, said in an 
article: "On April 17, 1973, several months before the October War began, I was 
informed by my official Saudi intelligence counterparts that Anwar Sadat had reached a 
decision to begin preparing for a major military assault across the Suez Canal, and that 
he had informed King Feisal of this decision in a letter received that day."2 
The goal was to encourage the US to support a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict. King Feisal explicitly informed President Nixon about the contents of the 
letter through an envoy. "The US ignored such warnings and later in a personal letter to 
King Feisal dated Dec. 3, 1973, President Nixon included remarkable passages. He said: 
'Looking back over recent years, I recall the many times Your Majesty has written to 
me of your concern and of your conviction that we should do more to resolve the Arab-
Israeli conflict.. .. You have always given me wise counsel, and in retrospect your advice 
was well taken and should have been heeded ... with your Majesty's cooperation, I am 
prepared to devote the full energies ofthe U.S. to bringing about a just and lasting peace 
in the Middle East based on the full implementation of Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338, in the adoption of which my government played a major part"'.3 
3-1-1 Ideological and strategic principles of the Arab Gulf countries policies 
Ideological principles are formed from the nature of conceptions prevailing in 
the political structure of states and their societies. In the case of the Arab Gulf countries, 
they are derived from their Arab and Islamic identity. Both Arab national and Islamic 
religious identities, therefore, form factors that favour the involvement of the Arab Gulf 
I. For more details see: Robert Hartr:, Oil and the US Poling Towards Arabian Gulf and the Indian 
Ocean, Arabic Papers, (1980), p.62; and Hassan Abu-Talib, The Kingdom o(Saudi Arabia and 
Jerusalem Shadows, (1992), p./17 
2. Raymond Close," It's Time to Keep American Promises", International Herald Tribune, November 
29, 2002. 
3. Ibid. 
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countries m the Palestinian cause and the conflict with Israeli interests. Such 
involvement on the state level results in harmony between the official and popular 
positions within states. This has historically resulted in general agreement between the 
stances of the Arab Gulf countries on the one hand, and the general Palestinian, Arab 
and Islamic stances concerning the Palestinian cause on the other, with a few 
exceptions. Such exceptions usually occurred as a result of the Arab Gulf states 
succumbing to pressure by the US, which as the protector of the Arab Gulf States' 
security was able to wield influence over the latter's policies during some historical 
periods. Examples might be the pressure exerted on the PLO by the Arab Gulf states to 
withdraw from Beirut during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, or the attendance 
of representatives from the Arab Gulf states at the Madrid Conference in 1991. The US 
has used its relations and influence over these states to pressure them to help in the 
accommodation of American policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The religious dimension was symbolized by the al-Aqsa Mosque that linked, 
according to Quranic verses, the holy mosques in Mecca and Jerusalem. The Arab Gulf 
States often referred to the importance of the al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem in Islam as 
an argument to exert pressure on Israel through the US. The religious dimension was 
instrumental in King Feisal's insistence on a full Israeli withdrawal from the territories 
that Israel occupied in June 1967, including East Jerusalem. King Feisal conducted 
more than eight meetings in only 17 months (November, 1973-19 March 1975) with 
Kissinger on the subject of the peace process and Israel's occupation of Jerusalem and 
the al-Aqsa Mosque. King Feisal was assassinated on March 25, 1975; six days after the 
last failed meeting took place4• 
From the first meeting on 81h November 1973 he discussed three main points: 
oil, Jerusalem and Palestinians. He insisted that Jerusalem is Arab territory refusing any 
ideas of intemationalising the holy city. He also affirmed the importance of Jerusalem 
to Muslims5. In addition to these ideological bases, the Gulf region has always been 
linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict by the strategic nature of the conflict and its impacts 
on the Arab Gulf countries, their interests, and identity. 
From the perspective of the Arab Gulf countries, the strategic nature of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is based on: 
4. For details of this discussion see: Hassan Abu-Talib (1992), pp. I 29-130 
5. Kameel Mansour, (ed.), The annual Book of the Palestinian Cause of 1973, (1976), p. 175 
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1. A perception of continued Israeli threats to the Arab Gulf countries and 
their oil interests, as the thesis has shown earlier. 
2. The real financial responsibilities of the Arab Gulf countries that emerge 
as a result of the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, that were related 
to: 
e The support for both Palestinians and Arab front-line countries, 
including finance for their armament procurement strategy. 
• The Arab Gulf countries· own wide ranging military spending, 
considered necessary for enhancing their ovvn security and 
stability in light of perceived threats. 
• Assistance with economic development in Arab front-line states 
in order to enhance infrastructural capacity in order to achieve 
steadfastness against Israeli threats. 
3. The assumed contribution of the conf1ict in creating political, security or 
social instability in the Arab Gulf countries themselves. 
Commitments on the part of the Arab Gulf countries to the Palestinian cause 
provide them with political legitimacy in their countries both from their own peoples as 
well as from the large expatriate Palestinian community living in the Arab Gulf 
countries. This Palestinian presence played a role in promoting support for the 
Palestinian cause. This community consisted of 450,000 Palestinians in Arab Gulf 
countries in 1980, which rose in 1990, prior to the Gulf crisis, to 750,000.6 These 
numbers dropped after the Second Gulf War in 1991 to about 443,500 as of 1999.7 
The ideological and strategic principles encouraged the Arab Gulf countries to 
be more involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This again has demonstrated the potential 
reciprocal relations between those countries' interests and the outcome of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. At the same time, the overlapping of the Western and Arab Gulf 
countries' interests created new constraints that hindered the development of Gulf 
6. B.S. Abu AI-Qaraya, "The £r:pelled Palestinians in the Arabian Gulf', a paper submitted to the 
Future o(Dispelled Palestinians Conference, ll-13 September, 2000, MESC, Amman, Table#8 in the 
Appendix, (2000). 
7. Palestinian National Information Centre, The web: wWJv.pnic.gov.ps/information. 
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policies in support of the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
3-2 The variables affecting the policies of the Arab Gulf countries 
The Arab Gulf countries' policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict have been 
affected by other decisive variable factors in addition to the ideological and strategic 
principles discussed above. The most mentioned factors are the emergence of security 
challenges in the Gulf, the development of the Gulf region's economic capabilities, the 
increasing correlation of interests between the Arab Gulf countries and the West; and 
the developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict itself. All these factors played a role in 
shaping the policies of the Arab Gulf countries towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
3-2-1 The Emergence of Security Challenges in the Gulf region 
The Gulf region witnessed very difficult security challenges during the period of 
the study. These challenges attracted the attention of intellectuals and the political elite 
in the Arab Gulf countries and played a role in lessening the contribution of the Arab 
Gulf countries to the consolidation of the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
most notable are: 
3-2-1-1 The downfall of the Shah and the revival of the Islamic revolution in 
Iran in 1979 
The emergence of security challenges that followed the Shah and replaced him 
with the Islamic regime in Iran are discussed deeply in chapter two. Yet this section will 
show how those new challenges fit into the scope of this chapter. 
The Shah of Iran had represented a threat to the Arab Gulf countries through his 
increasing relations with Israel. He had played the role of a protector of American 
interests in the region as a regional ally and the "Twin Pillar" policy. He also had his 
own ambitions towards neighbouring countries in the Gulf. Iran under the rule of the 
Shah enjoyed relative political, social and economic growth. In spite of all the above, 
the downfall of the Shah in 1979 invited new security challenges to the region, as was 
believed by Arab Gulf countries' intellectuals and American politicians and analysts. 
The most important were: instability whether in economic or social conditions, the 
ideology of the new Islamic revolutionary regime, and the international crisis that 
emerged due to the Iranian revolutionists occupation of the US Embassy and keeping its 
American employees as hostages. 
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The Islamic Revolution in Iran succeeded as a result of the frustration among the 
Iranian people about the Shah's internal and foreign policies. The new revolution was 
motivated by the Islamic ideology, in general. Lots of fears spread in neighbouring Arab 
countries about the major theme of this revolution, to export its revolutionary way of 
changing regimes. 
Arab Gulf countries were very wary of the new Iranian regime, and began to pay 
more attention to both their internal as well as regional security. These new security 
concerns diverted resources in the Arab Gulf countries away from other parts of the 
Arab World in general and the Palestinian cause in particular. 
3-2-1-2 The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 
In 1979, the Soviets moved into Afghanistan, created a Communist regime in 
Kabul and declared a state of emergency in the country. Afghani Mojahideen revolted 
against the Soviet occupation and called upon their Muslim brothers to suppmt their 
(Jihad) against Communism (the red danger). The echo of their calls found wide 
response in the Gulf on both public and official levels. The Arab Gulf countries had 
long hostile attitudes towards the Communist ideology of the USSR. The Arab Gulf 
countries feared that the main reason the Soviets had occupied Afghanistan was to later 
expand even further so as to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and thus 
threaten the nearby oil fields of the Gulf. 
The West was also deeply worried about the increased Soviet threat to Gulf 
security as represented in the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. American and 
Arab Gulf policies became aligned in opposition to the Soviet challenge. This 
alignment further directed the concerns of the Arab Gulf countries towards their own 
security. 
3-2-1-3 The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 
As the Islamic Revolution took root in Iran, war broke out between Iran and 
Iraq. Arab Gulf countries, as did most other Arab countries, stood beside Iraq against 
Iran. Iraq and Iran both suffered thousands of casualties, lost much of their economic 
strength and much of their civil and military capabilities. The war lasted for eight years. 
Its cost was estimated to be $600 BN according to the estimate of the Kuwaiti Foreign 
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Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad8. This constituted a very dangerous phenomenon 
against the Gulf countries' security in particular, and against the security of the Arab 
world in general. Arab Gulf countries paid most of the war costs of the Iraqi side. The 
war also deepened the fears between Arabs and Iranians in the Gulf, which led to more 
hostility between both sides9. It encouraged the mass presence of the American military 
in the Gulf on the pretext of protecting oil routes and shipments. This presence 
crystallized the new intemational security concem in the Gulf. It also divetied the Gulf 
countries away from the Arab-Israeli conflict in a very critical period, when the Israeli 
military and intelligence efforts were destroying the PLO forces and institutions in 
Lebanon in 1982. 
3-2-1-4 The establishment of the GCC in 1981 
In light of the downfall of the Shah, the emergence of the Islamic regime in Iran, 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the breakout of the Iran-Iraq war with its 
security consequences, the Arab Gulf countries convened to co-ordinate their efforts in 
protecting their countries' security, stability, economy and living style. They declared 
the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at their summit in 1981. The 
details of this establishment were illustrated in chapter one's footnotes. It was 
considered a positive response to these challenges. Therefore, the Arab Gulf countries 
decided to come together in military action in case of any threat. They formed a special 
army called "Desert Shield," that was made up of officers and soldiers from the GCC 
members' armies. 10 This new trend increased their security and armament budgets as 
mentioned in Chapter two. The Arab Gulf countries became less concemed about 
contributing deeply and widely towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially to the 
economic and military aspects. However, they still collectively expressed their support 
for the Palestinian cause and the Arab struggle against Israeli threats. Their stance 
towards the Israeli aggression against the PLO and Lebanon in 1982 was an example of 
this analysis. The Arab Gulf countries contributed symbolical financial and military 
8. At-Riyadh Newspaper, ( 13/ I 0/2002), The web: 
http://www. a/riyadh. com. sa/Contents/ 13-1 0-2002/Mainpage/POLITICS _ 2 714.php 
9. For more Details on the 1980-1988 Gulf War see: Feisal Al-Ors, Iran-Iraq War: Daily Events, (1988) 
I 0. For more details see the GCC official website: http://www.gcc-sg. org 
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support during the war and acted as mediators to help in ending Israeli aggression. So it 
can be said that the establishment of the GCC itself was a factor that lessened the 
support the Arab Gulf countries provided to the Palestinian Cause in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as it shifted the concerns and priorities of its countries towards the Gulf region 
except for the peace efforts and the humanitarian aid mostly supplied by publics for the 
Palestinians. 
3-2-1-5 The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the second Gulf war (1990-1991) 
Iraq invaded Kuwait on the pretext of the protection of its economy, sovereignty 
and stability. It claimed that there had been a conspiracy against Iraq with the 
participation of the Kuwaiti government. Tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers moved into 
Kuwait, toppled the government, occupied the whole country, and appointed a new 
government of its own in August of 1990. Then, Iraq annexed Kuwait and declared it 
Iraq's 191h province. 11 This violent way of resolving disputes between Arab neighbours, 
not to mention neighbouring sovereign states, enraged the international community and 
the Arab Gulf countries as well. The UNSC imposed economic and military sanctions 
against Iraq. The US did not wait for the sanctions to work in weakening the Iraqi 
government position. "Former National Security adviser Zbigneiv Brzezinski in an 
interview on CNN said that as of early December 1990, since sanctions were imposed, 
Iraq had suffered a 97% drop in exports, a 90% drop in imports, 43% drop in its GNP, 
while prices had soared 700%. The sanctions were said to be costing Saddam $1 00 
million a day." 12 
Within 5 months, the US and its Western allies succeeded in gathering more 
than half a million soldiers with high-tech weaponry to fight Iraq and drive its forces out 
of Kuwait. Arabs were divided into two axes on such developments, one with the US 
alliance, and the other against it. The Arab League failed to reach any political 
settlement to the situation. The US, supported by 12 UN resolutions 13 , took a decision to 
II. Mohammad Haykel, Gul(War ... the Illusions o(Power and Victory, (I 992); for more details see: 
Erick Loran, The Desert Storm: The secrets o(the White House. Arabic Version by Mohammad 
Mustajeer, (I99I) 
I2. Ted Thornton, History of the Middle East Database," Key events in the Modern History of Iraq", The 
web: www. nmhschool. org/tthornton!mehistorydatabase/gulf_ war. htm 
13. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq-Kuwait crisis, The web:; 
http://www.un. orgl Docs/scres/ I990/scres90. htm 
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wage a war against Iraq under the pretext of liberating Kuwait and protecting other Arab 
neighbours. The war began on January 151\ 1991. Iraq suffered a massive defeat and 
Kuwait was liberated by the end ofF ebruary 1991. 
This crisis and its war cost the Arab Gulf countries billions of dollars. James 
Baker estimated the cost of the war on the side ofthe coalition forces to be $60 BN. The 
Arab Gulf countries pledged to pay most of those costs. 14 The war cost on the side of 
the Arab Gulf countries and Iraq reached more than $300-400 BN according to different 
Arab and western estimates. 
This war and crisis, with its high cost on all levels, constituted a new stage in the 
shift of the Gulf countries' policies towards the Palestinian cause in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This was expressed in decreased financial and political support to the 
Palestinians from the Gulf under the pretext that the PLO leadership was considered in 
the Gulf to have been supportive of the Iraqi leadership. In addition, the new security 
concerns that emerged in the Arab Gulf countries themselves required the purchase of 
increased armaments as mentioned before, not to mention the economic and social 
suffering that the Arab Gulf countries faced as a result of the war. 
The crisis constituted a fundamental shift in the Arab Gulf countries relations 
with the PLO. The PLO suffered an additional political crisis when some of its leaders 
saw participation in the Madrid conference of 1991 as a chance to reform the PLO 
situation on the international and Arab levels. 15 
As a result of the war and some other regional, internal and international factors, 
the Arab Gulf countries had a largely absent role in the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout 
the 1990s. While the Arab Gulf countries' support toward the Arab side in the conflict 
almost disappeared on the military, economic, and political levels, the Arab Gulf 
countries were used by the US to push forward the peace process starting with Madrid 
in 1991. As the US protected the Arab Gulf countries against Saddam' s plans to topple 
their regimes. 
3-2-1-6 The Damascus Declaration 1991 
The Foreign Ministers of the Arab Gulf countries along with Egypt and Syria 
signed a Declaration in Damascus on 6 March 1991 in the wake of the defeat of Iraqi 
14. James Baker," The Right Way to Change the Regime", Alwatan Newspaper,(26/8/2002), The web: 
http://www. alwatan. com.sa/daily/2002-08-26/first _page/first _page12.htm 
15. Lamis Andoni," The Washington Talks, Deadlock or the End?", Middle East International Journal, 
(613/1992), p.3 
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forces in Kuwait. The signatories pledged to cooperate in security and economic 
matters. The Declaration called for massing Arab capabilities to face challenges that 
might emerge, especially from Israel's continued occupation of Arab land - an 
occupation that threatened the stability and security of the region. The Foreign Ministers 
asserted that they aimed to reach a just and comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict through an international conference for peace. 16 
The Declaration claimed as its goals: "to accumulate the capabilities of the eight 
signatories to face mutual security challenges and interests including to settle a protocol 
for a new Arab collective security defence system; and to establish a collective Arab 
defence force including troops from all the signatories." 17 The US Secretary of State 
James Baker had met with the declaration states' foreign ministers in Riyadh on 1 0 
March, 1991 addressing security arrangements and the Palestinian issue. The move was 
considered part of the US effort to halt the implementation of the Declaration security 
and military parts. Baker suggested that the US was keen to participate with the 
declaration members in securing the Gulf region. Oman suggested that this declaration 
- ..;;.': not be considered an agreement or military treaty, and that the troops formed from it 
would constitute a temporary force. It considered all the arrangements as temporary and 
asserted the right of any party to sign bilateral agreements with any other regional or 
international party without contradicting the declaration. It also advocated using troops 
only from the Arab Gulf nations - and not from Egypt and Syria - on the pretext that the 
Arab Gulf had to become self-dependent in protecting its own security. This was 
addressed in the Foreign Ministers meeting on 15-16 July 1991 in Kuwait. 18 It is 
considered the first clear shift in the different understandings of the declaration among 
the eight members. The further differences that surfaced in later meetings and 
discussions resulted in delaying the implementation of the kind of cooperation the 
Declaration called for. 
By 1993 the members were only putting their efforts toward the implementation 
of the economic annex of the declaration. In a meeting in May of 1993, the Arab Gulf 
16. The Official Website of The State of Kuwait, Damascus Declaration, The web: 
http://demo.sakhr. comldiwanlmain/Story _Of_ Kuwait/Liberation/Reconstructingldamascus.html 
17. Fighter from the Desert encyclopedia, the web: 
http://www. mukatil. com/ openshare/indexf html 
18. Ibid 
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countries proposed an executive protocol on security and cooperation which they agreed 
to implement within 10 years at a cost of $6.5 Billion. Iran and the United States 
however expressed strong opposition to any Egyptian or Syrian military presence in the 
region, and in a subsequent June, 1993 meeting, the Arab Gulf countries reversed 
themselves and decided not to activate the military annex of the Declaration but rather 
leave security issues to be decided in bilateral meetings between the individual Arab 
Gulf states and any other nation that could provide them security. 
The years 1994-1995 witnessed the resumption of relations between the Arab 
Gulf countries and other Arab states especially Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, the PLO and the 
Arab Maghrib. This eased security tensions in the region and lessened the hostility to 
the Arab Gulf states from within the Arab community. It contributed to defuse the 
enthusiasm that had accompanied the declaration climate in 1991. Egypt and Syria 
were continuing to insist that Gulf security could best be achieved by the permanent 
presence of their troops in the Gulf at the expense of the Arab Gulf countries' budgets. 
The Arab Gulf countries however refused to activate any joint military cooperation with 
Egypt and Syria. With the lack of any mechanism for military cooperation, the 
Declaration was emptied of its main effect and goal. 19 
The history of the Damascus Declaration confirms the thesis regarding the 
potential reciprocity of Gulf security and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In theory, the 
Declaration gave Egypt and Syria, the main Arab confrontation countries in the conf1ict, 
an important security role in the Gulf. At the same time they were to get massive 
economic support with $15 Billion from the Arab Gulf countries.20 If implemented the 
agreement would have likely provided a more unified security framework for the whole 
region, more directly linking security in the Gulf to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
failure of the Declaration, however, underscored the increasing reliance of the Arab 
Gulf countries on the West for their security, and how this reliance translated into a 
lower level of involvement of the Arab Gulf countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
Arab Gulf countries ultimately opted for bilateral defence treaties with Western 
countries to accomplish their security needs as an alternative to the Declaration. The 
19. For more details, See: Ibid. 
20. Fighter from the Desert encyclopedia, the web: 
http://www.mmJalel. com/MOKA TEUData/Behoth/Monzmat3/Demshek/ I /Mokate/2 _7 -4. htm# 13 
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correlation of Arab Gulf states and Western security concerns increased and both sides 
became more interlocked than ever. 
3-2-2 Developments of the economic capabilities of the Arab Gulf countries 
The seventies witnessed a great boom in the financial and economic potential of 
the Arab Gulf countries. It also witnessed the rapid progress of economic and trade 
infrastructures, in addition to general modernization. World oil prices jumped from 
$3.11 per barrel in 1970 to $32 in 1980, an increase of 928.4%?1 The impetus for the 
rise was the 1973 Arab decision to ban the f1ow of oil to some states in the West. This 
decision also helped the Arab oil-producing countries participate in controlling the 
production, pricing and export of oil, which has a special sensitivity to Western 
industries, and thus gave them a chance to influence the world economy.22 Various 
countries throughout the world subsequently focused their attention on the Gulf region 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Far away countries, like Japan, established Middle Eastern 
and Gulf study units at their universities, but their role and budget receded after the 
ld . . d 23 wor energy cns1s came to an en . 
That sharp rise in oil prices was ref1ected on the Arab Gulf countries' budgets, 
and also on their national standards of living. Oil revenues of Arab Gulf countries, 
excluding Oman, rose from $2.486 billion in 1970 to $144.714 billion in 1980, an 
increase of 5721.2 %?4 The Gross National Product (GNP) of the Arab oil producing 
countries, including Arab Gulf countries, rose from $18.508 billion in 1970 to $89.715 
billion in 1975, an increase of 384.7%. Individual standards of living rose from $540.4 
per capita in 1970 to $2225.6 in 1975.25 
The rise in oil prices was also "ref1ected in the acceleration of construction 
activity in high rates, which in turn, resulted in great emigration to cities, where various 
21. Graph of the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics," Real and Nominal 
Prices of Oil", (1970-1995), The web: www. imf orglexternallpubs/ft/policy/chart02.htm. 
22. Akera Usoki, Unpublished Lecture at MESC, (4/3/2002) 
23. Ibid. 
24. Khaldoun AI- Naqib, Society and State in the Gul[and Arab Peninsula,(/987), p./22 
2 5. Mahmoud Abdul- F adhil, Oil and Arab Unity, (1981), p./4 
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service organizations were concentrated". 26 That consequently led to large local 
economic movements that were parallel to the revenues generated by the sale of oil. 
Some Arab Gulf countries, especially Kuwait and the UAE, established important 
international trade zones. As a result of all these economic advancements, the 
capabilities of the Arab Gulf countries to support Arab confrontation countries became 
higher. 
That oil upswing also increased the relative weight of the Arab Gulf countries in 
the Arab and international orders, especially in light of the rise in their oil capabilities 
and the growth of their relative military power. Annual military expenditures of Saudi 
Arabia rose from $634 million in 1971 to $3653 million in 1978. In Oman, the increase 
was from $15 million in 1971 to $486 million in 1978, and in the U AE, from $16 
million in 1972 to $641 million in 1978. In Bahrain, figures increased from $5 million 
in 1971 to $22 million in 1978.27 The increases in the levels of military expenditures in 
these Arab Gulf countries were 476%, 3140%, 3906% and 340%, respectively. 
Kuwait's level of military expenditures rose from 4.3% of the GNP in 1971 to 16.6% in 
1976. In Saudi Arabia, the level rose from 7.5% in 1971, to 18.1% in 1976. In Oman, it 
rose from 12.8% in 1971 to 32.2% in 1976.28 
Developments in the Gulf's new financial capabilities continued, under annual 
growth rates of 10% from 1965-1970, and 37.1% from 1970-1975, an increase of 
271%.29 Arab Gulf countries maintained their ability to efiect international markets 
even after they lifted the oil embargo as the world demand for energy sources increased. 
World demand rose from 44,374.00 thousand bpd in 1970 to 60,184.00 thousand bpd in 
1980, an increase of 35.61%.30 
Their new economic power gave the Arab Gulf regimes more local power as 
they could provide more services to their people. This was somewhat mitigated by 
growing popular demands to withdraw the Arab Gulf countries' deposits out of 
26. Abdul Jaleel Marhoun," The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Project of Regional Order", Shu'nn 
al-Awsat Journal, (I 992), p. 62 
27. Stockholm International Peace Research Institution ( S/PRI), World Armaments and Disarmament: 
SIPR! Year Book 1979. (1979), pp.40-41 
28. Ibid., pp.42-43 
29. M Abdul- F adhil, (I 981 ), p./4 
30. A.R Al-Faris, "Gulf Crisis and Oil Crisis, and Arab Oil Weapons", Al-lvlustaqbal-Al-Arabi 
Journal, (March 1991), p.22 
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European banks and the US. These demands, which were largely predicated on 
Western support for Israel, were never heeded as the oil wealth of the Arab Gulf 
countries continued to be invested in the West. Nonetheless, their new power enabled 
the Arab Gulf States to nationalize the British and US oil companies in their countries. 
That trend opened the door for them to play a m.ore effective role in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, on both regional and internationallevels.31 The Arab Gulf countries new power 
enabled them to influence international policies and positions towards the cont1ict as 
international actors were in need of the oil of the Gulf. Yet, while gaining some 
immediate fmits, the Arab Gulf countries could not use this power to draw an effective 
strategy that could bring about a real strategic change in the conflict's balance of power. 
The US refused to yield to Arab pressure and was able to contain its impact through 
such policies as increasing their own military presence in the region on the pretext of 
securing the world's oil supply. 
The Arab Gulf countries were however to play an effective role through the 
provision of their new economic capabilities to support the front line Arab countries and 
Palestine. For example, King Feisal supplied Egypt with $400 million in aid, 32 while 
Palestinians received $429 million from the Public Committee for Palestine in Saudi 
Arabia. 
This policy was manifested in economic aid, development funds, the increase of 
labour in the Gulf, and the enforcement of the oil-ban to pressure Israel's allies .. 
As a whole, the amounts of Arab development aid from the Arab Gulf countries 
rose from $7.7 billion in the first half of the seventies to $31.9 billion in the second 
half.33 Such aid played the major role in enabling the frontline countries to sustain a 
position of confrontation. It contributed to the economic and political stability of the 
frontline countries as well as in enabling them to modernize their military infrastmcture. 
The details of the economic aid are illustrated in the next section. 
Moreover, Arab labour immigration to the Gulf region greatly increased, and 
Arab Gulf countries opened doors for increasing Arab labourers. There were 300 
31. !vf S. Idrees, The Regional Order o(the Arabian Gulf. (2000), p. 64 
32. H. Abu-Talib,(J992), p.Jl9 
33. A. Al-Halfi, "Oil's Effect on Main Economic Developments in Arab Countries", Shu 'un Arabiah 
Journal, (September /998), p. I 59 
79 
thousand such labourers in 1971 and this number rose to about 600 thousand in 1973.34 
In light of the rising labour immigration from Arab confrontation countries to the Arab 
Gulf countries, financial transfers increased to such countries, particularly Jordan, Syria 
and Egypt. Total expatriate transfers in the Gulf region to these three countries rose 
from $181 million in 1973 to $1941 million in 1977, a relative increase of 972.4%.35 
Such labour took part in increasing the popular and official interaction of the Arab Gulf 
countries with the Arab-Israeli conf1ict and its consequences as it helped the states and 
peoples of the Arab Gulf feel the level of threat that Israel posed to the Arabs. King 
Feisal's initial position of refusing to lift the oil-ban against the US until Israel 
completely withdrew from the occupied Arab territories and secured the rights of the 
Palestinian people expressed such effect as was discussed later in detail in section 3-2-
4-2.36 The Arabs were satisfied with the general international mood and most European 
positions to support the Arab cause as a response to the embargo. They also wanted to 
use the increasing oil prices to compensate for their losses during the embargo. The 
embargo led to intense US pressure that threatened the political, security and economic 
stability of the Arab Gulf countries, especially the implicit threats to occupy the oil 
fields by force. A deal was ultimately reached between the Arabs and the US to lift the 
oil embargo in exchange for American political pressure on Israel to accomplish an 
agreement on the Syrian Israeli front. 37 While this was a political achievement for the 
Arabs that resulted from the embargo it was much less than the goals they first declared 
when they began enforcing the embargo. 
The Gulf oil-ban decision, in itself, was regarded as a direct confrontation with 
countries that supported Israel and could pressure it to withdraw from the occupied 
Arab territories. The embargo was seen as participation in the battle, by using the "oil 
weapon" as it was called at that time. As a result, the embargo had the effect of bringing 
the Arab Gulf countries' role to the front of the confrontation line, not only with Israel, 
but also with Israel's military and political allies. 
34. M Abdul- Fadhil, (1981), p.39 
35. ibid., p.56 
36. H. Abu Tali b. (I 992), p./29 
37. For details see Ismail Fahmi's,_Egypt Foreign lY!inister, explanation in Hassan Abu Tali b. (I 992), 
pp./40-142 
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Under such pressure, the European Community supported the Arab stand calling 
for an Israeli withdrawal, but the US reply was to give more American aid to Israel and 
refuse to yield to the embargo with a change in its foreign policies. Through its exertion 
of political and economic pressures, Washington tried to break the Arab decision. 
Along with its position towards Israel and its threats against the Arab positions, the US 
tried to direct the political horizon for a solution to the conflict through continuous and 
deep consultations with other industrial countries. At the same time it aimed at 
reducing Arab anger against the US,38 and at helping moderate Arabs get more support 
to lift the oil-ban. Despite the American attempts to unify the Western stance, the 
position of the Arabs led to clear contrasts between the US and European positions. The 
nations of the world were classified by Arabs into friendly and hostile groups, with 
Britain, Holland and the US being considered the most hostile nations. This new 
phenomenon raised concerns in the US about a dispute within NATO, regarding the 
CflSlS. 
The oil embargo generated a crisis endangering the Western economy in general 
and its heavy industries in particular (as detailed earlier). It even had an effect on the 
everyday life of people in the West. "The US (itself) was obliged to reduce its oil 
consumption by 1 0%"39 due to this crisis. 
The economic capabilities of the Arab Gulf countries that provided them with 
the potential to influence international policies passed through different stages during 
the eighties. These capabilities continued to increase as the oil price increased until 
1983. It then suffered a sharp drop and collapsed in 1986 when oil prices dropped to 
$13 per barrel [see Figure (2) in the appendix). This was reflected on the Arab Gulf 
countries' policies, linkages, and support towards the Arab-Israeli conflict up to 1990 as 
in the mid-1980s they cut back on the amount of economic assistance they could 
provide to the Arab frontline states and the PLO. 
The Arab Gulf countries suffered due to the increasing security burden needed to 
counteract the new emerging security challenges. The Iran-Iraq War ( 1980-1988) 
constituted the most dangerous challenge to Arab Gulf security as they spent a large 
part of their oil revenues in supporting Iraq and on the development of their own armies' 
structure and equipment. The war and the economic burdens it entailed also led the 
38. Saleh Al-Aqad, Political Currents in the Arabian Gulf. (1974), p.J36 
39. ibid 
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Arab Gulf States to decrease their role in supporting the Palestinian cause. The second 
dangerous challenge was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which resulted in the 
great exhaustion of Arab Gulf capabilities and contributed to a further retreat in their 
ability to support the Palestinian cause. 
This section illustrated that despite the decrease in income in the Arab Gulf 
countries after the mid 1980s and onwards, the burden of the needed finance to face 
security requirements increased. Saudi Arabia spent 22.6% of its GNP in 1991 in 
response to these emerging security requirements40 . The security budget was about 
$13.2 billion in 1995. It constituted one third of the Kingdom's whole budget. Through 
the period from 1992-1997, Saudi Arabia bought arms worth $9.8 billion from Britain, 
France and the US. 41 
Saudi Arabia's security expenses amounted to $28.459 billion in 1991.42 Kuwait 
as well had expended 117% of its GNP for security expenses.43 Its total security 
expenses amounted to $12.993 billion in 1991.44 These expenditures resulted in deeper 
exhaustion of their financial capabilities. 
The impact of such developing changes and challenges in the Gulf region, 
taking into consideration the developments of the Arab-Israeli conflict as mentioned 
above, resulted in lessening the role of the Arab Gulf countries in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict by the end of the eighties, and at the beginning of the nineties. Their role was 
almost absent in the nineties except for their pledge, under the pressure of the US, to 
support the peace process agreements with Israel. Thus, the emergence of security 
challenges in the Gulf proved to be an important factor influencing their interaction with 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the hypothesis claims. 
3-2-3 The correlation of interests between the Gulf countries and the West 
With increased Western interests in the Gulf region and the growing Western 
dependence on oil from the Gulf as was shown in Chapter One, the US believed that 
40. Shmuel Even, Tendencies and Expenses o[Security in the Middle East in the Nineties, 
(1999), Table #1, p. 7 
41. Ibid., p./5 
42. Ibid., Table #6, p./6 
43. Ibid., Table #I, p. 7 
44. Ibid., Table #6, p./6 
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"the main element in its plans for the region was to exclude the Arab coastal regions 
from the Arab depth. This meant that the Arab oil states were to be kept away from the 
areas of Arab demographic density and that the Arab oil countries had to be convinced 
that their security was not guaranteed without American power".45 
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 justified the later exclusion of Iraq from 
any regional security framework. The Assistant to the US Secretary of State Edward 
Djerejian, when referring to the joint interests of America and the Arab Gulf countries, 
emphasised this policy by saying: "the common interests of Arab Gulf states and 
America are based on achieving security and stability in the region which will lead to 
the accomplishment of American national interests as well as world economic security. 
Iraq is considered the most dangerous direct party which threatens Gulf security. It is, 
therefore, very essential to maintain the Arab Gulf countries' opposing position to 
Saddam Hussein's regime and support of UN resolutions related to the sanctions against 
Iraq".46 The Americans concluded that any change in the attitude of any Arab Gulf 
country towards Baghdad would unveil the international and legal cover that enabled 
the US to maintain its position against Iraq and thus jeopardise American interests in the 
regwn. 
Chapter One revealed the volume of trade between the West and the Arab Gulf 
countries. The oil factor in their relations as well as the extent of defence and security 
ties between the West and the Arab Gulf were explored as well. This is basically 
represented in the heavy Western military presence on the Gulf, where American, 
British and French forces have been deployed. The Arab Gulf states, excluding Saudi 
Arabia, signed joint-defense agreements with the US; Oman signed its agreement in 
1980, Bahrain in 1991, Kuwait in 1991, Qatar in 1992 and the Emirates in 1994. 
Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE also signed similar agreements with France in 1992, 1994, 
and 1995 respectively.47 
The European concern about stability in the Gulf greatly depends on US military 
capabilities in the region. Since the British withdrawal in the early seventies, the US 
has become the major power determining the security situation of the Gulf. It has 
45. M Omar, The Impacts o(Changes in International Order on The Middle East Region, (/995), p.65 
46. Edward R. Djerejian," The US and the Middle East in a Changing World", US State Department 
Dispatch,( 81611992), pp.445-447 
47. Johans Riesner, "Europe, United states and the Gulf', Shu'un Al-Awsat, (October 1997), p.13 
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enough power and concentrated military presence in the region to maintain security. 
The US controls the balance between Iraq and Iran and has assumed responsibility for 
the defence of the Arab Gulf countries against any Iranian or Iraqi aggression. The 
European position generally conforms to American policies on these issues. 
On the other hand, Arab Gulf countries are a basic market for Western military 
products and completely depend on the West for importing their military equipment. 
The Arab Gulf countries make huge budget outlays for defence requirements in 
response to Western assessments about the nature of existing threats from surrounding 
sources, i.e. Iran and Iraq. The combined annual military budgets of the Arab Gulf states 
in 1994 amounted to $24.4 billion. Total defence expenditures during 1990-1994 
reached about $181 billion in the Arab Gulf countries. Those large amounts caused 
budget deficits, equivalent to $40 billion in the above countries in 1994.48 
King Fahd announced that through 1993-2003 Saudi defence military 
expenditures would increase by 9% (to reach $8.762 BN). Kuwait assigned $12.00 BN 
for arms purchases during the same period.49 
Such arms deals play a main role in stabilizing the military manufacturing 
industry in the West, a fact that supports the claimed correlation between both the Gulf 
and the West. 
The Gulf and Western interests are formed and interlock as a result of the 
outcome of the complex equation between the need for security and political stability 
for oil production in the Gulf, and the armament race in the shadow of the assumed 
security threats. Ironically, while arms purchases may seem to provide more security 
for individual states, the armament race has a detrimental effect on political stability. 50 
The above discussion illustrates the clear correlation between the US-European military 
and civil industries on one hand, and oil in the Arab Gulf countries on the other. 
The analysis has shown the important correlation of Gulf and Western interests 
that started in the 1980s and was accelerated in the 1990s. Consequently, this 
correlation played a role in shaping the Arab Gulf countries' policies towards the Arab-
Israeli cont1ict in these periods. This correlation resulted in the ability of the West to use 
48. Hassan Jawhar and Abdullah Sahar, "The Gulf and International Attempts to Dominate Oil 
Sources", Asseyasah Al-Dawliva Journal, (July 1 998), p.27 
49. Ibid. 
50. Johnas Reisner, (October /997), p.23 
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the Arab Gulf countries to help implement Western policies regarding the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, rather than being used by Arab Gulf countries to develop Western policies 
towards the conflict more in favour of Arab rights, as had been attempted in the early 
1970s - most notably through the enforcement of the oil embargo. This is due to the 
increased fear within the Arab Gulf states of the outbreak of any dispute with the US, 
which maintains a very heavy military presence in the region. Ironically that very 
security presence, while protecting the Arab Gulf states from external threats, increases 
the likelihood of internal instability, especially in light of escalations in the denial of 
Palestinian rights by Israel and the US. These escalations are a very effective tool in the 
discord of Islamic opposition in the Arab world, including within the Arab Gulf 
countries, to destabilize and de-legitimize the Arab regimes. In the face of such threats, 
the Arab Gulf regimes have generally not called for the removal of the Western military 
presence but have rather become doubly dependent on it hoping that the correlations of 
interests they have built up with the West will lead the Western states and their military 
and intelligence bodies to protect them from internal as well as external threats. They 
thus deeply feel the need to satisfY the requirements of maintaining their friendship with 
the US. The correlation of interests is thus a detern1inant variable that explains the 
degree of the Arab Gulf countries' involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The more 
there is a correlation of interests; the less the Arab Gulf States are involved in the Arab 
struggle. 
3-2-4 Developments of tlte Arab-Israeli conflict 
The developments of the Arab-Israeli conflict itself represented an important 
factor in crystallizing the role of the Arab Gulf countries within that conflict. 
Arab leaders met in Ansha'as, near Cairo, in 1946 and declared that "Palestine is 
an indivisible part of the Arab countries. It is not only the cause of the Palestinians but 
of all the Arabs". 51 But the UN Security Council members did not respect the Arab 
position. Hence the Arab countries appeared very weak against both the Western and 
Eastern blocs' willingness to implement a resolution establishing the state of Israel. 
In spite of strong Arab opposition, the UN adopted Resolution 181, of 
November 29, 1947 calling for the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews. The 
51. Abdel- Sattar Qasim and Ghazi Rabab 'a, "Arab- Israeli Wars" in: J £!-Hamad, (ed.), 
Introduction to The Palestinian Cause. (1999), p.257 
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Zionist movement, while they accepted the principle of partition, refused to accept the 
percentage allotted to their state, which was 54% ofPalestine.52 
Arabs were obliged to go to war when British troops withdrew from the 
Mandate. Armed Jewish military organizations quickly moved to occupy lands that had 
been allotted to the Palestinians by the UN Partition Resolution. Arab armies moved 
into Palestine on May 15, 1948, to defend the Palestinians' allotted land. The 1948 
War53 constituted additional complex security and stability problems to the Middle East 
region, which had not yet recovered from the period of colonisation by European 
countries. The war ended with the signing of the truce agreements. 54 
The new source of threat to Arab security, including the Arabian Gult~ was now 
the Jewish State. In supporting such a prevailing view, Arabs referred to Israel as an 
aggressive political entity, which held an expansionist project in Palestine based on and 
affiliated to the First Zionist Congress decisions. 
Arab states imposed an economic and political embargo on Israel and signed the 
"Common Defence Agreement" in 1950. Among the states that signed the agreement 
was Saudi Arabia, the only independent state of the Arab Gulf countries at that time. 
Eight years after its establishment, Israel commenced its first attack on Egypt in 
1956 with France and Britain. That war uncovered, as the Arab literature states, the 
functional role that Israel might play against the Arab nation's interests and sovereignty, 
and in service of Western goals. 55 It also revealed that Arab security was vulnerable to 
threats by the Jewish state. Such developments affected the substance of national Arab 
thought and gave the Palestinian cause a deeper dimension. 56 
The Arab Gulf countries were the incubators of the Palestinian Revolution when 
the Fatah movement was established in 1962 in Kuwait, and openly started its military 
52. Moneer AI- Hour and Tareq AI- Musa, Political Settlement Projects o(the Palestinian Issue 1942-
1982, (1983), p.22 
53. Fore more details about the 1948 war see: Dan Knrzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War 
(1970); ivfohammadAbdul-Mone'm, 1948 War (1968) 
54. A. Qasim and G. Rabab'a, (1999), p.274 
55. A.S. Nofal, "Features of the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since Israel's Creation Until Camp David", in 
Abdul Khaliq G. (ed.), The Centwy of Conflict: 100 Years of Arab Conflict with Zionism and Israel, 
(1999), pp./09-110 
56. A.S. Nofal. "Between Palestinian Liberation and Arab Unity" ,in J. £!-Hamad (ed.), Introduction 
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operations against Israel in 1965. They also supported the establishment of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The sixties, therefore, witnessed a 
prominent role for the Arab Gulf countries in fostering the crystallization of a 
Palestinian identity and the support of the Palestinian people's struggle against Israel. 
The Arab world was characterised in the 1960s by what was called a division 
into two axes: the "conservative" and "progressive" states. The Arab Gulf countries, 
classified as conservative, were led by Saudi Arabia, while Egypt led the progressive 
states. The Palestinian cause was claimed as a source of inspiration for both sides. 
Arab countries deployed their forces on the front line against Israel in light of 
continuous and increasing Israeli threats to the Arab World. Units frorri the Saudi 
Arabian and Iraqi armies were moved to Jordan and stationed on the eastern front. 
Kuwaiti and other Arab troops were moved to both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. 57 
The nature of the conflict was obviously widened by the pm1icipation of Arab Gulf 
countries on the Arab front, as the coming developments will show. Such developments 
and policies were pursued by Arab governments who felt that Israel threatened their 
own stability, sovereignty and subsequent development. They went to the front line to 
prevent the conf1ict from escalating and being taken to their capitals. 
3-2-4-1 The June 1967 War and its consequences 
Within a decade following the Tripartite Aggression on Egypt, in 1956, reasons 
for conf1ict and war between Arabs and Israelis gathered again. 
On the other side, the Jewish State enjoyed relative stability and was able to 
develop its economic, military and political infrastructures. The Zionist project enjoyed 
great success due to increased waves of immigration. The Zionist successes led them to 
prepare to execute Israel's expansionist ambitions to occupy new Arab land. 
Israel waged a war against three Arab states in June 196i8. The war resulted in 
a defeat of the Arab armies. Israel occupied new Arab lands in the Sinai, Golan Heights, 
and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, in addition to two 
Saudi islands in the Red Sea. 
The Arabs rejected the results of that war. They declared that defeat would not 
be a reason for reconciliation with, recognition of, or negotiations with the Israelis. That 
57. A. Quasim and G. Rababa', "The Arab-Israeli Wars", in J. £!-Hamad (ed.), Introduction to the 
Palestinian Cause. (1999), pp.279-284 
58. For the Details ofthe 1967 War see: John Norton Moore, The Arab-I~-rae1i Conflict, (1974) 
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position was manifested in the three "Khartoum NO's" adopted by Arab leaders in their 
Khartoum Summit, on August 27, 1967. The Arab Gulf countries who participated in 
that summit, at the same time, regarded the results of the June 1967 War as new 
evidence oflsrael's threat to their direct security. The Israeli Army occupied two Saudi 
islands in the Gulf of Aqaba during the war, making Saudi Arabia a front line state (see 
map 3 in the appendix). 
The UN intervened to impose a cease-fire through Security Council Resolution 
242 of 1967. The Resolution was accepted by most Arab states who regarded it as a 
good base for conflict settlement. This thus changed the mood and policy of Khartoum's 
summit of 3 No's, although it might accomplish the end of the Israeli occupation if 
implemented. The Arab regimes began yielding to the international community rather 
than to the enthusiasm of their own people who wanted to retaliate for the 1967 defeat. 
The Arab Gulf countries stood strongly against the Israeli aggression on a political level 
and endeavoured to bring about the UN Security Council Resolution, which called for 
an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories they occupied in 1967, 
hoping that its implementation would lead to a prolonged peace settlement between the 
states of the region. Israel however refused to conform to the international will 
represented in that resolution. Therefore, the War of Attrition started between Arabs and 
Israelis. 59 During the War of Attrition, King Feisal agreed to provide both Egypt and 
Jordan with 150 million sterling pounds annually in the summit. He pledged another 50 
million sterling pounds to support other Arab countries that had a role in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. He also declared on January 10, 1968 that he always "(stood) beside 
Jordan to continue its struggle for the liberation of the Arab homeland and sacred 
places, and the removal of consequences of aggression".60 In a letter to the Sudanese 
President, Ismail Azhari, Feisal affirmed that: "The Kingdom is ready to engage in war, 
side by side with its sisterly countries, in case efforts for a peaceful solution fail". 61 In a 
later joint Saudi-Kuwaiti statement, both sides proclaimed that "containing the 
consequences of aggression is the responsibility of the entire Arab nation".62 Saudi 
59. Tala't Mussalam, "The Palestinian War of Attrition and the Future of Occupation", Middle 
Eastern Studies Journal, (Summer 2001), pp. 29-30 
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Arabia demanded the return of its Tiran and Sanafer Islands, which were occupied by 
Israel in 1967. Saudi Arabia conveyed its demand to the Israeli side through the US.63 
The Palestinians and the Jordanians confronted the Israeli army in a battle, in the 
Karamah area east of the Jordan River on March 21, 1968. An Arab victory in that 
battle deepened Arab hopes in the Palestinian Revolution, which was given more 
protection and support by Arab countries. Hence, Palestinians easily exercised their 
political, social and humanitarian activities in the Arab Gulf countries at the time. This 
new stage of the conflict directed the policies the Arab Gulf countries into a deeper 
consideration of the Arab-Israeli conflict on both political and economic levels. The 
Arab Gulf States increasing role largely reflected their will to stop Israeli ambitions 
threatening their own security as mentioned earlier. 
An1ong the most notable consequences of the June 1967 War was the rapid 
development of US-Israeli relations, which had a significant impact on Arab-American 
relations in turn. Feeling the extent of such problems and their impact on its interests, 
the US tried to rebuild some of its ties with Arab states through economic aid and 
diplomatic courtship. 
Israeli refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 also raised 
great Arab doubts about its "unfriendly intentions". Its potential added new evidence to 
the prevailing view of the Zionist intention to realize their project of "Greater Israel" in 
the Arab world. 
Arab conservative countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, becan1e 
convinced of the real danger of Israel to the sacred places, especially the al-Aqsa 
mosque. This view developed after the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, including the al-
Aqsa mosque. The attempts to destroy or burn it, best exemplified by the arson attempt 
on August 20, 1969, and the increasing calls for the rebuilding of the Jewish Temple on 
the site of al-Aqsa, increased these concerns. Muslim leaders, therefore, called for an 
Islamic Conference, which convened in Rabat, Morocco, on 22-25 September 1969. 
Twenty-five countries took part and the meeting resulted in establishing the "Islamic 
Conference Organization" (ICO). Saudi Arabia and Morocco prepared for the 
establishment of the ICO following a decision by the Foreign Ministers' Council of the 
Arab League in Cairo, on August 25-26, 1968. Through establishing such an 
63. Ibid. 
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organization, Saudi Arabia played a critical role in involving the Islamic countries in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The aim of the Islamic Conference was to discuss means for the 
"liberation" of Jerusalem and to putting an end to the occupation, as stated in the ICO 
decision which was approved in Jeddah, March 4, 1972. Saudi Arabia hosted the 
pem1anent headquarters of the ICO and supported its strategic goal of supporting the 
Palestinian Cause, particularly Jerusalem. By hosting the ICO, Saudi Arabia, with other 
Arab Gulf countries, extended political, information and financial support to the holy 
city and al-Aqsa mosque. These developments increased the involvement of the Arab 
Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It provided a 
structure identifying their responsibilities and obligations towards the conflict and its 
consequences on both Arabic and Islamic levels as well as to their own people. This 
phenomenon has served as a means for these countries to gain political legitimacy in the 
face of critics of their regimes from the Islamic and national oppositions. 
A critical dispute involving military clashes broke out between the Jordanian 
government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970. Saudi Arabia 
played the major role in settling this dispute due to its special relations with both 
parties. Saudi Arabia was motivated by its eligibility to play such a role as it used to be 
the main source of finance to both Jordan and PLO. 
3-2-4-2 The October 1973 War and the Oil Embargo 
The consequences of the October 1973 War64 represented an essential change in 
the conflict. The Arab military forces were perceived in the Arab world to have 
weakened the Israeli hold on occupied territories on both the Syrian and Egyptian 
fronts. The Egyptian army had advanced and succeeded to destroy the Bar Lev Line on 
the east bank of the Suez Canal. They moved deep into the Sinai, forcing the Israeli 
army to retreat. The US announced massive financial aid and a military airlift to support 
the Israelis against the Arab troops. The Israeli army was supplied with sidewinder 
missiles, bomb racks and other sophisticated military equipment that was dropped 
directly on the front line in the Sinai itself. As a result, the battle scene changed 
dramatically.65 The Arabs regained some of the occupied lands, and raised the hopes of 
64. For more details about the 197 3 war see: Tarek M. Shukri, October War: A point of View and 
Analvsis, (2002); Mohammed H. Haykel, As The Road Diverges: The October War ... What Happened 
During and After?, (1984) 
30. William Burr (ed.}, The October War and US Policv. October 7, 2003, Document 18, The web: 
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returning Palestinian territory. The war heightened international concern about the 
Palestinian cause. Yet, the US did not allow the war to reach its anticipated outcome. 
The US interfered by supporting the Israeli side using different means including 
military aid with sophisticated technology. The Arabs were enraged by this position, 
considering it as an alignment with Israel against Arabs. 
The Arab Gulf countries participated in both the battle and the consequent anger 
against Israel and the US. Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian forces were stationed in the front 
line. The Saudi army was stationed in Jordan, while the Kuwaiti Army was on the 
Egyptian front. 66 It is true that the magnitude and capability of that participation did not 
have much impact on changing the balance of power on the battlefield, yet it expressed 
the Arab Gulf countries concern and involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict with a 
symbolic military contribution because they didn't have enough capability to deploy 
more forces. 
On the other hand, Arab oil countries, especially the Gulf countries, used their 
oil in the political struggle against Israel and to put pressure on the international 
community to intervene appropriatell7. This was one of the distinctive elements of the 
participation by the Arab Gulf countries in supporting the Palestinian cause. Petroleum 
Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar and Iraq (the Arab members of 
OPEC) convened in Kuwait on October 16, 1973. They decided to decrease their oil 
production immediately by 5% monthly. 68 
Arab Gulf countries participated in the enforcement of the oil embargo against 
the US, Europe and Japan. The economies of these Arab Gulf countries was heavily 
dependent on the revenues from oil sales in the international market and by enforcing an 
embargo they risked decreasing their revenues and endangering their own economic 
stability. In addition to this, the embargo increased political and economic tensions in 
the international order in general and with the US and Europeans in particular. This role 
66. Tala't Mussalam, Arab Military Cooperation.(J990), pp. 197-199 
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remained an eminent mark in international relations history and in international order 
policies towards the Middle East in general, and the Gulf region in particular. 
The embargo caused panic among energy consumers. In the US, for example, 
"Customers experienced lines and sometimes no fuel at gasoline stations, the lights on 
the national Christmas tree didn't turn on that year because of the energy crisis, a 
reassessment of the US strategic position in the world was addressed, US oil production 
increased to satisfy the local needs of energy and to reduce depending on oil imports. "69 
The rise in the price of oil due to such crisis from 1973 up to 1981 cost the 
Western economies billions of dollars and caused panic and fear among economists and 
politicians in the West. The price of oil rose from $2.59 per barrel in 1973 to $10.46 
per barrel in 1974 and then up to $24.00 per barrel in 1979 and then $34.00 per barrel in 
1981 representing an increase of 1212.7% in only eight years. The annual cost of oil 
imports to the US alone increased from $6.1 Billion in 1973 to $86.9 Billion in 1981 an 
increase of 1324% in eight years. [See Table 1 and Figure 1 in the appendix.] 
This situation indicated the potential impact that developments in the Arab-
Israeli conflict or the Gulf region could have on the West if such developments might in 
any way disturb the stable flow or price of oil. The correlation that was built up 
between Western industry and Gulf oil made the impact real and tangible. The shortage 
of crude oil supplies to the West would create an energy crisis that would have the 
potential of severely damaging Western economies. In a study conducted by the US 
Treasury Office, it was found that a halt in the flow of Saudi oil to the US for one year 
would cost the American economy $272 Billion, increase the US unemployment rate by 
2% and increase inflation by 20%.70 
On the security and political levels John Campbell discussed how the oil 
embargo affected the NATO alliance. He said that "governments of the most vulnerable 
consuming countries, in Western Europe and Japan, reacted in near panic, seeking ways 
to appease the Arabs on political matters and to obtain economic deals that would 
assure them continued access to Middle East oil at the new high prices. The less 
69. Jay E. Hakes, Administrator, Energy Information Administration, (9/3/1998), the web: 
www. eia. doe.gov 
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vulnerable United States declared it would not bend the principles of its foreign policy 
(which in this case meant supporting Israel) because of economic pressure". 71 
As a result of that embargo, according to the Atmual Report of the Strategic 
Studies Institution in London in 197 4, the industrial countries, with the exception of the 
US, were forced to balance their policies regarding the status of the conflict. 72 This new 
situation enhanced the Arab Gulf countries' coiTelation with the Palestinian cause 
creating deeper linkages and dynamics. 
In particular, the Saudis showed that they were willing to use their oil weapon in 
the Arab cause, and that gave them influence in the Arab world, even if they never used 
it again (as discussed later). They also have provided money to support the anns 
purchases of the confrontation states, especially Egypt." 73 
This contribution by Arab gulf countries in the Palestinian cause emphasised 
their role of "Supportive Countries" to the "Confrontation Countries". Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, in particular, were the most active in war and peace.74 
3-2-4-3 The Camp David Accord and Treaty 1978, 1979 
King Feisal encouraged the United States to intervene m the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and an American initiative to settle the conflict was proposed as a response to 
Saudi demands. Egypt responded positively to the American peace initiative to halt the 
1973 war and negotiate a peace settlement with Israel. Negotiations between Egypt and 
Israel commenced after Sadat's visit to the Israeli Knesset.. In September 1978, Egypt 
reached an individual peace accord with Israel that enabled Egypt to regain its occupied 
teiTitory of Sinai without a comprehensive regional peace settlement. Widespread anger 
erupted in the Arab World. This accord was seen by Saudi Arabia as an individual 
initiative towards Israel that ignored the legitimate rights of the Palestinians; it would 
neutralize Egypt in the Arab-Israeli conflict and it was thus believed to be a big loss for 
the Arabs75 . Thus, at a summit in Baghdad on November 2, 1978 the Arab leaders 
decided to boycott and isolate the Egyptian government as a punishment for its "sin". 
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With the absence of Egypt, Saudi Arabia took the leading role within the Arab world. 
Saudi Arabia opposed the Israeli-Egyptian agreement. The Saudis sought the full 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 regarding the Palestinian issue; 
whereas, the agreement only solved the Egyptian-Israeli aspect of the conflict. It only 
included a vague promise of self-government for the Palestinians at some future time. 
Saudi Arabia referred to the treaty as a relinquishment of the Palestinian cause76 . In 
addition, the treaty did not return the Saudi islands of Tiran and Sanafer in the Red Sea, 
which had been occupied by Israeli forces in 1967. This was also a cause of Saudi 
disappointment with the treaty. 
3-2-4-4 Tlte Israeli invasion of Lebanon 1982 
In 1978, the Israeli Army undertook an assault on Southern Lebanon that was 
designed to eliminate the Palestinian forces stationed there. The Israelis failed to defeat 
and destroy the Palestinian forces and suffered heavy casualties in their attempt. By 
1982, soon after the signature of the 1981 US-Israeli cooperation agreement aimed 
against Soviet influence in the region, Israel decided to attack the Palestinian forces in 
southern Lebanon again. The political context encouraged the Israelis to take such a step 
with US support. The Arabs were preoccupied by other regional conflicts and disputes 
such as the Iraq-Iran war, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the consequences of 
the Camp David treaty on Arab system and internal relations. 77 
76. For more details on Saudi position see: Hassan Abu-Talib (1992), pp.I77-I87 
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Israel thought the invasion would be an easy job both militarily and politically, 
and would give them a chance to eliminate their most dangerous enemy at that time, the 
PLO. They wanted to seize an opportunity when the Arab and Muslim world was 
divided and preoccupied. The Israeli military campaign began on June 6t\ 1982. 
Within 78 days, it succeeded in destroying the PLO forces and institutions, dispersing 
them away from Israel's borders. 
Both Iraq, the usual ally of the PLO, and Iran, with its Islamic regime that was 
backing the Palestinian cause, were trapped and preoccupied by their war against each 
other and thus could not participate in any meaningful way to stand with or back the 
PLO forces against the Israeli aggression. Thus, while the consequences of the Iraq-Iran 
war on security in the Gulf were paramount, it also had an important impact on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, proving the point that there is a continuous potential reciprocity 
between the Arab-Israeli conflict and security in the Gulf. 
Saudi Arabia helped as a mediator between the US and the PLO. Under US 
pressure, an agreement was reached to pull the Palestinian forces out from Lebanon and 
relocate them in Yemen, Tunisia, Sudan and Algeria. But this was not enough to protect 
Palestinian civilians in the Lebanese refugee camps who were subjected to massacres in 
Sabra and Shatila on 16-18 September 1982. The Arab Gulf countries expressed 
political solidarity with Palestinians. They tried to help in containing the 
consequences. 78 
Saudi Arabia offered a peace initiative during the Arab Summit in Fez, Morocco 
that convened soon after those massacres, in 1982. It was known as "Fahd's Initiative", 
and later became an Arab political program. It put emphasis on the Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied territories in exchange for peace with the Jewish State, based on UN 
Resolution 242. 79 It also called for the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as 
its capital. It accepted the idea of the gradual implementation of the resolution over a 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. At the same time, the USSR, usually the main international supporter of the 
Palestinian cause was also preoccupied and concerned about the samefi·onts. 
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period of a few months and under the mandate of the UN. It implicitly recognised the 
right of the Israeli state to live in peace and security in the region. 80 
Israel refused this initiative claiming it aimed at destroying the Jewish state. 81 
The Israeli refusal, plus the regional circumstances that continued pre-occupying Arab 
policies, halted any serious political or military development in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
until 1987. 
3-2-4-5 The Palestinian Intifada 1987 
The Palestinians began a major uprising against the Israeli occupation forces on 
December 8, 1987. This Palestinian phenomenon was called the "Intifada". The Israeli 
forces killed at least 1392 Palestinians, 353 ofthem children, by May 1994.82 
The Arab Gulf countries supported the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli 
assault and provocation. They encouraged public aid to the Palestinians, especially 
those who had suffered mJunes, or lost their homes. Politically, they praised and 
recognized the Palestinian State decision, which was declared by the Palestinian 
National Council of the PLO (PNC) on November 15, 1988 in Algeria. In a statement 
released after a GCC meeting in December 1988, the GCC collectively asserted their 
stand in supporting the Palestinian Intifada. They promised to use their capabilities to 
help in achieving the Intifada's goals. They called for an international conference to find 
a just and lasting peaceful settlement to the conflict, based on the right of self-
determination for the Palestinian people. 83 
3-2-4-6 The Middle East Peace Process (1991-2000) 
The President of the US, George Bush, invited Arabs and Israelis to a peace 
conference in Madrid from October 30 to November 2, 1991 84. The conference 
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convened with the attendance of Israelis and Arabs, including the Secretary General of 
the GCC and the Saudi ambassador to the US. It resulted in two negotiation tracks: 
bilateral and multilateral.85 Some Arab Gulf members officially took part in multilateral 
negotiation committees, something considered as a great change in their official policy 
towards the conflict. "Their motives behind such participation have many 
considerations, the most notable are86 : 
1- The continuous US pressure which was aimed at achieving two main goals: 
a. to encourage the Arab normalization with Israel and to end the 
economic boycott against it that has been enforced since 1948 
b. to use the Arab Gulf countries oil revenues to finance the outcomes of 
the expected Arab- Israeli peace settlement especially regarding the 
settlement of the Palestinian refugees. 
2- The participation of the Palestinians in the process which provides the political 
excuse and cover to their new political stance 
3- The expectations of emergence of a settlement between Israel and other Arab 
frontier countries which might limit the Israeli ambitions to reach the borders of 
the Arab Gulf countries 
4- Some believed that the cost of peace that they will burden would be less than 
that of war, especially on the economic level ". 
Hence it is owing to US pressure, to fulfil their traditional position since the 
1980s promoting peace based on the UN resolutions, to save part of their money since 
peace was thought to be cheaper than war, and due to their security calculations, that 
they took part in such a deal. 
Some argue that part of the change in the positions of the Arab Gulf States after 
the second Gulf war was related to the perception in the Gulf that the PLO supported 
Iraq in their invasion of Kuwait. This led the Arab Gulf States to freeze their relations 
and curtail financial support to the PLO. "The PLO's public support for Saddam Hussein 
85. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eighth Anniversary o(the Madrid Peace Conference, Oct 30-
31, 1991,( 2911011999), The web: 
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during the Persian Gulf war shocked the Saudis. The government retaliated by cutting 
off its aid to the PLO". 87 
On the other hand, Russell Watson explained US strategy in this regard when he 
noted that the US Secretary of State, James Baker, wanted Saudi Arabia to take the lead 
in approaching Israel on the first track, so that Israel could take the first step towards 
Palestinians on the second track. 88 
Syrians, Jordanians and Lebanese took pat1 in the bilateral tracks, agreeing to 
engage in direct negotiations with the Israeli side. The Palestinian-Israeli track opened 
the way to achieve a secret negotiated agreement in 1993. It became known as the Oslo 
Declaration of Principles. It was signed in Washington on September 13th, 1993 with the 
attendance of many Arabs, including Arab Gulf countries' diplomats. Consequently, 
Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel on October 26, 1994.89 
In the 151h round of the Higher Council of the GCC in Manama during 19-22 
December, 1994, the Gulf countries welcomed the new steps in the peace process, 
calling on the US and Israel to comply with intemationallegitimacy.90 
Since the Madrid Conference, the Arab Gulf countries played an important 
political role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather than the role of supporting the 
Palestinian resistance that the Gulf countries played in the seventies, their post-Madrid 
role was that of supporting the US sponsored peace process. The Arab Gulf countries 
pledged to aid the Palestinian Authority and the Arab countries bordering Israel if they 
signed peace agreements with Israe1. 91 This new policy expressed the shift that affected 
the Arab Gulf countries' policies towards the conflict. With the downfall of the USSR 
and the unilateral leadership of the US that emerged, the Arab Gulf countries related 
most of their policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict at the peace process level to the 
consideration of their correlation of ties with the US. The Arab-Israeli conflict 
underwent a shift from being primarily based on military confrontation in the 1970s and 
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the early 1980s into political negotiations afterwards, so the position of the Arab Gulf 
countries shifted as well toward support for those negotiations. At the same time, the 
Arab Gulf countries had to cover their position regarding supporting the Palestinian 
cause, which was used as a confirmation of and support to their legitimacy internally 
and in accordance with their regional role. The Arab Gulf countries were able to 
achieve an internal political balance by allowing their people to continue supporting the 
Palestinians and other Arabs involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This suppo11 was 
expressed on political, social, media and economic levels. 
Such developments contributed to constitute a new dilemma for the policies of 
the Arab Gulf states towards the Arab-Israeli conflict as will be clarified later. 
One of the results of the Gulf crisis and war of 1990-1991 - that will be 
discussed later - was that the Arab Gulf countries became more focused on issues 
related to internal affairs than the larger pan-Arab interests. It also resulted in the Arab 
Gulf countries boycotting the leadership of the PLO. The Arab Gulf countries declined 
to provide their usual financial assistance to the PLO due to its stand in that war. 
Yet, they resumed their aid as a part of their obligations towards the peace 
process, but to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) rather than to the PL0.92 Saudi 
Arabia, for example, donated $300 million to the PNA from 1994, when it was 
established, to the year 2000.93 
US pressures succeeded, in the middle stages of the political peace process, in 
changing the policies of the Arab Gulf states towards the Arab boycott of Israel. The 
Arab Gulf countries issued a resolution by the GCC on September 3 01\ 1994, cancelling 
the Arab League's boycott of the second and third degrees. 94 That was excused by the 
first achievements of the peace process. Kuwait had already set the precedent when it 
had unilaterally made a similar announcement in June of 1993.95 Qatar and Oman had 
also individually opened Israeli trade missions in their capitals. 
92. Reed Stanley, (et al), "The Mideast: Why Washington May Give Abdullah's Plan a Try", Business 
Week, (41112002), p.49 
93. King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz Web: www.Kingfahd-binabdulaziz.org/pagesl/9-20.htm 
94. Emma Murphy (eta/), Gul[Security in the new World Order, (1997), p. 194; the official web of the 
CCC: www.gcc-sg.org/index.html; Abdul Jalil Marhoun, Gui[Security in the Post Cold War, (1997), pp. 
270-282 
95. A. Atiyah, [General Secretwy of the CCC}," The Future Horizon of the CCC", (1514/2002), The 
web.· www.zc:cf org. ae//ectures/ A2 
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The Arab Gulf countries were divided on the issue of normalization with the 
Jewish State. Qatar and Oman began having open relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, the Emirates and Bahrain were, however, less enthusiastic about having such 
ties with Israel. 
As far as Qatar's position towards Israel, it is worth mentioning that Qatar had 
been in border disputes with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain for many years. Since the 
overthrow of the old Qatari system by Sheikh Hamad, the son of the previous Emir, 
Saudi Arabia has been increasingly sensitive to the policies of the new government. 
Qatar found that its relationship with Israel strengthened the support it got from the US 
in its border disputes as well as in the face of general Saudi hegemony over the Arab 
Gulf. Qatar was keen to use the peace climate to have relations with Israel and create for 
itself a new role that would improve its international and regional standing. This Qatari 
policy succeeded in minimizing the impacts of Saudi threats against Qatar. The deal that 
was intended to enable Qatar to sell Natural Gas to Israel also played a role in Qatar's 
enthusiastic policy towards Israel. Qatar and Japan were negotiating a natural Gas deal 
worth $2-6 BN in 1995. Israel offered to take the deal of $2 BN96 when the Qatari-
Japanese negotiations broke down. Qatar began the deal negotiations with Israel in 
1995. The Qatari government authorized the American Company "Enron" to provide 
Israel with 2.5 million tons of its gas annually97 . 
An Israeli trade mission was publicly declared m Doha in March of 1996. 
Shimon Peres, The acting Prime Minister of Israel, visited Qatar in April of the same 
year. He officially signed the agreement between both countries to exchange the 
opening of Commercial Offices. Five months later, in September, 1996, Israel suddenly 
stopped the negotiations for the gas deal. This move, taken by Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu, disappointed the Qatari govemment.98 
As far as Oman's position is concerned, it is worth mentioning that Oman had 
not agreed with the general policy of Saudi Arabia towards the embargo against the 
Egyptian government after the Camp David accord was concluded in 1978. Oman had 
96. Johans Reisner, (October 1997), p. 18 
97. Hamad Bin Jabr Al-Thani, Embassy of lsrael, Washingtopn D.C., American Jewish Committee 
Conference, May I 0, 1996, The web: http:///www. israelemb. org 
98. Al-Hayat, Egypt,( December 16, 2001)," Will Qatar be the Alternative ... ?", The web: 
www. msrawy. com 
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always been more open to a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and never 
participated significantly in the conflict. The leader of Oman had long been known to 
have a less hostile attitude towards Israel than the other Arab leaders. Before the 
American Jewish Conference in May 10, 1996, the Omani Foreign Minister, Yousefbin 
Alawi, affirmed Oman's vision towards Israel. He said: "Oman has committed its policy 
to support peace. Oman supported Sadat's move of peace towards Israel. Oman 
developed every beneficial and fruitful relationship with Israel. "99 So when the 
circumstances of the conflict changed, he used the opportunity to implement his 
traditional beliefs regarding the conflict. It is worth mentioning that Oman used to have 
secret relations with Israel before the Madrid Conference in 1991. Gei Bakhour, the 
Israeli journalist, uncovered that "Yousef bin Alawi, the Foreign Minister of Oman, 
visited Israel secretly many times in 1987. He was hosted by the Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir. 100 Both Qatar and Oman hosted visits from Israeli political leaders, and 
reciprocally opened trade representation offices in Tel Aviv. In November of 1994, 
Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, visited Oman. Israel and Oman signed an 
agreement in Muscat on January 27, 1996 to open trade representative offices. In April 
1996, Israeli acting Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, visited Oman. 101 
But for the other Arab Gulf countries, different considerations were taken into 
account, including their commitment to the full settlement of the Palestinian cause and 
the return of the Palestinians legitimate rights. The GCC itself expressed this position 
officially; it stated that "The GCC Council welcomes the achievements that the peace 
process has accomplished for peace in the Middle East. The Council expresses its 
continuous support to the peace process. It calls upon the patronage states of peace to 
exert pressure on Israel to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 
425".102 
99. Youse/ Bin Abdullah Bin Almvi, Embassy of Israel, Washingtopn D.C., American Jewish Committee 
Conference, May 10, 1996, The web: http://lwww.israelemb.org 
100. Gei Bakhour, Ha'artz Newspaper, (13/3/1996), in Dar Al-Jalil Limited Report ( 9141 1996) 
101. israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations, Foreign Aiinistry Statement on Israel-Oman 
Agreement, 28 January 1996, The web: 
http:ll>vww. mfa.gov. il/MF AIF oreign%20Relationsllsraels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%20 1947 I 1 
99 5-1996/F oreign%20Minisf1y%20Statement%20on%20lsrael-Oman%20Agreemen 
102. The final communique of 15th round of the Higher Council ofthe GCC,( Dec 1994), The web: 
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Saudi Arabia continued individually and through the GCC to support efforts for 
peace. It affirmed the necessity to pressure Israel to comply with the signed agreement 
with the Palestinians. On the other hand it supported the PNA efforts to maintain the 
running of Palestinian civil institutions. It also encouraged the Palestinian efforts to 
accomplish internal unity. Saudi King Fahd hosted Sheikh Ahmad Yaseen (Hamas 
spiritual leader) for a few days in April of 1998 giving him the full support of the 
kingdom in his struggle to restore Palestinian rights and independence. Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Qater did the same .. Y aseen was promised good financial 
support in the future. The US, on the other hand, pressured the Arab Gulf states to stop 
all financial support to the Islamic Palestinian factions such as Hamas. Madeline 
Albright, the US Secretary of State, toured the Gulf in 1998, after the Yaseen visit, to 
promote this policy. 
When the peace process stalemated, many efforts were made to implement the 
signed agreements between the Palestinians and Israelis. The last effort to restore the 
process was made by President Bill Clinton in Camp David in July of 2000. He could 
not overcome the obstacles between both parties' positions after 13 days of behind scene 
negotiations. It was said that the Jerusalem issue and the right of the Palestinian 
refugees to return in accordance with the UN resolution number 194 of 194 7 caused the 
failure of these negotiations 103 . Each party blamed the other for this failure. 
3-2-4-7 The Second Palestinian Intifada 2000 
On September 28, 2000,the Palestinian people began a new upnsmg which 
became to be known as the al-Aqsa Intifada. It was a public reaction against Ariel 
Sharon's ill-advised visit, under heavy military guard, into al-Aqsa Mosque. This 
Intifada resulted in deep changes in the Palestinian and Arab attitudes towards the peace 
process with Israel. Israel used excessive and fatal force and forbidden weapons against 
Palestinian youths, children and women. Israel killed, wounded and arrested tens of 
thousands of Palestinians. 104 
The Arab public was enraged; accordingly, Arab leaders convened an urgent 
meeting in Cairo on 21-22 October 2000. This Summit approved the Saudi proposal of 
I 03. Hassan Asfour, The right of Return in the Peace Process, in "The titture oft he Expelled 
Palestinians' Conference". (September 2000) 
104. For more details See :Middle East Studies center, AI-Aqsa Intifada, (2000) 
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establishing an "al-Aqsa Intifada Fund" of $200 million, to support the families of 
killed and injured Palestinians. Another Fund was proposed to sustain the Arabic and 
Islamic identity in Jerusalem and to support the Palestinian economy. The name of this 
fund, tinanced with $800 million, was the "al-Aqsa Fund". 105 
The Islamic Conference Organisation Summit also convened in Doha, Qatar, on 
12-13 November 2000. It was named the "al-Aqsa Intifada Summit". The Summit 
called for explicit support to the Palestinian Intifada. It called upon its members to 
boycott Israel and close its missions. This boycott was to remain in force until Israel 
complied with the UN resolutions on the Palestinian cause, Jerusalem, and the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 106 There were different responses to the call in the Arab world. Jordan 
and Egypt recalled their Ambassadors from Israel. Qatar, Oman, and Tunisia went 
further by closing the Israeli offices in their capitals. 
This new Intifada contributed to a change in the public and ofticial mood of the 
Arab Gulf countries. Large numbers of their citizens demonstrated in the streets in 
support of the Palestinians. They donated through their NGOs and the Arab funds 
established for such support as will be detailed later. 
The Israelis tried unsuccessfully to crush the new intifada. The Israeli army 
committed many grave violations and atrocities against the Palestinians. The Saudi 
Arabian vision was that a peaceful solution was the only way to solve the conflict. In a 
dinner with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2001, Thomas Freedman, the 
famous New York Times columnist, encouraged the Saudis to make this stance public. 
The Saudis then proposed an initiative that was adopted in the 2002 Arab summit in 
Beirut to settle the cont1ict completely through the exchange of concessions from both 
sides. 107 
I05. Urgent Arab Summit Concluding Statement, Cairo,( 2I-22/I0/2000), The web: 
www. arableagueonline. org/arableaguelarabic.htm 
I 06. The Islamic Summit Conference Concluding Statement, Doha, ( 12-13/II I 2000), The web: 
www. oic-oci. orglindex-arabic. asp 
I07. The main lines of Saudi initiative were based on the Israeli withdrawal to the borders of June 4th, 
1967, and to facilitate the establishing of the Independent Palestinian State, due to UN resolution 242, 
338. Therefore, the members of the Arab League (the twenty-two) will setup complete diplomatic 
relations with Israel, and normalize their trade and security as well, and all of that in exchange with 
Israel's withdrawal mentioned above according to UN decision No. 242. 
It is worth mentioning that this initiative expressed clear development in Saudis' political 
position towards the conflict, the most notable are: 
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It is clear, therefore, that the Arab Gulf countries have historically participated in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict on different levels and by different means. Their participation 
was affected by both developments in the conflict as well as other factors. The conflict 
developments played the role of reconsidering the conflict in the Arab Gulf countries' 
policies. Their contribution was very noticeable and effective during the seventies. The 
Arab Gulf countries traditional role was played in supporting the Palestinian cause. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the most e±Iective among the Arab Gulf countries in this 
regard because they were more motivated by the Arab inter-politics. They also had more 
economic capabilities, and used to have the largest Palestinian communities in the Gulf. 
They supported the right of the Palestinian people to resist occupation and the right of 
the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland as essential provisions needed to 
resolve the problem. They called for the execution of political and economic pressure 
on Israel to comply with UN resolutions in this regard. They worked to mobilize 
popular and political etiorts to boost the Palestinian cause. They offered military 
support and fought side by side with troops of the confrontation countries, in a direct 
I. Talking to the Israelis directly, which meant that it called upon the Israeli side to accept its 
initiative 
2. An Arab commitment to recognize Israel and normalize relations with it 
3. Saudi involvement in the details of the peace process directly and as a partner. 
4. It proposed the recognition of Israeli state in exchange with withdrawal only. 
5. Shared in forming peace and the political fitture of Israel in the region which was lift earlier to 
the Palestinians. 
The Israeli response to the final communique of the Arab summit in Jvfarch 28, 2002 in Beirut 
was reversal. Israeli incursion into the West Bank and its assault against Palestinians with its missiles 
after came only two days ajier the summit conclusion. This was considered as a practical response which 
led to understanding it as a rejection from Israeli side to the peace initiative, even through UN 
resolutions. This initiative was impeded before it even had seen the light due to the aggressive Israeli 
side. 
There were many motives which led Saudi Arabia to propose such an initiative including: 
• To reform the Kigdom's picture in American Media 
• To directly address the Israeli public 
e An attempt to get Arab as well as Israeli leaders back to the track of peace which 
Saudi Arabia traditionally supports. 
• To present the Kingdom as patron of peace and not a shield for terrorism after the 
continuous allegations claimed by many American journalists and congressmen against the 
Kingdom. 
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backing of other Arab and Palestinian efforts to regain their legitimate rights. They also 
worked to bring about a political settlement to the conflict by proposing peace 
initiatives in different Arab summits such as in 1982 and 2002. 
3-3 The dynamics and limits of Arab Gulf Countries' policies 
In earlier sections, the analysis underscored the important linkages throughout 
the last three decades between the Arab Gulf countries and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 
assessing the changing dynamics of the potential reciprocal relationship between Gulf 
security and the Arab-Israeli conflict it is important to keep in mind the same constants 
and changing variables that were discussed earlier. Earlier sections of this chapter have 
shown that the ideological and strategic constants that link the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict are constrained by four variables, namely the correlation between Western and 
Arab Gulf countries interests, developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict, developments 
within the Gulf region, and developments in the economic capabilities of the Arab Gulf 
countries. The earlier sections of the chapter have shown how each of these individual 
variables affected the role of the Arab Gulf countries at different times. 
It is also important to note that these individual variables were also affected by 
each other and they had different individual effects on the overall political, economic, 
and military contributions of the Arab Gulf countries to the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
different periods of the study. Looking at the wider picture gives a clearer understanding 
of the most important dynamics and the major limitations that affected Gulf policy. 
Overall, the dynamics of all these different relations and effects led to a general 
diminishment over time in the reciprocal relationship between the Arab Gulf countries 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This diminishment over time was influenced by a number 
of major limitations on the ability of the Gulf to remain so closely linked to the Arab-
Israeli con±1ict. 
Limits of tlze dynamics 
This study has shown that strong ideological, security and strategic motives 
stand behind the Arab Gulf countries' policies, especially those of Saudi Arabia, 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 108• Despite those motives, however, this study has also 
shown that the ability of the Gulf Countries to develop their policies toward the Arab-
1011
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Israeli conflict has been limited by a number of factors. The most notable factors that 
have served as the major limitations have been: 
1. The effect of the consequences of the conflict on Gulf security. 
2. The Saudi relations with the US as seen in the 1973 war, the 
AWACS deal in 1981, the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 and 
the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. 
3. The peace process especially regarding the Israeli positions 
concemmg the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 of 1967, and the Oslo agreement signed with the 
PLO in 1994. 
4. The economic capabilities that affected the extent to which the 
Arab Gulf countries could support the Arabs in the conflict. 
While this increased with the jump in the price of oil after the 
enforcement of the oil embargo in 1973-197 4, it declined 
dramatically after the sharp drop in the price of oil in 1986. 
5. The inter-relations of Arabs and the role of other players in Arab 
world politics. Egypt is the main player in this regard. Its role has 
traditionally minimized the ability of Saudi Arabia to manoeuvre 
with its special vision towards the developments of the conflict 
such as the case in 1967 and 1978. 
These factors played different roles in the different stages of the conflict through 
the period of study. They affected the Arab Gulf countries by impeding their deep 
involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict especially in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Such effects can be illustrated in two notable examples: 
First, ,the Arab Gulf countries' decision not to enforce the oil embargo after 197 4, 
in spite of the continuous alignment of the US and Europe with Israel. The reasons 
behind the unwillingness or inability of the Arab Gulf states to enforce a new embargo 
. 1 d' 109 are many, me u mg : 
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. For more details on this issue, see: Muhammad T Al-Gnaimi, Petroleum and the Middle East Crisis. 
(1974), p./62; Hassan Abu Talib. (1992). pp./62-163 
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1- The reaction of the embargo on the economic development of the 
Arab Gulf countries, whose GNPs are constituted almost solely from 
oil revenues. This is detected through their need of additional income 
after the first and second Gulf Wars. 
2- The emergence of a new philosophy among the Arab Gulf countries 
to use their oil income in support to the Arab side in the conflict 
rather than in enforcing an oil embargo. 
3- The increased US military presence in the region that would enable 
the US to occupy the oil fields on one hand, while it increased the 
dependence of the Arab Gulf countries on the US for their own 
security and stability on the other. 
4- The increased economic correlations between the Arab Gulf 
countries and the west throughout the eighties and the nineties. 
Secondly, their failure to continue the implementation of their pledges made in 
the Baghdad Arab summit in 1978 to provide the Palestinians with economic support. 
There are many variables that played a role in shaping this situation, including: 
0 The Iran-Iraq war that heavily burdened the budgets of the Arab Gulf countries 
through 1980-1988 
• The Saudi proposal of a peace plan in the Arab Summit in Fez in 1982. This 
proposal minimized the enthusiastic support to what used to be called the 
''frontline countries". 
e The Arab reconciliation with Egypt after Sadat's assassination in 1982 which 
changed the climate of hostility against the Egyptian govemment that had been 
due to Sadat's unilateral treaty with Israel. 
~ The sharp drop of the Arab Gulf countries' income from the oil revenues after 
1983 to reach its minimum in 1986. 
e The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent war of 1991 that came 
at the expense of any financial contribution in the conflict. Moreover, the 
dispute that arose between the PLO and the Arab Gulf countries in the aftermath 
of that crisis (Second Gulf Crisis 1990-1991 ). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the linkages between the Arab Gulf countries and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict developed through different historical stages. Throughout the 
period 1970-2000, the Arab Gulf states felt linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict by their 
Arab and Islamic identity as well as by their strategic ties to the region. This link 
served as a const.ant that made the Arab Gulf states almost permanent supporters of the 
Palestinian position and placed important limits on the extent to which the Arab Gulf 
States would be willing or able to restrain or cut back support for the Palestinian cause 
no matter what other factors intervened. Another constant throughout the period was 
the desire by the Arab Gulf States to link their policies to international law and 
resolutions. They have always felt the importance of such a linkage in justifying and 
legitimating their positions. 
However, these constants cannot by themselves explain the various different 
stances taken by the Arab Gulf countries over the thirty year period from 1970-2000. 
These differences can be explained by four other variables. Those variables are the 
level of correlation between Western and Gulf interests, the level of aggression that the 
Palestinians and Arabs faced from Israel, the level of the threat that Israel posed to the 
security of the Gulf, and the level of the economic potential of the Arab Gulf countries. 
These four variables changed dramatically in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and the 
manner in which they changed explains Arab Gulf policies towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
In the 1970s there was relatively little correlation of interests between the West 
and the Arab Gulf States. The Arabs were victims of Israeli aggression as the 
occupation of Arab territories, including Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, was still 
fresh in the minds of the Arab peoples and states. Israel posed a direct security threat to 
the Gulf through its alliance with Iran, it's clearly expansionist program - as represented 
by the 1967 war, and its nuclear ambitions and refusal to sign the nuclear non-
proliferation agreement. Finally, during the 1970s, the Arab Gulf countries enjoyed 
massive economic and financial potential as represented in the huge increase in oil 
prices throughout the decade. All four factors led to strong support from the Arab Gulf 
states for the Palestinians and frontline Arab states. This was seen in the financial, 
political, and even military support the Arab Gulf states provided Palestinians and Arab 
frontline states during that decade. 
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In the 1980s, there was increased correlation of both economic and security 
interests between the West and the Arab Gulf States. Their economies became 
increasingly linked through oil sales, consumer and military purchases and international 
financial investments. Their security needs became closer aligned as they both looked 
upon the Soviet and Iranian threats to the region in the same light. The Iranian 
revolution and the establishment of an Islamic regime in Iran ended the Iranian-Israeli 
relationship thus lessening Israel's direct threat to the security of the Gulf. New Iranian 
and Soviet threats, best represented by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, increased 
the security threats from other areas. The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) occupied the 
priority of Arab Gulf countries' policies on both economic and security concerns. Their 
economic potential decreased dramatically in the 1980s as the price of oil began 
collapsing in 1983. Israel's aggression against the Palestinians and Arabs remained high 
during the 1980s as best represented by Israel's invasion of Lebanon and their brutal 
crushing of the Intifada that started in the occupied West Bank and Gaza in 1987. 
With three of the four variables working against strong Arab Gulf countries 
linkages in support of the Palestinians and Arab frontline states, there was a noticeable 
decrease and diminishment in such support during the 1980s. However, the support was 
still meaningful, especially after the beginning of the Intifada to which the Arab Gulf 
states provided important political and economic support. 
In the 1990s, the correlation of interests between the Arab Gulf states and the 
West again increased dramatically. The economic linkages that had first begun in the 
1970s and became meaningful in the 1980s matured further in the 1990s as 
globalization tied the economies of the Arab Gulf countries and the West closer 
together. The West had also come to the military support of the Arab Gulf countries 
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequently established large military bases on 
the territories of the Arab Gulf states. Much of the costs of those bases were picked up 
by the Arab Gulf states, further increasing the correlations of economic and security 
interests between the Arab Gulf countries and the West. The Iraqi threat to the Arab 
Gulf countries, represented by the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent 
Western-imposed embargo on Iraq - largely imposed through Western bases on the 
territory of the Arab Gulf states - further tied the Arab Gulf states to the West as it also 
underscored the kind of security threats facing the Gulf. 
In the view of the Arab Gulf countries, the Israeli threats to the region were less 
pronounced as the Iraqi threat and internal Islamist threats increased. The Palestinians 
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became active partners in the peace process when they signed the Oslo agreement in 
1993 that explicitly recognized Israel's right to exist and committed the Palestinians to a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. This development lessened the climate of Israeli 
hostility that had previously prevailed in the Arab world, including the Arab Gulf 
countries. Some Arab Gulf countries subsequently built trade relations with Israel. The 
economic potential of the Arab Gulf States also decreased further in the 1990s as the 
huge sums of money that the Arab Gulf states spent on the war against Iraq and on new 
arms purchases put some of them into debt. 
With all four factors working against a strong role for the Arab Gulf countries in 
supporting the Palestinian cause in the 1990s, their position changed dramatically 
during the decade. It moved from a role of supporting the Palestinians and Arabs 
against Israel, to a role of encouraging the Palestinians to accept the US-sponsored 
peace process. This situation only began to change slightly with the outbreak of the 2nd 
Palestinian Intifada in September of 2000. That Intifada and the unprecedented Israeli 
acts of brutality that it witnessed, including the use of tanks and military helicopters 
against civilian Palestinian targets, partially brought the position of the Arab Gulf 
countries back in support of the Palestinians and their struggle to gain their rights. This 
shows that as there was a change in one of the four variables, in this case the level of 
aggression that the Palestinians and Arabs faced from Israel, there was a subsequent 
change in the position of the Arab Gulf countries toward the conflict. 
This chapter has thus shown that in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s there was a 
reciprocal relationship, whereby, the policies of the Arab Gulf States toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict were influenced by both developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict itself 
as well as Israeli threats toward the Gulf and the security concerns they engendered. The 
detailed analysis earlier showed the diminishment in their strong support and role 
through the three decades. The Stanley Foundation noted the anxiety felt in the Gulf 
region concerning Israel when it stated in its policy brief that: "The Arab Gulf states 
view the Israeli-Palestinian (Arab) conflict as a major destabilising force in the region 
from a political and ideological standpoint". 110 
The Arab-Israeli conflict thus both influenced the security of the Gulf- through 
Israeli ambitions toward the region - and was, at the same time, intluenced by it as the 
110. The Atlantic Council of the United States and Others, "US Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: 
Israel and the Gulf', Policy Brief# 7, p. I, The Web: www.acus.urg 
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Arab Gulf States' policies, at different times, had a meaningful impact on the conflict 
itself. Such reciprocity between Gulf security with its different aspects, and the Arab-
Israeli conflict was acknowledged by the authors of a paper published by RAND 
Corporation. The paper tests an approach to a new security system in the Gulf. The 
authors concluded that: "there is no doubt that constructing a more stable security 
system and promoting reform in the Gulf would be easier if there were a settlement to 
the Israeli-Palestinian (Arab) conflict. On the other hand if a more stable system can be 
constructed in the Gulf . . . it may actually prove easier to make progress on the Israeli-
Palestinian (Arab) front." 111 
This statement, from a leading Western think tank, best summarizes the notion 
that there is strong reciprocity between Gulf security and the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
111. Andrew Rathmel/ and others, "A New Persian Gulf Security System", issue paper o[Rand. (2003), 
http://www.rand.orglpublications/JPIJP2-18/!P2-18.pd( 
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The Conclusion 
This thesis explored the potential linkages and dynamics in the relationship 
between the security of the Arab Gulf states and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has shown 
that the policies of the Arab Gulf states toward the Arab-Israeli conflict can be 
explained by their security perceptions and needs as well as developments in the Arab-
Israeli conflict itself. Thus, changes in the kind and level of interaction that the Arab 
Gulf states had with the Arab-Israeli conflict occurred as a result of developments in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as well as developments in their own security perceptions. At the 
same time, the Arab Gulf states policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict had a 
meaningful impact on developments in the conflict. Therefore a potential reciprocal 
relationship exists whereas the Arab-Israeli conflict, Gulf security, and the policies of 
the Arab Gulf states have a reciprocal influence. 
Arab Gulf security is composed of many factors and is thus influenced by many 
variables. The two main variables that are relevant to this thesis are the international 
competition over the Gulf and the Israeli ambitions in the region. This is specified with 
the acknowledgement of the impact of other factors including the Arab system itself. 
The oil wealth of the Gulf region has given it vital strategic importance and has 
thus made it into an arena of competition among international actors. This has given 
rise to serious security concerns among the Arab Gulf states. The extent to which those 
security concerns have at times forced the Arab Gulf states to depend on pro-Israeli 
Western powers for their security needs thus forms one of the most important variables 
affecting the Arab Gulf states policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same 
time, the Arab Gulf states enormous economic potential as well as their strategic 
location has given rise to Israeli ambitions in the region. These ambitions have also led 
to serious security concerns among the Arab Gulf states. The extent to which Israel has 
seemed to represent a security threat to the security and independence of the Arab Gulf 
states fom1s another extremely important variable affecting the Arab Gulf states policies 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The first two chapters of this thesis dealt with these two main variables. Both 
the international competition over the Gulf and the Israeli ambitions toward the region 
were dealt with in detail. Both of these factors are complex and their nature changed 
from the 1970s to the 1990s. The increasing correlation of economic and security 
interests between the Arab Gulf states aqd the West over the period of the study reveals 
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some of the complexity of these factors. This correlation came about as a result of 
developments that took place during the international competition over the region but it 
has given rise to a new factor that both affects the long-tenn security and independence 
of the Arab Gulf States as well as their ability and/or willingness to take strong political 
stances in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Related to this is the ability of Israel to influence 
US policy either directly or through the pro-Israel American Lobby as detailed in 
chapter two. This ability represents a security threat to the Arab Gulf states in and of 
itself, while at the same time; it fmther hinders the ability of the Arab Gulf states to take 
strong political stances in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the light of their economic and 
security dependence on the US. 
The third chapter revealed some of the complexity of these factors by providing 
a detailed analysis of their historical development. It also explains how at different 
times two other variables have affected the Arab Gulf countries' policies toward the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The economic capabilities of the Arab Gulf states is itself a 
variable that partially explains the positions they have taken in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
though it is in many ways related to the international competition over the region. 
Developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict represented by the level of aggression that the 
Arabs and Palestinians faced from Israel, is another variable that explains developments 
in the positions taken by the Arab Gulf countries. Wars waged by Israel, developments 
in the peace process, such as the signing of the 1993 Oslo Agreement, and the 
occurrence of uprisings in the occupied Palestinian territories all have had an important 
impact on the development of Arab Gulf policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
This thesis has thus provided a model that explains the development of Arab 
Gulf countries policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, it 
underscores how those policies have had a meaningful impact on the conflict itself and 
how the Arab-Israeli conflict- in all its complexity- has had an important impact on 
security in the Gulf. The explanation of the potential reciprocity in the relationship 
between Gulf security, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Arab Gulf countries' policies 
toward the conflict has given us a new way of understanding important developments in 
the region. 
Hence, the Arab Gulf countries have contributed to the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
different ways and means over the course of the period from 1970 to 2000. During 
some periods, they played a vitally effective role that contributed to the many regional 
and international challenges that they had to face. Those challenges in turn led the Arab 
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Gulf countries to adopt new policies, which mostly have been at the expense of their 
contributions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The seventies witnessed a growing role for, and involvement of, the Arab Gulf 
countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This increased involvement was due to many 
developments, including the growing financial capabilities of these countries, the 
increase of their political independence, and developments within the Arab-Israeli 
conflict itself. All those developments had essential impacts upon the increasing 
involvement of the Arab Gulf countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict especially at the 
economic and political levels. 
During the eighties, regional and international developments in the Arabian Gulf 
played an important role in reforming the Arab Gulf countries' policies towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The decade was marked by the birth of the GCC in 1981, which was established as 
a result of wide-ranging regional and international challenges facing the Arab Gulf 
countries. The formation of the GCC symbolized the increasing regional concerns of the 
Arab Gulf states that came at the expense of collective Arab national concerns towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Under the shadow of the repercusswns of the Second Gulf War in 1991, the 
nineties witnessed a further lessening of the Arab Gulf countries involvement in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The security concerns in the region rose to occupy most of the 
interest and concerns of their agenda. This period witnessed the vitiual absence of the 
Arab Gulf countries' role regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict; their only participation 
being in support of a peace process that the US pressured them into supporting as shown 
in chapter three. 
So, the thesis showed that from 1970-2000, the international competition over 
the Gulf as well as the level of security concerns that came about as a result of the 
perceived threat posed by Israeli ambitions in the Gulf region formed effective factors 
in developing the different policies of the Arab Gulf countries' towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Such policies were mostly in line with Arab and Palestinian interests but the 
level to which they were in tandem with those larger interests was sometimes tempered 
by their own security concerns and what was needed to meet those concerns. The degree 
of their involvement was constrained and affected by some limits as shown earlier. The 
emergence of security in the Gulf, the halt of peace process initiatives, the decrease of 
oil revenues and the increase of correlations and dependence on the US impeded the 
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effectiveness of their involvement. They behaved in accordance with their Arabic and 
Islamic loyalty towards the conflict in the seventies, while the emergence of their 
security concerns and economic interests were mostly the frame of their involvement in 
the eighties and nineties. 
In regard of fields of involvement it was diminishing through the three decades 
that best shown in the dynamics analysis in chapter three. 
At the economic level it changed from the generous pledges in 1970s to the 
minimum duty for public relations in 1980s to the response to US pressure and for 
peace process and its outcome only in 1990s. 
At the political level it changed from considering themselves part of the conflict 
on different levels in 1970s, to advocates for peaceful resolution based on full 
withdrawal in 1980s, to pm1icipate in the interim settlements in 1990s totally depending 
on the US. 
At the military level it changed from direct participation and aid in 1970s to 
occasional contributions in 1980s to denouncing the military choice to resolve the 
conflict in 1990s. 
Thus the thesis has provided the analysis, evidences and knowledge that the 
reciprocity between Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab Gulf countries security is potentially 
exists with different degrees and levels throughout the period of the study i.e. 1970-
2000. 
This thesis has contributed to filling a gap concermng the literature on the 
Arabian Gulf. There is a necessity for future researchers to consider the deeper study of 
the dynamics created through each chapter of the thesis. The role of the Arab Gulf 
countries with its variable effectiveness might also be studied independently. The GCC 
as an institution was not the focus of this thesis. Further studies looking at the 
institutional aspects of the GCC would be another good contribution to the literature. 
Other researchers have discussed the international and the Israeli ambitions in the Gulf 
region. But there is a need for future studies to look closer at the implications these 
ambitions have on the interests of the Arab Gulf countries. Such a study could look into 
the hypothesis that the security of the Arab Gulf countries is best served by their active 
engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A related area of study that has emerged 
through this thesis is the impact that the Arab-Israeli conflict and later the peace process, 
have had on the security, stability, social and economic development of the Arab Gulf 
countries. 
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Based on the difficulties encountered in this thesis, I would suggest that each of 
these implications and areas of suggested studies be studied decade by decade, rather 
than attempting to cover the entire historical period. 
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YEAR 
1973 
1974 
1979 
1981 
TABLES 
Table (1)* 
The Cost of OH Imports to the US 
(The effect of Oill?rices Rise) 
1973-1981 
OIL OIL COST 
CONSUMPTION PRICE PER DAY 
(MBJPD) ($ lPB) ($M) 
6.50 2.59 11835.00 
6.30 10.40 6532.00 
8.50 24.00 204.20 
7.00 34.00 238.00 
ANNUAL 
COST 
($M) 
6144.80 
23914.80 
74460.00 
86870.00 
*Source: Prepared by the researcher depending on Energy Information Administration 
www.eia.doe.gov, figure 5 for the oil consumption per day; and the Oil Prices rise from Mh'd 
Khawajkeh, The Saudi Economic Development Experience in " Independent Development in the 
Arab World', Nader Ferjani et al, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1987, pp. 567-568. 
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Table (2)* 
World oil consumption according to regions, 
during 1990-1996, and projections for (2000-2020) 
(N b B bd) um ers 1y : m )pt 
Region I country 
Real consumption Expected consumption 
1990 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Industrial countries (total) 39 42.7 44.9 47.4 50.1 52.3 54.5 
North America (total) 20.4 22.0 23.6 20.5 27.4 28.8 30.2 
USA 17.0 18.3 19.5 21.2 22.7 23.7 24.7 
Western Europe 12.5 13.7 14.4 14.8 15.3 15.6 16.0 
Industrial Asian countries (total) 6.2 7.1 6.8 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.3 
Japan 5.1 5.9 5.6 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.6 
Eastern Europe & former Soviet 10 5.7 6 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.9 Union 
Developing countries (total) 17 23.1 26.2 31.4 37 42.9 48.7 
Developing Asia (total) 7.6 11.9 13.6 15.5 18.5 21.8 24.3 
China 2.3 3.5 4.6 5.6 6.4 8.1 8.8 
India 1.2 1.7 1.9 2.6 3.1 3.5 4.11 
Middle East 3.9 4.8 5.2 6.5 7.5 8.5 9.8 
Africa 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.5 4.1 4.7 
South & Central America 3.4 4 4.8 6.3 7.4 8.5 10 
The world I total 66 71.5 77.1 84.8 93.5 101. 110.1 8 
*Source: US Department of Energy, Intemational Energy Outlook, 1999, Table A4. 
Table (3)* 
World Oil Imports from the Gulf Region in (1997& 2020) 
(b b I) ~m 7pt 
Importing region Real imports Estimated 
/country 1997 imports 2020 
North America** 2 4.1 
Western Europe 3.5 3.7 
Japan, New Zealand, Australia 4.8 5.5 
China 0.5 5.3 
Developing East and South West 4.2 9 Asia 
All other countries 1.3 8.8 
Total 16.3 36.4 
Annual 
change 
in rates 
1996-
2020 
1.0 
1.3 
1.2 
0.7 
0.7 
0.5 
0.8 
3.2 
3 
3.8 
3.8 
3 
2.8 
3 
1.8 
*Source: US Department of Energy, International Energy Outlook, 1999, Table A 13. 
**North America includes: the US, Canada & Me.:'Cico 
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Table (4)* 
Trade balance between the US and the Arab Gulf countries (1994-2000) 
(by m. dollars) 
Year US exports US imports 
1994 9,630 II ,133 
1995 10,1 91 II ,419 
1996 12,467 12,498 
1997 13,559 4,871 
1998 15,326 9,985 
1999 12,747 11,811 
2000 10,833 19,450 
Total 84,726 81,167 
Annual rate 12,103 11,595 
* Source: Prepared by the researcher, derived from IMF, Direction of Trade, 
Statistics Yearbook, IMF, Washington D.C., 2001, P. 477 
Table (5)* 
Trade balance between the Arab Gulf countries and the EC (1973-1990) 
(by b. dollars) 
Year EC exports EC imports 
1973 1.2 5.8 
1982 23 28.6 
1983 21.2 17.2 
1990 18.1 13.2 
*Source: Adaptetl by tile researcher, quoting Hollis, R., Europe and Gulf Security: Economic 
Competition, Security of the Arab Gulf in the 21'1 Century, Emirate centre for Strategic Studies ami 
Researches, Abu Dhabi, 1998 pp I /0-111 
Table (6)* 
Trade balance between the Arab Gulf countries 
And the European Union (1994-2000) 
(Numbers By: m. Dollars) 
Year EU exports EU imports 
1994 20,153 12,035 
1995 22,195 11,151 
1996 22,614 14,482 
1997 22,653 14,976 
1998 24,164 10,716 
1999 26,164 12,046 
2000 29,912 18,451 
Total 167,855 93,857 
Annual rate 23,979 13,408 
*Source: Atlapted by the researcher, derived from 1/lt/F, Direction of Trade, Statistics 
Yearbook, IMF, Washington D.C., 2001, Ps 120,289,364, 404,47 
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Table (7)* 
Israeli Exports to Iran (1972-1978) 
(In m. dollars) 
1974 1977 
63 195 
1978 
225 
*Source: Adapted by the researcher, from: Ha/lwmi, Benjamin Beit The Israeli Octopus, Translation 
by Barlwum, M ami Abu Lay/a, Y, Dar ai-Karmel, Samid, Amman 1989 P. 21 
Table (8)* 
Palestinians in Arab Gulf Countries (1980-1990) 
1980 1981 1982 1984 1985 1990 
Kuwait 264,500 229,710 308,177 341,521 350,000 400,000 
S. Arabia 47,400 136,779 147,549 171 ,146 250,000 262,821 
UAE 34,000 36,504 59,037 42,720 ---- 47,374 
Qatar 22,000 24,233 59,037 33,975 ---- 30,995 
Bahrain 1,800 2,000 59,037 1,600 ---- 2,174 
Oman 5,100 5,800 5,000 5,700 ---- 6,636 
Total 450,000 505 ,026 519,763 596,662 ---- 750,000 
Source: Abu Al-Qaraya, B S. , The Expelled Palestinians in the Arabian Gulf, a paper submitted to the 
"Future of Dispelled Palestinians Conference", 11-13 September 2000, Midtlle East Studies Centre, 
Amman 
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Table ( 9 )* 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1984 1985 1990 
Kuwait 6348317.4 5513315.652 7396617.812 8196913.825 8400420 9600480 
KSA 2841156 8198533.26 8844087.006 10258491.24 14985000 15753490.74 
UAE 1468800 1576972.8 2550398.4 1845504 2046556.8 
Qatar 990000 1090485 265665 1528815 1394775 
Bahrain 81000 90000 265665 72000 97830 
Oman 260100 295800 255000 290700 338436 
Totals 11989373 16765106.71 19577 433.22 22192424.07 23385420 29231568.54 
.. 
*Annual deductton from the Pa/estuuans salartes 111 the GCC countrtes; selected years. Based on the 
2.5% -5% deductions it was prepared by the author. The author assumed the mean salary for the governmental 
employees only out of the total Palestinian community. The statistics of the community was based on that shown in 
table (8) in the appendix. The increase of the deduction was due to the increase of Palestinian Labor as well as 
their income. 
Table (10)* 
Arms Purchases by Arab Gulf countries 
(1989-2003) 
(Million dollars) 
Period/ 1989-1993 1993-2003 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 8039 8762.5 
Third world importer 
Kuwait 2308 12000 
twenty first importer 
Emirates 2491 -----
seventeenth importer 
.. 
*Source: Jawdat Bah jet am/ Hassan Jctwher, "The peace and Stabtltty Factors m the Gulf m the nmeties: 
Internal Indications and external Pressures", Al-Mustaqba/AI-Arabi, (1996), p. 41 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
US Petroleum Imports, 1960-2000 
Source: Energy Information administration, 
www.eia.doe.gov, figure 5 r: c 9 -
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Figure (2) 
Chart 2 
ReaJ and Nominal Price of Oil, 1970-951 
(In U.S. dollars per barrel) 
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MAPS 
Map (1) 
"Great Israel", Map found in the safebox of 
Rotcheld - Frankfort, German 
Ascandaron 
Syria 
Medeterranian Sea 
Egypt 
Ibrahim Abdul Karim, "Arabian Gulf in the Zionist Calculations", 
AI-Ta'awon, Vol. 1, No.2, (Apri11986), P. 43 
* Source: Ibid. 
Map (2) 
The Land of Israel as in 
The Torah of Israel 
(To your descendants 
I gave this land from 
the river of Egypt to 
the great river, 
the river Euphrates.) 
Gen.15:19 
'· .... 
' ! 
Iran 
Suggested Borders of Great Israel 
Current Political Borders 
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Map (3) 
Sharm AI·Sheikh Sanafer Island 
C\J 
Teran Island 
Red Sea 
The Saudi Islands in the Gulf of Aqaba occupied by 
Israel in 1967 
* AI-Ta'awon Journal, Vol. 2, No.6, (April1987), P. 88. 
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